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Summary 
This thesis uses a contextual case study approach covering the period 1985 to 2011 to examine 
the construction of Trinidad and Tobago’s ICT4D policy as discourse. The guiding theory of 
method is contextualism as described in Pettigrew (1990), according to whom a contextual 
analysis can be characterised as: processual, by emphasising the evolution of actions embedded 
in specific contexts (structural and otherwise) over time; multi-stakeholder, by recognising the 
competing viewpoints of reality perceived by actors at different levels; longitudinal, by 
considering both historical and contemporary views of actions and events. Consistent with this 
approach a framework has been adopted here that views policy as an iterative process involving 
the generation of texts from events, the translation of texts into narratives, and competition 
between alternative narratives resulting in institutions, which, in turn, enable and constrain 
events. This framework facilitates understanding interactions between actors at multiple levels 
across time.  
There are three original contributions to knowledge made in this thesis. Firstly, I have proposed 
an analytical framework that integrates three separate bodies of literature. The discursive model 
of institutionalization of Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004) and the ‘policy as discourse’ 
approach of Shaw & Greenhalgh (2008) and Shaw (2010) are integrated by way of a bridge, the 
‘trading zones’ concept of Galison (1997) as extended by Collins, Evans, & Gorman (2007). 
Thereby, I developed a series of analytical constructs that can be used for contextual policy 
research, especially in developing countries where dominant policy narratives constrain and 
moderate discursive exchange when those policy narratives - which were originally articulated 
in advanced economies - are subsequently transferred into developing countries. 
Secondly, I have empirically applied the framework to the study of ICT4D policy construction in 
Trinidad and Tobago, generating new insights in the process. In so doing I critically examined the 
process of constructing policy as discourse with the aim of identifying ways in which policy could 
be done differently. A key finding is that the process of discursively transferring previously 
existing policy narratives into new contexts can result in one of three outcomes: no change - if 
the introduction of policy narratives had no impact whatsoever on institutions (either by 
creating new ones, or disrupting existing ones); the construction of policy pidgins (semi-specific 
yet incomplete proto-languages that mediate discursive transfer) - when discursive transfer, 
imitation and assemblage of narratives partially occurs; or the construction of policy creoles 
(full-fledged languages that facilitate not only discursive transfer, but social action) - if the 
discursive transfer is complemented by translation, editing and social embedding.  
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Thirdly, I developed a model of policy creolization through which the two main factors that 
influence the emergence of policy pidgins and, eventually, policy creoles (both viewed as 
particular forms of institutions) in a setting of discursive construction were identified, namely: 
 The length of the temporal window over which policy actors have an opportunity to 
develop interactional expertise to transfer, imitate and assemble narratives, and 
eventually to translate, edit and embed those narratives into social actions; 
 The degree of intentionality of the discursive action, and subsequently the social action, 
that policy actors engage in, noting that there are three categories of social action:  
o Intentional action – which deliberately conveys particular ideas through texts.  
o Consequential action – which is generated as a by-product of ongoing dialogue 
among actors during which they may draw on broader narratives. 
o Emergent action – which arises through discursive contestation and struggle in 
ways that were not necessarily intended or predicted. 
 This highlights that both intentionality and time are required to bridge the knowledge gaps 
present between the different contexts, and even so, that the policy construction process in the 
new context requires practitioners to develop non-trivial levels of interactional expertise. 
This thesis has implications for policy practice on two fronts. Firstly, the framework can be 
employed to assist policymakers in creating policy creoles through coordination and interaction 
between external mainstream narratives and alternative narratives, including those that are 
locally derived. In doing so, policymakers and policy analysts can unpack the conceptual 
constructions of their subject domain, learn how to engage with new domains (and thereby gain 
interactional expertise) and uncover the latent power dynamics that are reinforced by lack of 
critical analysis. Secondly, application of the framework provides a means of assessing 
institutional dynamics. This is important because of the powerful normative, cognitive and 
regulative functions institutions play on the development of new institutions, and ultimately on 
social action. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Much has been written during the past thirty years by technologists, futurists, 
development specialists and other self-styled evangelists who have proclaimed the arrival of a 
new and heretofore unseen ‘information age’ in which ‘revolutionary’ and ‘disruptive’ electronic 
digital technologies would allow suitably capable entrepreneurial spirits to usher in a new social 
order and means of economic production, variously labelled the “information society”, 
“network society” and the “knowledge society”1 (see, for example: Bell, 1976; Castells, 1996; 
Friedman, 2006; Webster, 2002; Kleine and Unwin, 2009). 
This techno-optimistic outlook has been embraced by governments, particularly those in 
developing countries, not least because of the implication that failure to ‘harness the power’ of 
the new technologies would result in falling even further behind in international rankings of 
traditional development metrics, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. Between 
2005 and 2008 I worked for the government of Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) devising policy 
instruments to facilitate the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for 
achieving national development objectives. During that time my interest in the varying 
conceptualisations held within the policy community was piqued by questions about the exact 
nature and capabilities of ‘ICT’, the type and extent of ‘development’ that a country could or 
should pursue, and the prospects for technology to affect the rate and direction of development. 
A key example of these varying conceptualisations is expressed in the term “ICT for 
Development” or “ICT4D”. For the purpose of this thesis these disparate conceptualisations are 
characterised as being embedded within competing narratives via discourse. The primary 
research question being addressed here is: “How has ICT4D policy been constructed discursively 
in Trinidad and Tobago?”  
The idea of policy being a construct which emerges from a collection of ideas is the subject of a 
considerable literature (e.g. Bacchi, 2000; Hajer, 2003; Fischer, 2003) and this will be examined 
further in Chapter 2.  However, the basic notion is that ideas and conceptualisations about the 
relationship between ICT and development are created as text – through spoken and written 
communication – in one context and are then distributed, reconstructed, and integrated into 
the social practice of people in operating environments that are vastly different from the 
originating context. Further, it is arguable that the prevalent conditions in the recipient contexts 
                                                          
1 Though often used synonymously, the preference for the latter term is generally accredited to those 
who espouse a broader, less techno-centric definition of ‘information’ (Unwin 2009: 22) 
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are not always well suited for developing and implementing the ideas. Avgerou (2010) has 
argued that there is a dominant discourse in recent ICT4D literature, specifically that “ICT and 
Development [represents] socioeconomic improvements through the transfer and diffusion of 
ICT and required institutions” (p. 9). This discourse is largely structured around three prevailing 
narratives (narratives being taken as a unit of analysis for discourse) that are being played out 
in world politics: modernization, democratization and globalization. Furthermore, this discourse 
proceeds from a technologically determinist perspective of the world which asserts that 
increased investments into ICT infrastructure, and its associated organizational and 
management systems, produce economic growth via a rise in productivity in the public and 
private sectors that ultimately results in benefits to the wider populace. This narrative persists 
and thrives in public policy circles despite limited and contested evidence to support it (Avgerou, 
2008). 
Alternative narratives that are in competition with this main theme tend to be less techno-
centric and put greater emphasis on bottom-up or participatory multi-stakeholder engagement 
in the determination of public affairs, the enhancement of human capabilities, and the creation 
of opportunities for people (most often, those who are poor and/or in marginalised 
communities) to be closely involved in influencing the trajectory of their ‘development’. Such 
narratives suffer from their own limitations, such as the lack of specification of means by which 
dominated people groups can engage in collective discussion and limited agreement on a given 
developmental path, or of a means from transitioning from the current path to an alternative. 
The solutions proposed in these narratives tend to be too simplistic (e.g. ‘give everyone a laptop 
and internet connection’) and do not adequately address the intensification of the structural 
inequalities in ICT usage and access (van Dijk and Hacker, 2003: 324). As a result, such alternative 
narratives struggle to gain recognition and power (Fischer, 2003), and are therefore 
marginalised during mainstream political discussion in modern democracies.  
This thesis uses a contextual case study approach covering the period 1985 to 2011 to examine 
the construction of Trinidad and Tobago’s policy on ICT4D as discourse. The guiding theory of 
method is contextualism as described in Pettigrew (1990), according to whom a contextual 
analysis can be characterised as: processual, by emphasising the evolution of actions embedded 
in specific contexts (structural and otherwise) over time; multi-stakeholder, by recognising the 
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competing viewpoints of reality perceived by actors at different levels; longitudinal2, by 
considering both historical and contemporary views of actions and events. 
Based on this focus I have adapted a theoretical framework that views policy as an iterative 
process involving the generation of texts from events, the translation of texts into narratives, 
and competition between alternative narratives resulting in institutions, which, in turn, enable 
and constrain events. This framework facilitates understanding interactions between actors at 
multiple levels across time. The levels of analysis being considered in this framework are: intra-
governmental interactions; intra-national interactions; extra-national state-focused 
interactions; and extra-national firm-focused interactions. 
Data, in the form of documents and interviews, were collected on site in Trinidad and Tobago in 
2011 prior to analysis. The analysis consisted of, firstly, critical discourse analysis or CDA 
(following Fairclough, 1995 & 2003) of a corpus of policy documents, reports, newspaper 
articles, official pronouncements, and other textual material. The second major stage of analysis 
was a qualitative and interpretive study built upon in-depth interviews with over twenty-five 
individuals engaged in the situated policy narratives examined in this thesis.  These participants 
were considered by their peers to have knowledge of, or some level of influence on the 
construction of the local policy discourse.  
There are three original contributions to knowledge made in this thesis. Firstly, I have proposed 
an analytical framework that integrates three separate bodies of literature. The discursive model 
of institutionalization of Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004) and the ‘policy as discourse’ 
approach of Shaw & Greenhalgh (2008) and Shaw (2010) are integrated by way of a bridge, the 
‘trading zones’ concept of Galison (1997) as extended by Collins, Evans, & Gorman (2007). 
Thereby, I developed a series of analytical constructs that can be used for contextual policy 
research, especially in developing countries where dominant policy narratives constrain and 
moderate discursive exchange when those policy narratives - which were originally articulated 
in advanced economies - are subsequently transferred into developing countries. 
                                                          
2 Longitudinal is being used here following the definition proposed by Kimberly (1976: 329): 
“Longitudinal  organizational  research  consists  of those  techniques, methodologies and 
activities which permit the observation, description and/or classification of organizational 
phenomena in such a way that processes can be identified and empirically documented”. This 
definition has been the basis of much processual organizational research, such as Pettigrew 
(1990). While longitudinal research was originally, and continues to be in some quarters, 
primarily econometric in nature, it more recently encompasses a range of approaches for 
examining organizational change processes, such as narrative methods (see Boje, 2001). 
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Secondly, I have empirically applied the framework to the study of ICT4D policy construction in 
Trinidad and Tobago, generating new insights in the process. In so doing I critically examined the 
process of constructing policy as discourse with the aim of identifying ways in which policy could 
be done differently. The analysis suggests that the process of discursively transferring previously 
existing policy narratives into new contexts can result in one of three outcomes: no change - if 
the introduction of policy narratives had no impact whatsoever on institutions; the construction 
of policy pidgins when discursive transfer, imitation and assemblage of narratives partially 
occurs; or the construction of policy creoles if the discursive transfer is complemented by 
translation, editing and social embedding. These terms are unpacked and discussed in Chapter 
7. 
Thirdly, I developed a model of policy creolization through which the two main factors that 
influence the emergence of policy pidgins and, eventually, policy creoles (both viewed as 
particular forms of institutions) in a setting of discursive construction were identified, namely: 
 The length of the temporal window over which policy actors have an opportunity to 
develop interactional expertise to transfer, imitate and assemble narratives, and 
eventually to translate, edit and embed those narratives into social actions; 
 The degree of intentionality of the discursive action, and subsequently the social action, 
that policy actors engage in, noting that there are three categories of social action:  
o Intentional action – which deliberately conveys particular ideas through texts.  
o Consequential action – which is generated as a by-product of ongoing dialogue 
among actors during which they may draw on broader narratives. 
o Emergent action – which arises through discursive contestation and struggle in 
ways that were not necessarily intended or predicted. 
This highlights that both intentionality and time are required to bridge the knowledge gaps 
present between the different contexts, and even so, that the policy construction process in the 
new context requires practitioners to develop non-trivial levels of interactional expertise. 
This thesis is intended to be relevant to policymakers who attempt to grapple with the 
complications that arise in policy implementation caused by conflicting narratives that are not 
critically disaggregated and conceptualized during policy analysis and design. Such conflicting 
narratives are often exemplifications of contrasting worldviews on development, and the role 
of technology in the pursuit of it. Failure to disaggregate and conceptualize the narratives in a 
form that is appropriate for the context, possibly through the creation of policy creoles, leads to 
inappropriate policy constructions that are ultimately ineffective. 
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The rest of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature on 
the three main theoretical constructs underpinning this work - policy, discourse and ICT4D, and 
concludes with a bridge that connects the three – the concept of trading zones. In Chapter 3 the 
research questions are presented and the literature is synthesized into a theoretical framework 
that integrates the three constructs, and that will then be used as a lens for the later analysis. 
The methodology and research methods are presented in Chapter 4. Since understanding the 
context of the policy environment is a critical step towards interpreting the mechanisms of 
policy construction through discourse, in Chapter 5 I discuss the specific historical, cultural and 
political situated factors that characterise Trinidad and Tobago and impact on its policy making 
processes. In Chapter 6 I present a case study in the form of a descriptive and analytical, 
contextual case study of 3 cases of discursive construction of ICT4D policy in Trinidad and Tobago 
as the country attempted to find its place in the global information society.  Chapter 7 
subsequently provides an in-depth interpretive analysis to develop and refine the contributions 
of this thesis and ensure that those findings are generalizable beyond the case study under 
examination here. Finally, in Chapter 8 I frame the theoretical and methodological contributions 
of this research, highlight pointed implications of this research for policy practice, discuss the 
limitations of the present study and suggest directions for future research. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Within this chapter I examine both ‘ICT’ and ‘development’ as complex and contested 
concepts. As a result, it is important to engage in research to understand both the discursive 
processes by which policy about these concepts is constructed, and the constraints and enabling 
factors of those processes. Such research is of vital importance for the wider project of exposing 
and deconstructing untenable policy positions about ICT4D, which ultimately lead to ill-
conceived programmes of activity.  
The primary research question of this dissertation spans three areas of literature, which 
therefore become the major constructs of this work that are brought together through the 
mechanism of discourse. These constructs are policy, ICT, and development – with the last two 
having been integrated into a topic of great academic and political interest - ICT4D - particularly 
within the last thirty years3.  
By focusing on the mechanisms by which policy emerges, is reproduced through discursive 
practice, is made sense of through the collective action of stakeholders, and is finally integrated 
into social practice through taken-for-granted rules, norms and standards (i.e. “institutions”), I 
am giving the analysis a processual orientation, that is, one that emphasises the interaction of 
actions embedded in specific contexts over a period of time (Pettigrew, 1990).  
The next section will present a survey of the policy studies literature that illustrates the major 
frameworks used to explain the policy process, culminating in a review of policy-as-discourse. 
Following this, in Section 2.2 I address the mechanisms through which discourse creates, 
sustains and disrupts institutions. Section 2.3 then offers a discussion of the major debates 
behind the contested concepts of “development” and “ICT”, focusing particularly on 
relationships between the two as encompassed in the term “ICT4D” and related terminology. 
Finally, Section 2.4 offers a prospective mechanism for facilitating coordination and interaction 
between disparate policy knowledge sources, as the foundation for an interpretation of the 
findings in Chapter 7. 
                                                          
3 Of the top 3 ICT4D journals, one was founded in 1986 (Information Technology for Development), one in 
2000 (The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries) and one in 2003 (Information 
Technologies & International Development) 
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2.1. Policy  
This section presents a review of the major theoretical perspectives on the policy process that 
are present in the field of policy studies.  
The term ‘policy’ has been traditionally understood as a linear, deliberate and purposeful  
transformation of public desires into public goods and services (e.g. Easton, 1965). Modern 
policy scholars, however, have interpreted policy as the outcome of deliberation and 
argumentation under circumstances in which the state is no longer the central character (see, 
for example, Hajer, 2003). On one end of the spectrum is American policy scientist Thomas Dye’s 
pithy elaboration “Public policy is whatever governments choose to do or not to do” (Dye, 2008).  
On the other, proponents of public policy generated through argumentation, competition and 
collaboration among a range of actors would suggest: 
“‘[A] “policy” then is a set of shifting, diverse, and contradictory responses to a spectrum 
of political interests.’” – (Edelman, 1988: 16  as quoted in Bacchi, 2000: 48) 
For this thesis I take a broad view of policy that encompasses a complex translation of public 
demands (informed as they are by social, ideological and political values) into tangible social 
action. In this view policy is not the exclusive province of government actors. 
To clarify the use of terminology, for this review I follow Fischer (2003) in adopting the following 
distinctions between the terms ‘policy studies’, ‘policy analysis’ and ‘policy research’. 
"The term ‘policy studies’ … designate[s] the general field of inquiry. The term ‘policy 
analysis’ designates the application of a range of decision-oriented methodologies 
usually assumed under policy studies, cost-benefit analysis being an example. And ‘policy 
research’ is employed … to refer to the primary activity of scholars engaged in policy 
studies." – (Fischer, 2003: 1, footnote 1) 
As such, the policy studies literature is centred on understanding the various approaches to 
policy analysis. Classical policy analysis approaches date back to the post-WWII era, becoming 
defined firstly in the US but with later seminal contributions from European authors (John, 
1998). Lasswell, Lerner & Fisher (1951) is a touchstone entry in the literature. Here, policy 
analysis (referred to as ‘the policy sciences’ by the authors) was conceptualised as a multi-
method, problem-oriented means of transforming information on a given issue into a form that 
facilitated objective decision-making. An increasingly technology-centric way of life, combined 
with a modernist confidence in the ability of expert technocratic élites to discern ‘the best 
answer’ to a range of increasingly complex questions of social choice, contributed to the 
rationalist underpinning of classical policy analysis. Since the end of the Second World War the 
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gulf between the respective abilities of governments and the publics they governed to 
contribute effectively to policy making has widened. As a means of addressing the resultant 
paradoxes that arose from the public’s decreasing voice in policy processes, the application of 
objective, scientifically sound methodologies by technocratic élites acting on behalf of the 
general public was seen to be the most desirable resolution. The main idea of this form of policy 
analysis was to avoid getting lost in a bureaucratic maze of localized power and influence (Hajer, 
2003; Fischer, 2003). According to critics (e.g. Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993) what these early 
approaches lacked in explanatory potential was an appreciation of the fragmented structure of 
modern democratic governments, and the effect of that structure on implementation. 
Experience showed that hierarchical organisation with delineated procedural rules and norms 
encouraged the hoarding of knowledge within silos. This created power struggles between 
different arms and departments of governments, so that a given policy issue would suffer 
serious distortion or even non-implementation as it traversed the political landscape between 
legislation and the provision of public goods and services. This effect gave rise to the public 
administration tradition within policy studies. Stillman (2005) gives good coverage of this 
tradition in the US context, while Rhodes (1997) offers the British perspective. Public 
administration considered the effect on the policy process of the bureaucratic structures and 
institutions4, around which governments in advanced industrial polities were based. 
Each of the classic traditions of policy analysis developed along different trajectories, with policy 
science approaches emphasising the decision making aspect of policy, while the public 
administration side focused more on implementation and evaluation. Both sides developed 
empirical analyses based on US, British or European political systems. It is arguable, therefore, 
that policy research conducted in advanced, liberal, democratic states has overlooked the 
particularities of policy making in small developing countries, especially since developing 
countries are often constrained by global-spanning conditions established by the advanced 
countries. Despite the divergent emphases on decision-making and implementation, Bacchi 
(2000) proposes that for the most part policy studies literature (including the public 
administration tradition) can be placed into one of three categories, based on its conception of 
the nature of policy: comprehensive rationalism, political rationalism and discourse. The 
discourse approach is the most recent turn of the three and the only one that explicitly sets out 
to expose the invisible structure imposed on policy making in developing countries by powerful 
collective actors such as international organisations, development funding agencies, 
                                                          
4 Again, ‘institutions’ here means “rules, norms and standards” 
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multinational corporations and developed-country governments. I will next address these three 
categories in turn. 
2.1.1 Policy as comprehensive rationalism 
Within the comprehensive rationalist perspective, policy is standard and constant, and although 
localised to different issue domains, such as health or education, its underlying principles are 
thought to be generalizable and therefore subject to rational, scientific analysis. Under this view 
the policy process consists of an ordered sequence of events, including, but not limited to: 
problem definition, selection of a solution from a range of options, policy formulation, 
implementation and evaluation. The social problem under analysis is characterised as being 
primarily technical in nature and solving it occurs in a climate of consensual policy actors. The 
theoretical underpinnings of a comprehensive rationalist approach are positivism and economic 
rationalism. Policy studies that maintain this inclination are judged by their predictive abilities. 
Those studies share an empiricist methodology that can generally be referred to as 
‘quantitative’.  
The defining example of a comprehensive rationalist approach would be the stages model 
(Jones, 1977). Politicians in the US during the 1950s/60s envisioned the use of established social 
science tools as the most efficient means of achieving social goals. The clear delineation 
between different categories of activities (‘stages’) of the policy process meant that rationalist 
methods could be used to guide decision-making at each stage. Relatively little emphasis was 
placed on putting those decisions into practice (John, 2003). During policy analysis this 
conception is useful as a first approximation for identifying the major policy-making sites and 
major activities. This is because those stages tend to exist, in one form or another, in most 
contexts owing to the longstanding popularity of this model.  
The comprehensive rationalist approach has been heavily criticised as an actual model for policy 
analysis, however, owing to its implication of a ‘linear model’ of policy, complete with perfect 
search capabilities and purely rational decision making on the part of government actors (see, 
for example, the reference to this approach by Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) as the ‘stages 
heuristic’). As intimated above, another major limitation of a comprehensive rationalist 
approach is the impression it carries of a single-minded monolithic government carrying out 
unified or consensus decisions. Much empirical evidence has shown instead a reality of separate 
autonomous tribes within the public sector jostling for control of resources (e.g. Heclo, 1978). 
Such messiness often precludes the identification of a clear path between the expression of 
social values and preferences in legislation, and what the public actually receives by way of 
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goods and services. Another criticism of these approaches is their lack of appreciation of 
contextual values or knowledge. Policy is portrayed to be largely comparable across situations 
in disparate sites. When transferred to the context of a developing country such an approach is 
seen to be an attempt to further Western hegemony, with a predisposition to ‘getting the job 
done’, even (and often) at the risk of silencing or not recognising indigenous sources of 
knowledge (Keeley and Scoones, 1999). The comprehensive rational view has survived as a 
normative model and ‘dignified myth’ (Hill, 1997) that resonates with policy-makers and, is often 
implicitly embedded within the assumptions of many analysts (Allison, 1969).   
More recently, ‘new public management’ (NPM) (Hood, 1991, 1995) has been established as an 
extension of the comprehensive rationalist approach that seeks to address some of its 
implementation and principal agent issues. Specifically, NPM introduced the idea of ‘service 
level agreements’ and other explicit contracts between representatives of those providing and 
receiving government services respectively. Such agreements could be monitored with respect 
to specific indicators of outcome and performance, thereby ‘grounding’ policies that aim to 
deliver the services.  
NPM represents a reconceptualization of the classic approach to policy that attempts to 
recognise or acknowledge the discontinuities and shortcomings that arise under the 
comprehensive rationalist approach and to address these problems by improving the interface 
between policy formulation and implementation with an explicit understanding that 
improvement is likely to require iteration and feedback (and is thus not strictly a linear process). 
Nonetheless, critics (such as Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler, 2006) suggest that the wave 
of NPM within public sector reform has already passed in “leading-edge” countries that have 
been public administration pioneers. Instead, they claim, a range of ICT-focused digitization 
changes are ushering in “digital-era governance (DEG)” which involves the integration of 
processes that “directly reverse NPM changes and many others which are at a tangent to NPM 
priorities and orientations” (pg. 488). Some of the components of a DEG approach that Dunleavy 
and his co-authors argue are at odds with NPM include: joined-up governance and reengineering 
back office functions (under the rubric of “reintegration”); client-based reorganization and one-
stop provision (under the rubric of “needs-based holism”); and, electronic service delivery and 
moving toward open-book government (under the rubric of “digitization processes”). Examples 
of some of the above have been noted during the conduct of this research and are chronicled in 
the case study in Chapter 6. 
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I will now present the political rationalist perspective, which integrated the effects of group and 
network interactions into the comprehensive rationalist perspective.  
 
2.1.2 Policy as political rationalism 
The term ‘political’ is used here in the sense of “behaviour that is outside one’s formal role, yet 
taken to attempt to influence the distribution of advantages”, thus recognising the pluralist 
nature of modern democratic activity (Barber, 2004). From this perspective policy is seen as 
unstable and emergent. It arises out of a diverse and constrained process characterised by 
problematic implementation in a conflictive climate. Here, the perceptions and interests of 
individual and collective actors take priority in defining and supporting certain policy issues in 
preference to others. The political rationalist view is considered more pragmatic than 
comprehensive rationalist approaches, because it takes into account the messiness of the 
administration of policy. That is to say, political rationalism attempts to grapple with the 
bureaucratic mechanisms that underpin all the activities ranging from the generation of policy 
ideas on the one hand, all the way to the actual implementation of those ideas in practice on 
the other. Proponents of political rationalism are said to be interested in bringing citizens back 
into decision-making. Political rationalism still encompasses a positivist theoretical leaning, but 
also introduces pluralism and some interpretivism. Research in this category may employ both 
‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ methods (see, for example Yates, Gulati and Tawileh, 2010).  
Policy literature in the political rationalist vein was initially advanced in response to the 
comprehensive rationalist model by highlighting the long-term stability of government 
bureaucracies and their resistance to policy innovations. Governments were said to be 
‘muddling through’ (Lindblom, 1959), thus resulting, on average, in decisions that were only 
incrementally different from previous policies and programmes.   
Two other theoretical frameworks have advanced the integration of politics into policy studies: 
Kingdon’s (1984) policy streams and windows framework and the advocacy coalition framework 
of Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993). Kingdon’s framework (updated in Kingdon, 1995) was built 
on the garbage can model of Cohen et al. (1972). He argued that a government (fashioned on 
the US federal government) is an “organized anarchy” in which three nominally separate 
streams of processes (problems, policy proposals - i.e. potential solutions to the problems - and 
politics) are present. Only when a “policy window” of opportunity opens as a result of major 
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shifts in the political landscape does a policy entrepreneur have the opportunity to couple two 
or more of the streams and achieve policy change.  
In their advocacy coalition framework, Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) argued that coalitions 
are formed around core beliefs shared by groups of actors with similar interests within a policy 
subsystem. Through extensive lobbying routines, opposing coalitions then battle for dominance 
with the successful coalition establishing the mainstream policy system. 
Finally, though they offer different perspectives of the effects of group politics on policy 
determination, later notable contributions that can be similarly categorised as politically 
rationalist include the work on elites (Dye and Zeigler, 2003); and, groups and networks (Heclo, 
1978; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Richardson, 2000).  
Political rationalism can be commended for paying adequate attention to the political behaviour 
involved in policy making and therefore putting a pragmatic emphasis - that was argued to be 
lacking in comprehensive rationalism - on connecting problems in the policy life cycle to 
solutions. However, a deficiency of political rationalism identified by social constructionists is 
that the political rationalist view portrays the policy analyst as a neutral, impartial observer who 
is capable of standing outside the socially constructed space of policy-making (Bacchi, 2000). 
From a social constructionist perspective, this position is untenable, since any entity to be 
investigated (e.g. a policy process or institution) is given meaning through a process of sense-
making that takes place individually within the minds of analysts, and communally via social 
interaction. This sense-making involves constructing, distributing, interpreting and 
reconstructing discursive events5 (Fairclough, 1992) that give meaning to the social world. 
Therefore, each analyst (and any other social actor), as a member of some group within a social 
environment cannot stand apart from the construction of those entities being investigated in 
order to assess in an independent manner the effect of the values and preferences of others.  
The next sub-section takes a look at a discursive approach to policy analysis which is purported 
to allow for the processual analysis of policy process mechanisms.  
 
2.1.3 Policy as discourse 
Policy-as-discourse is a third perspective within the literature that portrays policy as a dialogical 
process in which social problems and solutions do not simply exist in the abstract but are socially 
                                                          
5 See section 4.1.3 for an explanation of discursive events 
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constructed through argumentation and discourse (DeLeon, 1998; Fischer, 2003; Hajer, 2003; 
Majone, 1989). Since discourse forms the basis of this perspective an examination of the use of 
language becomes crucial for explaining interactions between the actors involved in creating 
policy. Discourse is realised at three levels: i) it is expressed through direct interaction between 
the actors involved; ii) it is captured in policy documents, manifestos, news articles, and other 
textual artefacts; and iii) it resides in the social rules and institutions of those who participate in 
it. Discursive approaches have a theoretical basis in post-positivism, and their objective is 
explanation of social processes as opposed to prediction.  
While political rationalist policy analysis approaches have been well established in the literature, 
discursive policy analysis has not been similarly well-received in the mainstream. This is partly 
attributable to the preference among policymakers (a large and vocal audience for policy 
analysis) for generalised, linear accounts of the relationship between specific actions and results. 
Like political rationalism, discursive approaches are concerned with opening up the participation 
in public decision-making to a wider audience. However, unlike political rationalism, a discursive 
approach seeks to lay bare the assumptions on which even problem conceptualisations are 
based, thereby addressing different types of research questions than can be examined from a 
rational perspective. 
There is recent growing evidence in theoretical and empirical literature of the use of discursive 
approaches to policy analysis wherein the role of language (as  a means of conveying ideas and 
social values through discourse) is examined in the construction of policy issues and in the 
process by which policy is produced (see, for example Carter, 2007 and Skelcher, Mathur, & 
Smith, 2005). Building on Bacchi (2000), Shaw (2010) is representative of this trend and proposes 
the application of policy-as-discourse to analyse the development of primary care research 
policy in the UK health sector on the basis of the ability of a discursive approach to “reach the 
parts [of policy explanations] that other theories and methods can’t reach” (pg. 196). The “other 
theories and methods” to which Shaw (2010) refers are what Fischer (2003) terms the 
“empiricist/neopositivist approach” to policy analysis, which I have discussed above as 
comprehensive rationalism. Comprehensive rationalism and political rationalism approaches 
are two sides of the empiricist/neopositivist coin.  
Methodologically speaking, given the main objectives of this research, as outlined in Chapter 1, 
and the foregoing categorisation of policy studies approaches, it follows that my research 
approach must identify explicitly the assumptions on which it rests and not take any part of the 
policy process being examined as “given”. The prominent policy models in existence were 
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developed with certain inherent assumptions and ideologies. Consequently, it would appear 
that in the context of this study, a methodology that rests too heavily on either comprehensive 
or political rationalism is not best suited to explaining the underlying mechanisms through which 
systems of meaning are constructed, and subsequently reinforced through repeated action and 
institutionalization. The subsequent discussion probes this issue further. 
 
2.1.4 Discussion: discursive policymaking for the modern, interconnected world  
Since the mid-twentieth century, policy-making in increasingly technology-centric societies has 
required policy-makers to rely more heavily on expert advice in the decision-making process. 
Discourse adherents argue that this dynamic has exacerbated the inequality of societal power 
relations (see, for example, Fairclough, 1995 and Fischer, 2003). As a result, they argue, 
discourse alters the dynamic of public engagement on societal issues by: i) allowing some things 
to be said and not others; ii) favouring some people to speak over others; and iii) attributing 
legitimacy to certain modes of communication more than others. As a consequence of the 
distributed, multi-stakeholder environment of modern public policymaking, it is more difficult 
for the general public to discern the actors who wield the power to influence discourse and the 
means by which they wield such power. Following Fairclough (1995) I interpret power in terms 
of the asymmetrical capacities of actors to control discourse in given sociocultural contexts. This 
power is defined as the ability of actors to “sustain particular discursive practices with particular 
ideological investments in dominance of other alternative (including oppositional) practices” (p. 
1), and may be enacted by a range of methods including persuasion, deceit and manipulation 
(Van Dijk, 2001: 302) 
In his exposition of the environmental policy discourse Hajer (1995) offers a discourse coalition 
framework in response to the popular advocacy coalition framework (ACF) of Sabatier (1988) 
(as extended in Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Although both approaches purport to explain 
policy change generally, Hajer’s approach is one that frames policy coalitions as discursive 
phenomena. In proposing his framework, Hajer offers a critique of the ACF that Fischer (2003: 
100–109) has distilled in terms of three problems. 
Firstly, advocacy coalitions are said to be structured in terms of relatively unified groups with a 
commonly shared set of beliefs. However, because the ACF is essentially positivist in nature and 
seeks to offer universally applicable empirical generalizations, it cannot cope with variations of 
beliefs within a given coalition, preferring instead to excise such differences and offload the 
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source of variation into ‘black boxes’ that are put outside the realm of the analysis. Instead of 
specific policy belief systems which constrain or enable the actions of their adherents, (Hajer, 
1995: 102) argues that “narrative storylines” “that symbolically condense the facts and values 
basic to a belief system” hold coalitions together. This is because most coalition members, with 
the exception of technocratic experts, do not possess sufficient factual/scientific knowledge of 
any issue with which to evaluate their belief system or any other. Interacting with these 
storylines therefore involves constant interpretation of events and actions within specific real 
social contexts. Hajer asserts that adherence to a given policy belief system is arrived at and 
sustained mainly via processes of socialization (specifically discursive reproduction or 
‘repetition’) and emotional responses to critical life events, rather than through the generation 
of knowledge about the belief systems via individual first-hand empirical examination of the 
underlying facts. This process persists for long periods of time in the face of arrival of new “facts” 
that may threaten to invalidate the storylines, since those facts are always interpreted by 
coalition actors who can choose to deny or ignore the facts if they do not fit their interpretive 
schema.  
Secondly, advocacy coalitions within the ACF are composed of individuals who collaborate via 
“a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity” (Sabatier, 1988: 139) to pursue their political goals 
in specific ways. This characterisation necessitates physical proximity between all actors and 
intentionality born from a shared purpose to account for policy change. However, by 
characterising policy coalitions instead as discursive phenomena Hajer explains that such 
coalitions can be reproduced and transformed over time and dispersed over large geographic 
distance without members ever sharing physical contact or coordinating their political activities. 
This accounts for the way in which actors in countries that are far apart are able to convey and 
reproduce a discursive understanding of technical issues, such as ICT4D.  
Finally, the ACF conceptualizes policy problems and solutions as relatively well-defined and 
static, and so focuses instead on identifying and explaining the operation of the coalitions as 
they evaluate policy solutions and pursue specific goals. By taking a discursive-analytic view, 
however, Hajer argues that coalitions struggle interactively to define and redefine problems and 
solutions, as well as their orientations to each, via discourse. In this view ‘problems’ do not exist 
in the abstract awaiting solutions – they are both created by the actors (including researchers) 
who are trying to apprehend them (c.f. Bacchi, 2000). Problematization thus becomes the focus 
of this type of policy analysis rather than problems and their solutions. The major problem he 
identifies with the ACF view is that actors are portrayed as having clearly defined value 
preferences that remain static over time. In practice such stability is not observed, as actors 
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(especially politicians) sometimes take very different positions on issues under different 
circumstances (Morgenthau et al., 2005). Hajer argues that such contradictions arise due to the 
political nature of policy, wherein actors offer particular narratives that compel others to 
respond in ways that they might not normally have responded in a different time and place. In 
Hajer’s view, these contradictions, which are omitted from examination with the ACF, are 
important indicators of the start of policy change. 
In later work Hajer (2003) avers that for headline issues such as environmental regulation (and 
ostensibly ICT4D) in the contemporary world, major institutional changes have occurred such 
that policy making now takes place in an ‘institutional void’. He makes a distinction between the 
policy environment within ‘classical modernism’ and the present age. In the former, public 
decisions were made within the bounds of specific polities, driven by formal actors according to 
well-defined institutional arrangements. In the present age the complexity of social problems 
means that political action now takes place in an 'institutional void' where "there are no 
generally accepted rules and norms according to which policy making and politics is to be 
conducted" (Hajer, 2003: 175). This void gives rise to 'new political spaces' wherein “consumer 
organizations...NGOs...and non-political actors” play a more pronounced role in creating the 
policy discourse6. The polity is no longer the central site of activity. This is an apt description in 
the context of applying ICT to the pursuit of development goals, which is a globally dispersed set 
of activities.  
From the discussion above, it should be clear that owing to their top-down hierarchical 
orientation, positivist approaches are decried by post-positivists due to the former’s tendencies 
away from ‘pure’ democracy since the layman’s perspective is diminished in favour of that of 
the expert. While political rationalist approaches sought to remedy this by including the impact 
of politics in their explanation of public decision-making and implementation, they have been 
criticised for their failure to recognise policy as a socially constructed entity, and therefore 
recognise the role of analysts in policy construction (Bacchi, 2000). In the search for a policy 
analytical approach that can deal with dispersed discussion and decision-making spaces, and 
which addresses the impact of non-publicly appointed actors, the final alternative is a 
discursive/interpretive approach. However, it is necessary to first apprehend the shortcomings 
of such an approach. 
                                                          
6 See Hardy and Maguire (2010) for a case study of institutional and organisational change via discursive 
“field-configuring events” in the context of reframing the insecticide DDT from “evil threat” to “necessary 
evil”. Herein multiple political spaces were identified. 
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Discursive approaches have been criticised by traditional policy scholars on the grounds that the 
analysis produced from applying them is relative, and contingent on the particularities of the 
case being studied (Sabatier, 1991). Consequently, discursive analyses are argued to lack 
generalizability.  
At a theoretical level, Bacchi (2000) has commented that due to the unsystematic use of the 
term ‘discourse’ by analysts, with some focusing on the use of discourse, while others elaborate 
its effects, the power of discourse as an explanatory mechanism has been diminished. There are 
three main theoretical problems she identifies within the literature on policy-as-discourse that 
concern the concepts of power, ideology and subjectivity. 
Firstly, Bacchi decries an over-emphasis in the literature on asymmetry in power relationships, 
characterised by a focus on ‘the effects of discourse’ on those without power by those ‘holding’ 
power. This, she suggests, then skews analysis to consider a bleak dichotomy between the actors 
that ‘hold’ power (often, the technical experts in either public or private sectors) as the 
shapers/creators of discourse and the power-less who become mere conscripts within the 
discourse, bound to follow the institutional routines set for them.  
To avoid this problem, some policy-as-discourse analysts have proposed discourses as 
“conceptual schema attached to specific historical, institutional and cultural contexts, making it 
clear that no agent is completely free to construct or reconstruct them” (Bosso, 1994: 52). While 
this diminishes the emphasis on asymmetry of agents that give rise to the initial problem, Bacchi 
suggests that it creates a second problem: indistinct use of ‘ideology’ as a focal device to link 
‘interests’ and ‘forms of consciousness’. Since no specific actor or actor group can be identified 
as having predominant influence over discourse, the ‘enemy role’ falls to the purveyors of 
ideologies, which encompass particular interests. Actors are therefore portrayed passively as 
subjects who become proponents of particular ideologies through processes of socialization. 
According to Bacchi this problem is exacerbated by the use of multiple conceptualisations of 
‘ideology’ in the policy literature.  
The third problem can be considered the ‘subjectification’ of the peripheral actors in policy 
problem scenarios as victims (“needy” or “disadvantaged”, for example), which thereby 
reinforces their disempowered status. By so doing, Bacchi argues, policy researchers leave the 
power to define “need” or “disadvantage” in the hands of those designing policy, which 
undermines the revolutionary orientation and potential of policy-as-discourse to change the 
status quo.  
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To overcome all three of these problems Bacchi recommends more theorizing of the “space for 
challenge” provided by a focus on discourse. Discourse, in her view, is powerful but its power 
cannot be fully realised without correcting the theoretical imbalances described above. To 
address this shortcoming, the next section will investigate the role of discourse in the 
institutionalization (standardization of rules, norms and standards) in a policy field. 
Section 2.1 has presented a review of policy analysis literature, using Bacchi’s (2000) three-part 
categorisation, comprehensive rationalism, political rationalism and policy-as-discourse, based 
around the orientation of each of the categories to different ontologies of policy. I have shown 
that a policy-as-discourse approach offers the most promise for conceptualising policy 
construction processes in modern societies, owing to its ability to take account of the existence 
of dispersed public decision-making spaces and the increasing roles of non-formal, non-elected 
actors in translating and interpreting the systems of meaning on which narratives in those spaces 
are based. Common problems concerning the theorisation of policy-as-discourse have also been 
examined, and the responses to those problems that have been designed into the theoretical 
framework of this dissertation are presented in Chapter 3. We now move on to review the 
relationship between discourse and institutions. 
 
2.2. Discourse and Institutions 
The study of discourse is generally concerned with “how the socially produced ideas and objects 
that comprise organizations, institutions, and the social world in general are created and 
maintained through the relationships among discourse, text, and action” (Phillips et al., 2004: 
636). Discourse can be considered an interactive process of representing and conveying ideas 
about actions, objects and practices. As such, discourse analysis starts from the position that all 
such ideas are “socially meaningful and that these meanings are shaped by the social and 
political struggles in specific historical periods” (Fischer, 2003: 73). As a result, the objective of 
discourse analysis is to demonstrate the process of social construction of the ideas, and to 
explain the implications of those ideas for social organisation and interaction. Because this 
perspective incorporates the notion of agency (in this case, that under certain circumstances 
policy actors purposefully convey ideas to other actors, often across geographical regions, over 
extended periods of time, and for different reasons) a focus on discourse in the analysis of policy 
making complements and extends other approaches that primarily emphasise structural 
constraints such as historical path-dependence, cultural appropriateness or material interest-
based choice, as I will discuss later in this section. 
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Although discourse is concerned with the transmission of ideas, the concept of 'idea', however, 
is diffuse and difficult to define. In fact, within the policy, politics and international relations 
literature there have been myriad approaches to explaining ideas. According to Schmidt (2008: 
306) ideas have been variously portrayed as: 
 switches for interests, road maps, or focal points (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993); 
 strategic constructions (Jabko, 2006); 
 strategic weapons in the battle for control (Blyth, 2002); 
 narratives that shape understandings of events (Roe, 1994); 
 frames of reference (Jobert, 1989; Surel, 2000); 
 collective memories (Rothstein, 2005); 
 national traditions (Katzenstein, 1996). 
As it relates to the policy and political action literature, Schmidt (2008) argues that ideas are 
characterised at three “levels of generality”, namely: policies, programs, and philosophies.  
Policies are the direct currency of policy makers and politicians. They represent ideas as 
“solutions” to social “problems” that are constructed at the more abstract social level of 
programs. Programs are the basic assumptions underpinning policies.  
Programs define: (1) the issues to be characterised as problems (as opposed to those which are 
framed as ‘accidental’ elements of the environment, and hence are not amenable to human 
intervention - see Stone, 1989); (2) the range of possible solutions that will be considered (and 
thus, excludes those options that are not given consideration); (3) the goals of the action to be 
undertaken; and, (4) the criteria for determining success. Programs act as links between the 
specificity of policies and the generality of public philosophies.  
Philosophies, also known as “public sentiments” (Campbell, 2004) or the “deep core” (Sabatier 
& Jenkins-Smith, 1993), are even more abstract and basic than programs, and at such a level of 
generality are difficult to detect, much less define, but can be considered the worldviews held 
by large collectives of people (insofar as such worldviews can be homogeneous across the 
multiple people groups that make up a society). Philosophies organize the fundamental values 
and principles of society. A citizenry's philosophies are not often subject to public discussion or 
modification, except during periods of major crises which prompt cognitive re-evaluation. 
To be clear, there has also been disagreement over the precise definition of the term 
“discourse”.  However, broadly speaking the term can be used to refer to both: 
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 (1) “[T]he ideas represented in the discourse (which may come in a variety of forms as 
well as content)”; and 
 (2) “[T]he interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed (which may be carried by 
different agents in different spheres)” (Schmidt, 2008: 309) emphasis added 
For clarity of the subsequent discussion and theoretical framework, I will use the term 
“narratives” to refer to meaning (1) and “discourse” to refer to meaning (2) only.  
For the purposes of this research ‘discourse’ is a more useful analytical lens than ‘ideas’ because 
the term ‘ideas’ connotes elements that only exist inside people's heads that are not subject to 
direct examination by external agents. Admittedly, as an analytical lens, discourse is itself a 
construction of the social scientists that examine it, and is therefore still somewhat abstract. 
However, discourse can be represented tangibly in the form of texts (see discussion below) 
which can be examined.   
Schmidt suggests that the term “discourse” carries a negative connotation to modern social 
scientists because of its early invocation as a reductionist mechanism by literary critics and 
postmodern philosophers who were criticised (not always accurately) for viewing all of social 
life as the result of the interplay of words. However, viewing discourse as an interactive semantic 
process for representing, conveying and interpreting ideas gives opportunity for productive 
investigation of the effect of language (as the vehicle of ideas) on action via the creation of 
institutions. As a result, this section will focus on those approaches that are concerned with the 
effect of discourse on action, i.e. the space where the linguistic focus of discourse theory 
intersects with the focus on power dynamics that is characteristic of critical theory. 
 
2.2.1 The institutional effects of discourse 
As introduced above, discourse arises through the production, dissemination and consumption 
of “texts”. Texts are instantiations of language in a particular meaning context and can take 
many forms in organizational settings. That is to say, texts are not simply random collocations 
of words but adhere to some defined internal structure, can be related in some way to other 
existing texts and are interpreted in reference to a system of meaning shared between text 
producers and their audience. With respect to the discourse analysis literature, there are various 
understandings of “text”, some of which are very loosely bounded. For example, “[t]ext ... [refers 
to] any kind of symbolic expression requiring a physical medium and permitting of permanent 
storage” (Taylor and Van Every, 1993: 109). Also, “[t]exts ... may take a variety of forms, 
21 
 
 
 
including written documents, verbal reports, artwork, spoken words, pictures, symbols, 
buildings, and other artifacts” (Phillips et al., 2004: 636). 
Texts are used by political actors in the framing of “causal stories” (Stone, 1989: 282).  Causal 
stories are composed by political actors so as to recast “difficulties” or “issues” in the public 
sphere into “problems” by attributing “cause, blame, and responsibility” to other actors, and 
thereby legitimizing government intervention in some form as remedial action. Three core 
elements are found within a causal story (Hardy and Maguire, 2010: 1372): 
1. coherent identities - by attributing human behaviour as the source of some undesirable 
condition rather than accident, fate or nature, political actors seek to establish a 
“burden of reform” 
2. a desired end point or ultimate goal - these are set in reference to existing problems 
that are defined via “active manipulation of images of conditions by competing political 
actors” (Stone, 1989: 282) 
3. enabling forces that contribute to movement toward that end point - here, any objects 
that can be brought in to assist in movement toward the desired goals (such as new 
computer technology) are appropriated via texts in ways that associate them favourably 
with the stories’ protagonists.  
This discussion draws attention to the issue of power within a discursive policy making modality. 
Power is exercised in the production and dissemination of texts, which therefore exerts an effect 
on the consumption of texts, and moderates the flow of ideas and the expression of 
perspectives. Discourse is thus important not just because of its effect on the dynamics of texts, 
but because it can affect action - in terms of the success or failure of policies, and by extension, 
the initiation (or not) of specific activities arising from those policies – ultimately to the benefit 
of certain interested parties. 
Discourse affects action through the production of institutions (in the broad sense of rules, 
norms and standards for behaviour) that govern how the ideas embedded in narratives are 
adopted and adapted into actual practice.  
Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004: 644–645) propose that three main factors affect the 
likelihood of discourse (as exemplified in narratives) successfully producing institutions, which 
include: 
 The internal structure of the narrative: “[Narratives] that are more coherent and 
structured present a more unified view of some aspect of social reality, which becomes 
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reified and taken for granted. The more reified and taken for granted the social 
construction, the more difficult or costly it is to enact behaviors not consistent with it, 
either because it is difficult to conceive of and enact alternatives or because 
proscribed/prescribed behavior can be defined and connected more clearly to clear, 
strong sanctions/rewards.” (ibid, pp. 644-645) 
 The level of support from other, highly legitimate narratives: “A [narrative] that is 
consistent with and supported by other, broader [narratives] will produce more powerful 
institutions because their self-regulating mechanisms will reinforce each other. 
Conversely, the existence of competing [narratives] will reduce the likelihood a 
[narrative] will produce institutions.” (ibid) 
 The level of competition from other contradictory narratives: “[T]he existence of 
competing [narratives] will tend to undermine the power of institutions stemming from 
the focal [narrative], because they provide actors with alternative institutions and 
consequently lower the costs associated with nonadoption of any particular institution.” 
(ibid) 
In short, as long as a narrative is structured so that it aligns to notions that are taken as “given” 
by the organizational actors who encounter or manipulate that narrative, and as long as it builds 
upon other well established narratives, and as long as it doesn’t suffer from competition from 
other plausible explanations (that are also well-established), it is more likely to be accepted and 
lead to the creation of an institution. 
In the view of these authors, institutions are “shared definitions of reality” which arise as people 
interact. Following Berger and Luckmann (1966), Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004) suggest 
that these shared definitions of reality develop through linguistic processes. This means that 
they view institutions as "constructed primarily through the production of texts, rather than 
directly through actions" (pg. 638). Additionally, they suggest that "[i]nstitutionalization does 
not occur through the simple imitation of an action by immediate observers but, rather, through 
the creation of supporting texts that range from conversational descriptions among coworkers 
and colleagues to more elaborate and widely distributed texts such as manuals, books, and 
magazine articles" (pg. 640). The value of this approach is that it considers the resilience of texts 
to be able to survive in a range of different local settings, without the necessity of close 
interaction between the inhabitants of those settings. In so doing, they distance their work from 
traditional studies of institutionalization in which institutions are defined in terms of patterns of 
action.  
This positioning then establishes discourse analysis as their choice of methodological approach 
to investigate institutionalization. By taking this approach, relationships are drawn out among 
texts, narratives, institutions and actions, with the sine qua non of the resulting model being the 
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conditions under which institutionalization is most probable (as highlighted on the previous 
page). 
Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004) follow Palmer, Jennings and Zhou (1993) in ascribing the 
role of texts in institutionalization to three types of "isomorphic pressures", namely: 
a) normative pressures - 'particular text[s] ... influence the institutionalization of [specific 
norms]' 
b) mimetic pressures - '[specific organizational actors] learn about their organizations as 
well as other organizations through particular texts - org charts, reports, conversations, 
stories, etc.' 
c) coercive pressures - '[dominant organizations] use texts (such as org charts, reports, 
accounts and stories) to exert pressure on partners to adopt [specific norms] because 
doing so reduced cognitive and economic costs' 
Their model of institutionalization claims to offer three improvements over other approaches 
(pp. 635-636): 
1. Identification of “the microprocesses whereby individual actors affect the discursive 
realm through the production of texts, as well as the processes through which discourses 
provide the socially constituted, self-regulating mechanisms that enact institutions and 
shape individual behavior.” 
2. “[H]ighlight[ing] an alternative understanding of social construction to that of Berger 
and Luckmann (1966) that is better able to explain the production of the types of 
institutions that feature in most institutional research.” 
3. A method for connecting “the sophisticated techniques developed in discourse analysis 
for analyzing the social dynamics of language and meaning” with “empirical studies of 
how institutionalization processes actually occur.” Thus, they claim to show how 
“discourse analysis connects with institutional theory” and how “institutional theory can 
benefit from a linguistic perspective”. 
Assessing these claims requires an understanding of the terminology the authors use. In the 
model a “discourse” is taken, after Parker (1992), to mean a "structured collection of meaningful 
texts" (pg. 636), which is analogous to “narrative” as I have defined it in the introduction to 
Section 2.2. 
A narrative, therefore, imbues structure and meaning on a collection of texts. In so doing, 
Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy suggest, discourse (the process) is used to legitimise particular 
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forms of conduct, expression and understanding of a given issue (by framing these social norms 
in particular narratives), while illegitimating alternative forms that do not conform to the 
dominant structure. Further, while they may have very real effects, narratives themselves are 
intangible and can "only be explored by examining the texts that constitute them" (p. 636). Such 
examination is referred to as discourse analysis: "the systematic study of texts - including their 
production, dissemination, and consumption - in order to explore the relationship between 
discourse and social reality" (p. 636). Analysis of this type involves in-depth examination of the 
full range of processes concerning texts, including their linkages to other texts, and the meaning 
that is derived through interpretation from such linkages by way of "socially produced ideas and 
objects that comprise organizations, institutions, and the social world in general" (p. 636). In 
their conceptualisation, the relationship among narrative, text and action is "mutually 
constitutive", that is: "the meanings of [narratives] are shared and social, emanating out of 
actors' actions in producing texts; at the same time, discourse gives meaning to these actions, 
thereby constituting the social world" (p. 636).  
Previous studies that utilised discourse analysis to understand the social production of ideas and 
objects in organizational settings include: Alvesson & Karreman (2000); Grant et al (1998); Hardy 
& Phillips (1999); Morgan & Sturdy (2000); Mumby & Clair (1997); Phillips & Hardy (1997); 
Putnam & Fairhurst (2001). 
However, as (Schmidt, 2008: 312) argues, narratives need not be true, coherent or consistent to 
be successful. They may actually consist of lies or “spin” in attempts to obfuscate the actions or 
motivations of political actors. Generally speaking, according to social theorists such as 
Bourdieu, Foucault and Gramsci when language is used in this way it becomes a mechanism for 
exercising power and domination by societal elites.  
In relation to this issue, Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘habitus’ and ‘doxa’ are important. Habitus 
described a cultural framework within which and by which habitual thought and social action 
occur. Dominant social groups were thought by Bourdieu to use their power to ensure that their 
habitus remained dominant over others by legitimising actions and outcomes which they 
considered valuable, while constructing the characteristics of the habitus of subordinate groups 
as non-desirable. Bourdieu’s notion of doxa, or interaction between habitus and a particular 
field of endeavour, produced a set of accepted assumptions in that field. These assumptions 
would come to be seen as “the norm” and therefore would be largely uncontested, making 
contrary social actions or beliefs become unthinkable or inappropriate to be expressed.  
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Foucault introduced the concepts of ‘technologies of power’ and ‘technologies of self’ as 
mechanisms of enforcement of social practices, as well as the social roles of individuals that 
participated in those practices. These mechanisms would create “institutions” that authorised 
particular practices and influenced how individuals perceived their roles. Similar to Bourdieu’s 
“doxa”, Foucault ascribed to discourses the ability to set the boundaries of what could and could 
not be queried, what was and was not acceptable in terms of beliefs and actions about a given 
subject, and the appropriate ways of expressing those beliefs. From Foucault’s perspective, 
institutions are defined and understood through discourses at the level of both individuals and 
macro-groups. 
Gramsci’s contribution to this topic is through his well-known conception of “hegemony”, which 
came in two forms. His first framing of hegemony referred to the mechanisms of power that 
controlled capitalist and fascist societies through ideological and consensual means, as opposed 
to the coercive approach of the state via the army, the police and the judiciary. The second 
conception of hegemony, framed as a more socially equitable alternative to the previous form 
of political and economic domination, offers opportunity to subordinate groups to resist through 
organisation of new models of education, politics and economics.  
At this point it is important to audit the organizational studies literature on institutions to ensure 
conceptual clarity going forward, since, like ideas, many different perspectives on institutions 
have been advanced in the past. 
According to Barley and Tolbert (1997: 96), institutions are “shared rules and typifications that 
identify categories of social actors and their appropriate activities or relationships”. They 
represent “constraints on the options that individuals and collectives are likely to exercise… that 
are open to modification over time”. In this way institutions can be said to “set bounds on 
rationality by restricting the opportunities and alternatives [that individuals and collectives] 
perceive and thereby, increase the probability of certain types of behaviour” (Barley and Tolbert, 
1997: 94). Or, in other words institutions are “conventions that are self-policing” (Douglas, 
1986).  
Institutions are not perfectly resistant to change, however, and can be altered or even removed 
through choice and action (Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 94). Specifically, Barley and Tolbert (1997) 
suggest that two conditions have a major effect on how easily an institution may be challenged: 
the length of its history and the degree of its acceptance by the members of the collective (pg. 
96). 
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Traditionally, institutional scholars have classified institutions into one of three categories based 
on their provenance: historical path-dependence resulting in “lock-in effects”; rational choice 
based on material interests; or, norms of cultural appropriateness arising from social interaction. 
More recently, a “fourth new institutionalism” (Schmidt, 2008) known as discursive 
institutionalism has been identified that extends and expands on the other three, as we shall 
see below. 
From a historical institutionalist perspective, institutions are perceived as “historical accretions 
of past practices and understandings that set conditions on action” through the way in which 
they “gradually acquire the moral and ontological status of taken-for-granted facts, which, in 
turn, shape future interactions and negotiations” (Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 99). 
A rational choice institutionalist perspective could sum up an institution as a rule that “involves 
mechanisms that associate nonconformity with increased costs in several different ways: 
'economically (it increases risk), cognitively (it requires more thought), and socially (it reduces 
legitimacy and the access to resources that accompany legitimacy)'” (Phillips et al., 2000: 28). 
Sociological institutionalists see institutions as norms that “influence behavior, because 
departures from them ‘are counteracted in a regulated fashion, by repetitively activated, socially 
constructed, controls’” (Jepperson, 1991: 145). And, in common with discursive institutionalists, 
according to Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004: 638) the sociological view recognises that 
institutions are “social constructions, produced through meaningful interaction”, however, they 
“are not just social constructions but social constructions constituted through discourse” (Kress, 
1995; Parker, 1992). 
A discursive institutionalist would portray an institution as a product of discourse. For example, 
Fairclough defines an institution as, “an apparatus of verbal interaction or an 'order of 
discourse'.... Each institution has its own set of speech events, its own differentiated settings and 
scenes, its cast of participants, and its own norms for their combination.... It is, I suggest, 
necessary to see the institution as simultaneously facilitating and constraining the social action 
of its members: it provides them with a frame for action, without which they could not act, but 
it thereby constrains them to act within that frame” (Fairclough, 1995: 38). However, as Phillips, 
Lawrence and Hardy (2004: 638) point out “while all institutions are discursive products, not all 
products of discourse are institutions” because only institutions have “self-regulating, socially 
constructed mechanisms that enforce their application”. From this perspective an institution can 
only exist “when sanctions are sufficiently robust”. 
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Consequently, depending on the organizational situation, a historical, rational choice, or 
sociological explanation may be best suited to elucidating the institutional dynamics.  
To conclude this part of the discussion we can say that while institutionalization is the process 
of production and reproduction of institutions, from a discursive perspective, institutionalization 
“occurs as actors interact and come to accept shared definitions of reality, and it is through 
linguistic processes that definitions of reality are constituted (Berger and Luckmann, 1966)” 
(Phillips et al., 2004: 635).  
 
2.2.2 The relevance of institutions for policy as discourse 
Institutions exercise cognitive and normative functions, that is to say, they define “acceptable” 
and “unacceptable” behaviour in a given social context, while attributing rewards and sanctions 
accordingly. Institutions thus moderate human activity. 
Institutions matter for policy because they affect discursive action as well as social action. 
Discursive institutions are linked to social institutions, but the two sets are distinct. Institutions 
governing discursive activity allow certain expression (who may speak, where, when, what type 
of expression) while constraining others, hence manipulating the flow of ideas. Institutions 
governing social activity control the allocation of resources. Thus, understanding the change (or 
continuity) in particular social institutions is an important issue for understanding how discourse 
contributes to policy (including why some policies are successful while others are not). Because 
of the effect of institutions, some actions are more likely to produce texts than others, and in 
turn those are more likely to influence discourse. Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004: 640–644) 
suggest that two types of actions are more likely to produce texts than others: those that “leave 
traces” and those that “are likely to act as organising mechanisms across individual situations”.  
If we now turn our attention to a developing country policy context so as to exemplify this 
analytical discussion, it can be said that in developing countries the plurality of narratives (as 
vehicles for ideas that originate from disparate sources of knowledge) is not opened up for 
consideration because of the high costs associated with doing so. These costs are economic, 
cognitive and social (Phillips et al., 2000: 28).  
Other factors also influence how texts affect policy discourse in a developing country, such as: 
(1) The characteristics of the text producer (Phillips et al., 2004) - Higher visibility, access 
to the media and social prominence within an organisational hierarchy all contribute 
28 
 
 
 
favourably to the success of a causal narrative. Thus an “internationally renowned 
consultant” recommended by a multilateral funding organisation is given primacy over 
local technocrats because of the greater 'discursive legitimacy' afforded to such a 
consultant.  
(2) Consonance between the narrative and “widespread and deeply held cultural values” 
(Stone, 1989: 24) - The more a story and its associated texts cohere with the social and 
cultural institutions and aspirations of a people, the better its chances of being 
accepted. For example, the use of telecentres as a preferred mechanism for providing 
public access to ICTs has gained significantly more traction in the developing world than 
in the developed world. This is because collectivism (the main rationale for a telecentre) 
rather than individualism is a much stronger motivator for action in the developing 
rather than the developed world.  
(3) Relationship between the story and the “national mood” - Timing is also important. 
Stories that connect in the right way with appropriate audiences at the right time are 
more likely to succeed (Schmidt, 2008). Thus a narrative that catches the wind of current 
national sentiment will fare better than one that does not. Chigona & Mooketsi (2011) 
explore the impact of the media on facilitating the diffusion of such narratives in a 
developing country context. 
(4) The form (genre) of text - overseas expert-led training seminars, meetings of 
international multilateral bodies, and development funding organisations are all sources 
of texts that “enact a relevant and recognizable genre [and] are more likely to provide 
other actors with a tool they can use for interpretation, motivating them to use these 
texts and incorporate them into their own actions and texts” (Phillips et al., 2004: 643) 
(5) The relationship of the text to other texts (Fairclough's “interdiscursivity”) - new texts 
that draw on the widely accepted genres discussed above are better placed to be 
accepted and adapted by actors into their practice than texts that do not. Conversely, 
rigid adherence to such widely accepted texts can have perverse effects on the resulting 
programmes of activity, as put forward by Clemens, Kenny & Moss (2007).  
(6) Degree of prescription of radical redistribution of power or wealth (Stone, 1989: 294) 
- Except in times of crisis, narratives that invoke images of gradual and non-conflictual 
change tend to be more successful. Maier (1975) gives a good example of this in the 
context of Germany, France and Italy after WWI.  
This section has examined literature concerned with the relationship between discourse and 
social action as constituted by the production and consumption of texts, and as constrained and 
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enabled by institutions. In so doing I have discussed the varying meanings accorded to the terms 
“narratives”, “discourse”, “texts” and “institutions” so as to set the stage for the theoretical 
framework that is advanced in Chapter 3. We now move on to the review of the ICT4D literature. 
 
2.3. ICT4D: ICT for Development 
This section provides a survey of literature that has taken a critical view of the ICT4D discourse. 
As the confluence of two largely separate domains, ICT and development, I think it important to 
first locate ‘ICT4D’ within the much broader body of literature that addresses the various 
perspectives and practices referred to as ‘development’. Pieterse (2010: 3) has characterised 
development as “the organized intervention in collective affairs according to a standard of 
improvement”, with the caveat that the standards defining ‘improvement’ and ‘intervention’ are 
subject to contextual particularities such as culture and power relations. I have taken this 
approach because of my interest in uncovering and deconstructing the assumptions behind 
conventional understandings of development, and particularly how development relates to 
technology. As such, my review of the technology side of the literature will be constrained to 
that which relates to development. 
For this review I have categorised development literature into two main camps. The first I 
characterise as the dominant discourse of development literature which I have found to be 
largely techno-deterministic. Herein, authors have portrayed development in narratives 
synonymous with “economic growth” and “progress”, as driven by technological innovation. In 
a subsequent section that perspective is contrasted with alternative narratives that are more 
human-centric and have been argued by their adherents to go beyond an economic focus to 
incorporate social and ecological goals as well. Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 explore the character of 
‘development’ by chronicling the major narratives that have described and comprised the 
phenomenon over time, with an emphasis on recent decades. Section 2.3.3 then integrates ICT 
by examining the purported outcomes of ICT4D initiatives: information or knowledge societies. 
Depending on how development goals are defined, such societies occur at the convergence of 
technological advancement and societal advancement. Finally, Section 2.3.4 offers a discussion 
of the perils of manipulating multiple sources of knowledge when advancing an ICT4D agenda. 
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2.3.1 Dominant development narratives: from “development-as-economic growth” 
to globalisation 
The fact that change has been a constant feature of human society from earliest recollections is 
well agreed upon. Key literature that bookended the turn of the twentieth century included 
Friedrich List’s (1841) ‘Das Nationale System Der Politischen Ökonomie’ (The National System of 
Political Economy) and Joseph Schumpeter’s (1911) ‘The Theory of Economic Development’, 
however the modern discussion of economic development as a discernible process with specific 
goals took root during the 1950s.  Specifically, works such as Lewis (1954), Myrdal (1957), 
Hirschman (1958) and Rostow (1960) laid the groundwork for collective emphasis on societal 
advancement at national levels via programmes of industrialization and later, modernization. In 
particular, Walt Rostow’s (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth was a seminal text that played 
no small part in propelling the Anglo-American focus in the 1960s on an economic growth 
agenda enabled by liberal democracy and free enterprise, despite the author’s later assertion 
(Rostow, 1971) that his motive had been generally non-economic. Rostow’s model was 
decidedly linear and proposed a direct connection between improvement in technological stock 
and transport infrastructure on the one hand, and rapid change that he referred to as economic 
take-off. The direct result of this phase of rapid growth would have been the production of more 
effective technology, which in turn was expected to encourage investment into manufacturing 
industries. Improvements in manufacturing would then yield even better technology and spur 
economic diversification. The final expected stage of this chain was a state of mass consumption, 
fuelled by the availability of better consumer goods and services.   
During the 1920s and 1930s there was a parallel linear model of development being proposed 
in the Soviet Union which emphasised the need for industrialisation and the centrality of heavy 
industry as a means for development of self-reliance. Several of the larger developing countries 
including India and China were influenced by this line of thought and made substantial sacrifices 
to pursue this goal during the 1950s and 1960s. Stewart (1978: 141–154) has argued that 
although the theoretical rationale for investment into capital goods industries followed by such 
developing countries was misguided since the underlying assumptions did not hold for those 
countries, such a capital goods sector was required for technological development. Without it, 
she averred, developing countries would be constrained to conform to a rate and pattern of 
development that was defined by the technological change of the advanced countries. 
Radical academic response to such linear perspectives on development began in the 1970s and 
came in the form of a neo-Marxist critique that focused on the perceived exploitation of the 
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poor in the global South by capitalist enterprise. This turn came to represent what was known 
as the dependency argument7. Some important early examples of work in this area are Best 
(1968), Best & Levitt (1968), Frank (1967, 1969), Girvan (1970; 1973) and dos Santos (1970). In 
the cases of Frank and dos Santos, their critiques were ostensibly founded on their political 
leanings since their analyses drew attention to what they identified as structural inequalities in 
the prominent capitalist development models of the time as well as the ill-effects of military 
interventionism into the 'Third World' by the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. At 
later stages of the debate other diverse facets of poverty were identified that had been under-
specified previously, such as gender discrimination (e.g. Momsen & Townsend, 1987). While 
some have argued (e.g. Unwin, 2007) that the critiques did not seek directly to improve 
development practice, some change was achieved; most notably in the increased emphasis in 
the literature on bottom-up (e.g. Stöhr & Taylor, 1981) and agropolitan development (e.g. Lea 
& Chaudhuri, 1983) which, in turn, influenced the activity of NGOs and civil society.  
The rise of neoliberalism in response to the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s signified 
a revision in development approach among developed countries and return to former 
neoclassical economics-based policies. Neoliberalism may best be associated with a confidence 
that the processes of approach to and onset of ‘economic take off’ described above would 
generate markedly higher levels of social welfare giving rise to what has pejoratively been 
referred to as ‘trickle down’ logic or more positively as a ‘rising tide lifting all boats.’ Its primary 
emphasis was on the creation and extension of conditions for global free trade. Free trade was 
the “engine” that was meant to raise the tide. Herein the definition of development as 
“economic growth” was retained with a switch from the state to the market as the primary 
implementation mechanism.  
Under the Reagan and Thatcher administrations in the US and UK respectively, the Bretton 
Woods organisations, IMF and World Bank, embarked on what has been called an ‘exportation’ 
of free-market policies from Western Europe and North America to poorer countries that came 
to be known as the Washington Consensus. The policy prescriptions encompassed therein 
comprised structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) based around market deregulation, 
reductions in state intervention, and divestment of inefficient public-sector enterprises. The 
driving force was a concern that the social and economic structures of many developing 
                                                          
7 West Indian scholars such as Lloyd Best and Norman Girvan, as well as non-West Indians such as Kari 
Polanyi Levitt critically theorised the dependency argument as a determinant of underdevelopment in the 
Caribbean region, making seminal contributions to the Plantation School of Caribbean economists in the 
process.  
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countries represented a serious impediment to the possibilities for development. In effect, these 
countries were or were becoming welfare dependent and free trade without structural reform 
would not be enough.  Hence, this perspective led to the idea that a number of structural reform 
measures should be imposed on countries – ranging from some that were less controversial such 
as limiting corruption to others that were much more controversial such as limiting the public 
sector’s role as an actor in the economic system (precluding ‘developmental state’ types of 
policies such as those advocated by Evans, 1995). 
Following the fall of Soviet Union in 1991 there was an increased emphasis on liberal democracy 
as a necessary pre-condition for growth, particularly among the transition economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe, but later as part of the prevalent generic approach to supporting 
development in poorer countries. The linear argument underlying this model can be understood 
as: good governance (as provided by liberal democracy rather than centralised administration) 
enables free markets which generate economic growth and results in poverty elimination. By 
defining 'development' thus in purely economic terms the problem was portrayed as one to be 
addressed via a narrow set of prescriptions. Some have argued that the linear model that 
underpinned Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) also lies at the root of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in 2000 (Unwin, 2009). Though, a counter-balancing 
argument is that the MDGs have stepped up emphasis on public-private partnerships, including 
those that can leverage ICT for poverty reduction. 
Closely intertwined with the ‘development’ discourse of the 1990s has been the ‘globalisation’ 
discourse, which has been extensively addressed in the literature and has now transitioned into 
general popular language. Definition of the term ‘globalisation’ is not a straightforward 
endeavour. While commonly understood as a catch-all for the increased interconnectedness of 
human activity across the world through trade and cultural exchange, in everyday speech people 
often view globalisation as a process that acts autonomously. As a precursor to examining ICT4D 
as a major mechanism for such interconnectedness Unwin (2009: 15) characterises globalisation 
in this way: 
 Economically: “a rapid increase in international trade, the integration of global financial 
systems, changing systems of industrial production involving increased amounts of 
outsourcing, growing economic interdependence between states, increased power of 
global or multinational corporations, increasingly global patterns of consumption, and 
an increasing complexity of global economic institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).” 
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 Socially: “increased migration and travel, new means of social communication such as 
instant messaging and mobile telephony, and increasingly complex patterns of human 
relationships across the world.” 
 
 Culturally: “increased intermixing and hybridisation, the creation of global fashions and 
crazes, the rise of global media organisations, increasing acceptance of a global set of 
human values as reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and above all 
a tendency for the artefacts of a few dominant cultures to be spread much more widely 
across the world.” 
 
 Politically: “the expansion of global justice movements and the creation of the 
International Criminal Court in 2002, the growth of international political alliances, the 
increasing significance of so-called 'international terrorism', the rise of global 
environmental movements, the dominant military role of the USA as a global political 
force, and indeed the existence of a worldwide anti-globalisation movement.” 
Some would argue that globalisation is not a recent phenomenon. World-system proponents 
such as Wallerstein (2000) have insisted that we must examine processes both short term 
(within the last 50 years) and long term (within the last 500 years) to truly understand the impact 
of globalisation as a policy development mechanism. These debates are explored in the 
literature on policy convergence – for example Drezner (2001) and Holzinger & Knill (2005).  
Whether or not the change processes in question were initiated well in advance of the current 
‘information revolution’, it is generally well accepted that ICTs have been used to a very large 
degree to increase the speed and scale of those changes within the past three decades. This 
point is explored further in Section 2.3.3.  
 
2.3.2 Alternative development narratives: from capacitation to post-development 
Modernization theory underpins much of the classical development thinking described in the 
previous section, and there is a well-recognised relationship between modernization theory and 
the knowledge revolutions of the 18th century Enlightenment (Bronner, 2004; Pieterse, 2010: 
22). Specifically, according to (Pieterse, 2010) it was during this period that rationality was 
asserted as the foundation of knowledge and ethics, building on the works of the Marquis de 
Condorcet (1743-1794). Consequently, empirical experimentation came to be perceived as the 
foundation of scientific enquiry. Unwin (2009: 7–8) points out three main problems with this 
view of the Enlightenment’s role in shaping development theory. Firstly, he argues that this 
perspective understates the influential intellectual traditions that preceded the Enlightenment, 
such as the works of John Locke, Rene Descartes, Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes in the 17th 
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century. Secondly, it downplays the moral & ethical dimensions of religion, such as the emphasis 
in both Islam and Christianity of charity to and worthiness of the poor. And finally, it is too 
Eurocentric, and doesn't reflect well the realities of development in Eastern cultures such as 
Korea and India (see also Mehmet, 1999). Economic historian and dependency theory 
proponent Andre Gunder Frank took the view that "[t]his entire approach to economic 
development and cultural change attributes a history to the developed countries but denies all 
history to the underdeveloped ones" (Frank, 1969: 40 quoted in Pieterse, 2010: 22).  
An alternative focus in development thinking arose in the 1970s/80s in the form of human 
development. The general thrust of this approach was the revision of contemporary 
development approaches to incorporate bottom-up, participatory approaches that recognise 
social and ecological, as well as economic goals. Some important works in this area include 
Chambers (1983), and Sen (1970, 1980, 1999). Amartya Sen in particular advanced the 
perspective of development as “capacitation”, which is focused on enabling of human capacities 
and entitlements. Sen’s influence led to the creation of the United Nation’s Human 
Development Index, and saw the portrayal within UNDP Human Development Reports of 
development as the “enlargement of people's choices” (Pieterse, 2010: 7). 
Whereas the 1980s saw the expansion of development literature, the 1990s brought to the fore 
the perspective of post-development. The post-development movement did not present an 
alternative to mainstream development concepts per se, but focused on discrediting the goals 
(economic growth) and means (the state) of conventional (pre-neoliberal) development 
agendas. The main claim made by the post-development adherents was that a majority of 
people suffer as a result of development programmes, and as a result the entire ‘development 
project’ should be scrapped. Key figures that espoused this view include Escobar (1995), and 
Rahnema & Bawtree (1997). 
 
2.3.3 Narratives of ICT for Development 
The rapid innovation and diffusion of ICTs within the past three decades have accelerated the 
processes by which private and public organisations have ramped up the scale and speed of 
transnational commerce and cultural exchange via processes of globalisation. Accompanying 
these changes has been an increase in the literature examining the nature and determinants of 
what has been portrayed as a new social order and means of economic production, variously 
labelled the “information society”, “network society” and the “knowledge society” that are 
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driven by the advance of “information technologies”, “telecommunications” and “information 
and communication technologies” (see, for example: Avgerou, 1998; Bell, 1976; Castells, 1996; 
Mann, 2003; Nair & Prasad, 2002; Webster, 2002; Friedman, 2006). This section will explore 
these concepts as they have been invoked in the context of development. 
Near the end of the 1990s various UN agencies turned their attention to the potential 
importance of ICT to development and the risk of being left behind faced by those without access 
to ICT. As a result, several working groups were created around the issue. One example was the 
Working Group on IT in Developing Countries established by the UN Commission on Science and 
Technology for Development (UNCSTD). An early output of that Working Group - Mansell and 
Wehn’s (1998) “Knowledge Societies: Information Technology for Sustainable Development” - 
analysed some negative effects of ICT diffusion at the time. They characterised ICT as having had 
negligible impact on the lives of the majority of people in the least developed countries, with 
the resultant exclusion from the “global information society” causing negative effects, 
particularly associated with the social and economic ‘dislocations’ related to technological 
change. Mansell and Wehn’s recommendations to governments at the time to develop national 
ICT strategies encouraged the creation of plans for establishing regulatory frameworks for ICT, 
transforming the public sector with e-government, building telecentres (public internet access 
points) and engaging in ICT education and skills training programmes (Kleine and Unwin, 2009: 
1048). 
The national ICT strategies that were created in attempts to accelerate economic development 
through use of ICT were of two types (Kleine and Unwin, 2009: 1048): 
a) ‘ICT-enabled’ strategies that “us[ed] ICT across sectors to increase efficiency overall 
(e.g. Chile, South Africa and Malaysia)”. 
 
b) ‘ICT-based strategies’ that focused on “economic development spearheaded by a 
competitive ICT sector (such as in India, Costa Rica and Brazil)” 
In parallel to these developments the global ICT industry took off, consisting of companies that 
integrated ICT into their business processes and created new business models (the dot-coms). 
Despite the bursting of the speculative investment bubble surrounding that industry in 2000, a 
few key ones survived and joined the incumbent trans-national corporations in reshaping the 
ICT industry and the global economy more generally. At this point politicians and academics both 
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contributed to expanding the techno-centric development discourse to include ICT-specific 
references such as “digital revolution” and “information superhighway”8.  
ICT4D is but one of a series of terminologies used in reference to the exchange of ‘information’ 
for the development of regions, countries, industries, communities and people. Of the many 
different turns in the literature it would appear that, while often used synonymously, the term 
‘knowledge’ is invoked to encompass a wider conception of social, economic and political issues 
than the term ‘information’ which is argued to be comparatively more focused on technologies 
that manipulate discrete units of processed data as inputs for decision making or as commodities 
(Unwin, 2009). So, for example K4D (knowledge for development) and KM4D (knowledge 
management for development) have been advanced by organisations such as the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and other UN agencies while ICTD (information and 
communication technology and development) and ICT4D (information and communication 
technology for development) have been preferred by the Washington organisations (IMF and 
World Bank) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In each of these domains the choice of 
terminology emphasises different intellectual, economic, political, social and ideological 
interests.  
Despite the complications created by this variety in terminology a constant feature of the ICT4D 
literature is that ICT is regularly portrayed unproblematically in beneficent terms, even if its 
effects (such as its developmental effects) are portrayed negatively and criticised. This is even 
evident in Avgerou’s (2010) wide-ranging multidisciplinary review of ICT4D9 literature wherein 
she argues that all ICT4D studies adhere to a specific assumption of the nature and process of IT 
innovation in developing countries, as well as its purported contribution to ‘development’. She 
identified two perspectives on the nature of ICT innovation: 
1) Innovation as the result of transfer and diffusion of material and cognitive entities 
that comprise IT, as well as the associated organisational practices surrounding their 
application, from the social environment in which they were produced into another; 
2) Innovation as the socially embedded construction of new techno-organizational 
arrangements in the context of a developing country. 
                                                          
8 While this term was popularised by US Senator and former Vice President Al Gore, it has even earlier 
origins, such as Brotherton’s (1964) Masers and Lasers; How They Work, What They Do and in a slightly 
different form (electronic superhighways) by Korean-American artist Nam June Paik from 1974. 
9 That author actually uses the ‘ICTD’ construction 
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While this characterisation considers the issue of the origins and centres of innovative activity 
in the ICT field – thereby addressing the eventuality of ICTs being created within and for 
developing countries – it appears to accept without question the construction of ICT innovations 
themselves as beneficial interventions. This is notable because the author then goes on to 
characterise the concept of ‘development’ in ICT4D research, as either “progressive 
transformation” or “disruptive transformation”. In her view, the progressive transformation 
approach in ICT4D research “reflects a widespread understanding of ICT as an instrument for 
economic and social gains that has been promoted since the mid-1990s by major international 
development agencies” (pg. 6). This perspective associates investment in ICT - and its 
subsequent effective use - with a country's economic development, which is purported to 
accompany efficiency, transparency and responsiveness in government, as well as private sector 
gains. While adherents of this perspective acknowledge that organizational restructuring is 
required to deliver such productivity gains, according to Avgerou, research in this perspective is 
underpinned by the fundamental assumption that “ICT-enabled improvements can be achieved 
without challenging the political economy of a country's social welfare provision” (pg. 7).  
Research that characterises development as disruptive transformation, on the other hand, 
“considers development, including ICT-enabled development, as a contested endeavour, or as 
involving action with unequal effects on different categories of population, and thus, as laden 
with conflict” (pg. 7). For authors that take this perspective (e.g. Thompson, 2004a, 2004b), the 
intentions and effectiveness of the main institutional actors of ICT4D - national and international 
development agencies - are the subject of critical assessment. The policies produced by such 
actors are seen as enabling and enforcing a social order that disadvantages some people to the 
benefit of others. As such, rather than adopt a neutral position vis-à-vis development, 
researchers who adhere to this type of approach adopt the cause of the marginalised 
constituents under discussion and seek to reveal the hidden motives of those who champion 
ICT-enabled development, and thus support the interests of the wealthy and powerful in society.  
Interleaving the two perspectives on ICT innovation with those on development in ICT4D 
research led Avgerou to propose four ‘discourses’ on information system innovation and 
development. She cautioned, however, that these discourses cannot lay claim to describing all 
ICT4D research because of the lack of explicit definition of ‘development’ or link to development 
theory in much of that research. At any rate, the four discourses are: 
1. “ICT and Development [represents] socioeconomic improvements through the transfer 
and diffusion of ICT and required institutions” (achieved by combining the ‘IT innovation 
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via transfer and diffusion’ perspective with the ‘development as progressive 
transformation’ perspective). Here, the main argument is “the adoption of ICT-based 
practices pioneered in advanced economies [is] a necessity for improving life conditions 
in developing countries” (pg. 9) 
 
2. “ICT and Development [represents] socioeconomic improvements through locally 
situated action” (achieved by combining the ‘IT innovation via socially embedded action’ 
perspective with the ‘development as progressive transformation’ perspective). Here, 
the main argument is “ICT [can] contribute to improving life conditions, but ... the form 
and processes of improvements are to be worked out primarily locally, in accordance to 
historically shaped meanings and power relations.” (pg. 9) 
 
3. “ICT does not necessarily result in development for all; the transfer and diffusion of ICT 
leads to uneven development” (achieved by combining the ‘IT innovation via transfer 
and diffusion’ perspective with the ‘development as disruptive transformation’ 
perspective). The main argument here is “ICT [is] a force for socioeconomic change, but 
... ICT intervention entails risks of reinforcing domination and inequality.” (pg. 10) 
 
4. “ICT does not necessarily result in development for all; it is subject to the power dynamics 
of IT innovation action” (achieved by combining the ‘IT innovation via socially embedded 
action’ perspective with the ‘development as disruptive transformation’ perspective). 
This discourse rests on the argument that there are “particular biases of power and 
inequalities in specific socioeconomic conditions of a country or community” that are 
exacerbated by ICT. (pg. 10) 
While this framework may not cover all existing perspectives in the literature on ICT-enabled 
development, it is useful as a focusing tool for the refinement and operationalization of a 
theoretical framework.  
 
2.3.4 Discussion: the perils of manipulating multiple ICT4D knowledge sources 
Thus far in Section 2.3 we have reviewed the dominant development narratives, and considered 
the effect of globalisation as an impetus to development. We have also reviewed alternative, 
contested conceptualisations of development that draw upon different knowledge sources for 
validation than those in the mainstream. An examination of the various perspectives of ICT4D 
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that exist in the literature followed. This opened up the door to the possibility of uneven 
development or even non-development arising from ICT innovation that causes disruption to 
socioeconomic norms, whether that innovation is imported in or developed locally. This raises a 
question about the differences in context that underlie either of those scenarios which I will 
explore next. 
As is evident from the various contested perspectives on development within both of the 
categories I have presented above, dominant and alternative narratives, there is no generalised 
agreement on the meaning of development, and hence, on the mechanisms of achieving it or 
on the knowledge required to activate those mechanisms. In fact, a central problem in more 
recent literature addresses the problem of “which knowledge, and for whose development” 
(see, for example, Powell, 2006). The view is now held by some (e.g. UNCTAD, 2009) that without 
a contextual understanding, or ‘knowledge’, of the socio-economic reality in an environment 
and the perceptions of that reality by its citizens, it is impractical to expect lasting, self-sustaining 
change to take place as a result of development-orientated interventions. Such arguments are 
based on a series of five presumptions.  
Firstly, it is presumed that a given society has a particular “historical reality” that is unique to 
that society. That is to say, the situated experiences of various communities are not easily 
reducible to a universal commonality, and the variance in those experiences will often affect the 
manner in which the development interventions are received by their beneficiaries.  
This connects to the second point, that the people who comprise a given society have particular 
perceptions of their reality. These perceptions are created through collective procedures by 
which people make sense of their circumstances10. 
This brings us to the third presumption that in order to be truly effective, development 
organisations must recognise and acquire knowledge of both the reality of the society it seeks 
to change, and the perceptions of that society's citizens about that reality. This understanding 
must be accompanied by knowledge of the divergences between their perceptions of the 
proposed change and the change that is needed.  
Fourthly, the practical acquisition of knowledge of societies and their citizens requires engaging 
in activities aimed at using and improving the development organisations' stock of knowledge.  
                                                          
10 See Harold Garfinkel’s (1967) seminal introduction to ethnomethodology in which he offered the 
concept of shared methods of practical reasoning and Charles Taylor’s (2002) modern social imaginaries 
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And finally, there are persistent, structural flaws in the mechanisms employed by (Northern) 
development organisations for using and improving their knowledge stock of (Southern) socio-
economic realities. 
In summary, Powell concludes:  
"The crucial point that needs to be made about 'knowledge' in relation to 
development is that there is no universal understanding of what it is. We all 'know' 
the world through a combination of our education, language, culture, and belief and, 
just as importantly, our actual physical realities - gender, location, socio-economic 
environment. How life is 'known' - that is, how it is experienced and understood - 
inevitably varies profoundly according to these differences. The issue for anyone 
working on development issues cannot be simply how to deal with 'knowledge', but 
how to act effectively in an environment of multiple 'knowledges'. How can this be 
done? What relationships are possible between different 'knowledges'?"  (2006: 521) 
When viewed from the specific perspective of ICT4D this foments a particularly intractable 
problem since ICTs are often considered by both development agencies and developing country 
policymakers as arising from purely technological considerations and thus, being devoid of 
political or economic interference. Such a perspective obscures the role of path dependency and 
technological lock-in on the development of technology, while leaving no room for considering 
that localised knowledge has a key role to play in producing context-appropriate products and 
services for users in developing countries. 
The ramifications of this problem of different knowledges, and indeed, knowledge gaps 
underpinned Avgerou’s 4-part framework which provided a useful structure for organising the 
ICT4D literature. The framework serves as a focusing tool for examination of the socio-political 
elements of the ICT4D discourses.  
 
2.4. A prospective bridge to close the gap between disparate policy 
knowledge sources  
It is outside the scope of this thesis to fully detail a mechanism for coordination and interaction 
among disparate policy knowledge sources to foster a more appropriate or effective path of 
information society development. However, owing to my commitment to make this research 
also relevant to policymakers through improvements to policy practice, in addition to the 
primary commitment of contributing to policy research, I wish to now set out some initial 
considerations for bridging the gap. To assist in this regard, there are some promising leads I 
wish to draw on from the sociology of scientific knowledge literature. 
41 
 
 
 
A concept that has been applied to collaborations in science and technology that appears 
relevant is the concept of a trading zone. This concept was first introduced by Galison (1997) 
and subsequently extended by other scholars such as Collins, Evans, and Gorman (2007). 
According to Galison, “Two groups can agree on rules of exchange even if they ascribe utterly 
different significance to the objects being exchanged; they may even disagree on the meaning of 
the exchange process itself. Nonetheless, the trading partners can hammer out a local 
coordination, despite vast global differences. In an even more sophisticated way, cultures in 
interaction frequently establish contact languages, systems of discourse that can vary from the 
most function-specific jargons, through semispecific pidgins, to full-fledged creoles rich enough 
to support activities as complex as poetry and metalinguistic reflection” (Galison, 1997: 783). 
Galison initially explored this concept through a study that explained how physicists and 
engineers from different paradigms collaborated with each other to develop particle detectors 
and radar.  
Galison’s insight on trading zones resonates with the focus of this work on two dimensions. 
Firstly, ICT4D policy, and specifically, the development of information societies is such that it 
draws on multiples sources of expertise, and therefore, there is seldom consensus or complete 
agreement on the meanings of terms. Galison’s trading zones was developed from that context, 
and the extension of interactional expertise derived by Collins, Evans, and Gorman (2007) and 
others usefully orients the original metaphor towards application to policy practice since it 
emphasises coordination by utilising expertise in multiple problem domains. In the perspective 
of this thesis, that means both ICT4D expertise and deep contextual knowledge of the 
developing country landscape into which it is being embedded. 
Secondly, while trading zones initially generate the contact languages of pidgins, these language 
constructs evolve over time into more general purpose languages which are used not only in 
situations where speakers come from different linguistic and cultural contexts, but also in 
discourse within the same cultural context.  The result, in linguistic terms, is called a creole. 
Creoles are stable natural languages that may develop from pidgins and become nativized 
through the development of a full vocabulary and grammar system.  
One way of tying these ideas together and linking them to the present concern with discursive 
policy making processes for complex issues in developing countries is through the perspective 
that both intentionality and temporality are required to bridge the policy knowledge gap. 
Determined effort on the part of personnel drawn from the different technological and political 
communities that comprise a policy domain (in this case, ICT4D policy) can be effective, but only 
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if those persons have sufficient interactional expertise to use appropriate contact languages to 
facilitate the translation. 
We will revisit this prospective bridge during the interpretation of the present case study that 
appears in Chapter 7. 
 
2.5. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I have reviewed the literature and produced characterisations of the main 
constructs of this dissertation. Policy has been characterised as a process involving multiple 
actors, both in the sense of individuals and collectively as organisations, who adhere to diverse, 
potentially conflicted interests and who gain understanding of their environment through 
processes of shared sense-making referred to as discourse. These actors are interconnected 
through networks and coalitions which are dispersed geographically, as well as over time. Policy 
‘problems’ are seen to be constructed along with ‘solutions’ through discursive processes that 
impact and intersect social actions that are observable and measurable. All actors (including 
researchers) thereby play a role in shaping the discourse that creates policy, however, power – 
viewed as the capability to dominate alternative perspectives - is unevenly distributed among 
them. Examining the effects of these imbalances in power - and particularly the way in which 
some narratives are rejected, others ignored, while others still gain primacy – is a fertile issue 
for research.  
We have seen that ICTs have been portrayed as solutions to a developmental ‘problem’. This 
has been characterised in terms of a ‘dominant contemporary vision of the information society’. 
However, further recognition is required among policy makers about the social construction of 
technological systems - that ICTs are not just neutral technological artefacts, but are also defined 
by and embody context (culture, values, preferences) through discursive processes. Usage of 
ICTs is redefined by users when they reinterpret ICTs in the in the context of their usage 
scenarios. ICT as a research theme is unique because the discourse in which ICTs are produced 
is also constrained and enabled by ICTs. This means that the definition of the ‘problem’, as well 
as who is allowed to define the ‘problem’ are linked to the power to produce and distribute ICTs. 
Multiple conceptualisations about development were offered. Some were solely focused on 
economic considerations, with others incorporating issues of social justice, enabling of human 
capabilities and equitable distribution of resources. Different ‘knowledges’ are enacted 
depending on the perspective taken by those shaping the developmental interventions. 
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Proliferation of ICTs is then seen as a mechanism that can either exacerbate existing gaps – 
which persist beyond knowledge into culture, economic and social status – or find innovative 
ways of reconciling the various perspectives into a new developmental vision. 
In sum, ICT4D policy is the result of conflicting discourses around divergent aims and proposed 
means of achieving the ‘information society’, and these divergences create paradoxes. Their 
resolution is a topic of importance in recent academic research. The contemporary focus in 
practice still overwhelmingly emphasises closing simplistic binary ‘digital divides’, but there is 
opportunity for research to help to widen conceptualisations, open up discussions and bring in 
alternative perspectives. 
In the final section of this chapter I introduced a prospective bridge for widening the 
conceptualisations of ICT4D policy among policymakers that needs to be more deeply explored 
empirically. Strictly speaking, such exploration is outside the scope of the core research question 
being addressed presently. Nonetheless we shall initiate investigate the utility of this bridge for 
interpretation and identification of policy implications in Chapter 7, while leaving more in-depth 
analysis to be the subject of a different research project. 
We now move on to detail the theoretical framework of this thesis. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
In this chapter the three streams of literature that were explored in Chapter 2 are 
integrated into the theoretical framework being adapted for this research.  
The next section introduces the framework as a discursive model of policy-as-discourse 
construction before the research questions are presented in Section 3.2. 
 
3.1. A Discursive Model of Policy-as-discourse Construction 
Building on the literature review presented in the previous chapter I have adapted a theoretical 
framework that integrates the conceptual domain of this dissertation (construction of policy-as-
discourse) with the empirical domain (policy) through a case of ICT4D policy in the specific 
context under examination (Trinidad and Tobago, between 1985 and 2011). 
The main approaches being drawn on are critical discourse analysis (as proposed by Norman 
Fairclough and others), Brian Pentland’s take on narrative theory and the discourse coalition 
framework of Maarten Hajer. These will be integrated into a single framework founded on the 
discursive model of institutionalization proposed by Nelson Phillips, Thomas Lawrence and 
Cynthia Hardy (2004). 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) has the benefit of building on critical theory, and so is ultimately 
concerned with changing the policy status quo that advantages some while disadvantaging 
others. Such an approach examines how the use of language creates and sustains the dominant 
discourses that comprise the status quo, and hence can potentially be used to upset it. Notable 
difficulties with a CDA approach include its problematic treatment of the concept of ‘power’. 
Left unadapted, CDA at its extreme lends itself to a simplistic dynamic of power ‘holders’ who 
shape discourse and power-less actors who are constrained by discourse. 
Narrative theory as proposed by Pentland conveys a processual focus that goes beyond 
sequential event reconstruction and attempts to discern the fundamental generating 
mechanisms that explain process change. Nonetheless, narrative analyses share one of the 
central criticisms of structuralist thinking in that they offer little guidance for ensuring validity 
and reliability of the process theories generated since the “deep structure” that is the subject of 
such theories is unobservable. 
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Hajer’s discourse coalition framework improves on political rationalist approaches to policy 
studies by taking a discursive-analytical view. In doing so an analysis predicated on ACF can 
appreciate that actors shape both ‘problem’ AND ‘solution’ construction. By focusing on 
discursive reproduction ACF analysis can explain both policy change – esp. how this occurs over 
time, dispersed over large distances without requiring personal contact – and stability (since 
actors can resist new facts that don’t mesh with their current interpretation). One apparent 
shortcoming of an ACF is that by emphasising interactions of coalitions, it neglects interactions 
that are accidental, unregulated or otherwise irregular. 
 The model of institutionalization proposed by Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004) provides the 
main underpinning of the theoretical framework adopted for this research. However, whereas 
those authors emphasised the production of institutions as the focal point of their work, this 
thesis puts the focus on the construction of policy, inclusive of the effect of institutions. The 
discursive model developed below illustrates the manner in which the collected data is 
connected to the theoretical framework.  
 
Figure 1 – Discursive model of the policy construction process (adapted from Philips, Lawrence and Hardy, 2004: 
641) 
Key 
Directly 
observable 
Events Not 
directly 
observable 
Narratives 
Texts Institutions 
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Using this model, I will present the empirical data in Chapter 6, through description and critical 
discourse analysis of a corpus of texts (documents and interviews) that describe a series of 
events and then in Chapter 7, summarise the theoretical contributions via interpretation and 
explanation of the underlying policy institutions that drive the events. 
The model can be explained as follows. Events (e.g. policy consultations, conferences, meetings, 
general elections, negotiations, protests, etc.) that occur in discursive spaces (such as daily 
newspapers, online forums, political campaign platforms, Parliamentary debate, etc.) generate 
texts (such as interview transcripts, reports, policy documents, legislative documents, 
manifestos, meeting minutes, green papers, white papers, periodicals, journal articles, etc.). 
These texts are used by people to constitute narratives. Narratives influence activity, and as they 
spread and gain popularity they recruit more adherents. During each iteration the narrative is 
re-interpreted and reproduced. When shared among a large proportion of the population of 
stakeholders, over time behaviours become subconsciously taken for granted and transition into 
institutions. Institutions, being self-policing, constrain and enable further social activity.  
 
Construct Definitions 
The definitions of the constructs employed in this framework are: 
“Discourse” can refer both to the process of making sense of the social world (e.g. among CDA 
theorists like Fairclough) and the tangible, surface-level outputs of that sense-making process 
(e.g. among narrative theorists like Pentland). However, the resultant effect of nesting the term 
“discourse” - the output of the process - within the process of “discourse” while constructing a 
process theory that explains how “discourse” creates policy seems unwieldy. To avoid such 
confusion I propose to use the following distinctions that bridge the vocabulary of CDA 
(Fairclough, 1995) with that of narrative theory (Pentland, 1999). 
In attempting to integrate the three approaches into a cohesive framework suggested by the 
fourth I have adopted the following conventions, drawing on various elements of the literature. 
Discourse is taken to mean a process by which people make shared sense of their environments 
and situations, thereby setting a context from which they then act (adapted from Fairclough, 
2009: 162–163 and Garfinkel, 1967) 
Narratives are stories that construe a sequence of events that are causally linked to 
particular outcomes. This perspective integrates Fairclough’s (2009) perspective that 
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narratives are ways of construing aspects of the social world associated with a particular 
social perspective and Pentland’s (1999: 711) definition of narrative as “a story that 
describes the process, or sequence of events, that connects cause and effect”. [c.f. 
Stone’s (1989) “causal stories”] 
Texts are instantiations of particular narratives through written and/or verbal 
communication into directly observable artefacts such as books, newspaper articles, 
interview transcripts and policy documents. (adapted from (Fairclough, 2003: 3) 
Discursive spaces are sites of discourse that are “governed by different rules and 
understandings regarding text production (who may author texts, of which type); 
distribution (when, where, and how texts may be distributed); and consumption (who is 
the target audience; who may access and act on texts)” (Hardy and Maguire, 2010: 1365) 
Social Action comprises specific activities that are carried out by actors in relation to other actors 
as a result of their interface with text. Those activities may be intentional, consequential or 
emergent.  
Intentional action deliberately conveys particular ideas through texts. It is important to 
note that while a reason for the intentional action always exists, that reason may not 
necessarily have been rehearsed by the actor prior to acting, and may instead be 
reconstructed upon reflection.  
Consequential action is generated as a by-product of ongoing dialogue among actors 
during which they may draw on broader narratives. Even though such action is not the 
primary focus of the actors, consequential action is not equivalent to the random 
combination of disconnected or isolated texts.  
Emergent action arises through discursive contestation and struggle in ways that were 
not necessarily intended or predicted. In this process, narratives are re-contextualized 
when new connections are made between texts drawn from different subject fields or 
linked at different levels, such as local, national and global. 
Social action conveys meaning, and meanings are constructed reciprocally by the actors involved 
via text. (adapted from Fairclough, 2009: 164 and Wetherell, 2001: 15–18) 
Actors may be “individuals, groups, organizations, or even larger collectives” (Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997: 97) since institutions (see below) can exist at any or all of the levels of 
analysis inferred by those categories. 
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An event is a sequence of actions that have a causal relationship with specific outcomes 
in the social world. Events are used by research participants as anchors in the narratives 
they (re)construct about the actions of themselves and others. (adapted from Pentland, 
1999) 
An interaction is a scheme of social actions and events. Interactions can be categorised 
in one of four ways:  social, repeated, regular, regulated (this follows Weber’s theory of 
social action; see Weber, Runciman, & Matthews, 1978) 
Institutions are “shared rules and typifications that identify categories of social actors and their 
appropriate activities or relationships” (Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 96)  
Institutional fields “constitute recognized areas of institutional life”, are “formed around 
industries, common technologies or issues”, may be “arenas of struggle and conflict” and 
develop into “centers of debates in which competing interests negotiate over issue 
interpretation”. They are “comprised of three key components: positions, 
understandings, and rules” and themselves comprise “meaning systems which are 
cultural expectations, shared cognitions and beliefs based on shared conceptions that 
constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning is made.” 
In so doing, institutional fields become taken for granted and “shape what is considered 
appropriate behaviour and give meaning to actions”. (Hardy and Maguire, 2010: 1366)  
 
3.2. Research Questions 
Following from the discussion of the literature in the previous chapter, and using the theoretical 
framework developed above to provide the analytical lens of this thesis, the following research 
questions are being addressed: 
How has ICT4D policy been constructed discursively in Trinidad and Tobago? 
This main question adopts a discourse analytic perspective to explain the process of ICT4D policy 
construction. Using this perspective and focusing on the domain of ICT4D policy that is 
concerned with socio-economic development in the Information Society, I ascribe to the view 
that policy is a result of discursive processes that produce institutions which, in turn, constrain 
and enable social action.  
The following sub-questions each address a perspective of the main question. 
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 How do texts enter policy processes? 
This question considers the processes by which texts are manipulated to achieve a 
shared understanding of the policy institutional field by the actors who interact in that 
field. The relative importance of texts (as embodiments of narratives conveyed via use 
of language) is assessed in relation to interests, technical claims and underlying belief 
systems. This question also considers the entry points into policy processes. 
 What are the competing narratives that interact in the institutional field of ICT4D policy? 
As presented in the literature review, narratives are constructed through discursive 
processes and exist in perpetual competition with alternative (sometimes conflicting) 
narratives. Narratives are being taken here as the units of analysis for discourse. This 
question, therefore, describes the narratives that constitute the institutional field of the 
present case. 
 How has the competition between narratives produced the institutions that comprise the 
institutional field of ICT4D policy? 
Finally, this question examines the effect of the discursive practices on the observable 
social practices that comprise the events being chronicled in this dissertation. The 
discursive practices include negotiation between individual actors as they reconstruct 
narratives. Specifically, the narratives produce institutions that constrain and enable 
actions. Since institutions are not directly observable, they will be assessed by referring 
to actions.  
 
3.3. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis was developed and 
presented. The framework is an adaptation and extension of the work of Phillips, Lawrence and 
Hardy (2004), but this adaptation emphasises the role of institutions in constructing policy. In 
the next chapter a methodological approach is developed to operationalise this framework so 
as to study, in a discursive manner, the construction of policy-as-discourse. The theoretical 
framework developed here undergirds the analysis of the case study presented in Chapter 6, as 
well as the discussion and inductive development of theory presented in Chapter 7.  
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4. Methodology and Research Methods 
 
This chapter outlines the research methodology that was adopted for this thesis, as well 
as the practical steps through which that methodology was operationalised to collect and 
analyse data.  
Section 4.1 presents the rationale behind the methodological choices made, such as the decision 
to use a case study approach, and the key features of the resulting research design. Section 4.2 
presents a summary of the actual approach taken to collect data through mixed methods. 
Section 4.3 summarises and reflects on the data analysis process employed, while. Section 4.4 
addresses the limitations of the methodology and research methods. 
 
4.1. Methodology  
As is evident from the thesis title the overall methodology of this research is a case study. 
According to Yin (1981) the defining characteristic of a case study as a research strategy is that 
it attempts to understand contemporary social phenomena in their natural setting, especially 
when the distinctions between the phenomena and their contexts are unclear. The literature 
review and subsequent theoretical framework developed in previous chapters have hopefully 
presented a compelling case that the mutual interaction of the phenomenon being studied in 
the present thesis (construction of policy-as-discourse) and its context (Trinidad and Tobago 
during the period 1985 to 2011) is not incidental, but is, in fact, a critical feature of this research. 
More specifically, given that the main research question being explored here has a processual 
orientation, that is, it emphasises how policy is constructed discursively, the case study approach 
is better suited to be the form of empirical inquiry than alternatives such as experiments, 
simulations or histories.  
Experiments and simulations are unsuitable because they would have required separating the 
phenomenon from its context, and because they imply the exercise of control by the researcher 
on the events under review, which would have been impossible given the topic. A strictly 
historical approach would have been inadequate since the phenomena being studied were not 
solely restricted to the past, but, per the theoretical framework, past actions exerted influence 
on the present actions and events that were observable at the time of the research. 
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4.1.1 Contextual case studies 
A research approach that has been used to analyse the effects of multi-level economic, political 
and social situated factors is the contextual case study approach as defined by Andrew Pettigrew 
(1990). According to Pettigrew (1990) a contextual analysis can be characterised as: 
 processual, by emphasising the evolution of actions embedded in specific contexts 
(structural and otherwise) over time; 
 multi-stakeholder, by recognising the competing viewpoints of reality perceived by 
actors at different levels; 
 longitudinal, by considering both historical and contemporary views of actions and 
events. 
Further, according to Pettigrew (1990: 269), a contextual analysis is predicated on four 
assumptions:  
i) the ‘embeddedness’ or interdependencies among multiple levels of analysis and 
their effect on the phenomena under investigation;   
ii) the ‘temporal interconnectedness’ of processes as a result of actions in the past 
and present (which therefore shape the direction of actions in the future); 
iii) the reciprocal and intertwined relationship between context and action; and 
iv) that causation of the types of change studied is neither linear nor singular. 
In this mode, “an approach that offers both multilevel or vertical analysis and processual, or 
horizontal, analysis is said to be contextualist in nature” (ibid). Such an approach seeks to create 
holistic explanations of process change by viewing social processes as the result of contexts 
constraining or supporting actions and events. Through these processes the contexts are re-
defined reciprocally by the actions and events. Contextual analyses offer explanations of events 
based on interpretations of the actions of people. These interpretations stem from the systems 
of meaning they have constructed about their social worlds. Being focused, therefore, on 
explaining processes, a contextual approach is therefore distinct from variance theory-based 
alternatives that “provide explanations for phenomena in terms of relationships among 
dependent and independent variables”(Langley, 1999: 692) since these are seen to be better 
suited to identifying the what of change, but less relevant or appropriate for gaining 
understanding of how and why change occurred.   
As defined above, a contextual research approach that employs mixed research methods is 
capable of developing a comprehensive explanatory narrative of ICT policy discourse 
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construction in Trinidad and Tobago, thereby shedding light on issues that have been ignored in 
mainstream discussion, and giving voice to actors that could not receive attention if other, more 
rationalist-leaning techniques were employed. This type of approach has been used, for 
instance, in the study of educational policy innovation under the Minnesota Innovation Research 
Program (Roberts and King, 1989).   
Process theory can be built around the resulting explanatory narrative by using the four-level 
construct defined by Pentland (1999). The most tangible level consists of text, or the “particular 
telling of a story by a specific narrator” (p. 719). Data such as documents, interview transcripts 
and notes from participant observations are collected at this level. The next level involves 
stories, which are specific subjective versions of the deep structures that underlie events as told 
by actors involved in the events.  Here, various (possibly contradictory) perspectives will be 
distilled from the text as the search for patterns and relationships begins. Going further, takes 
us to the level of fabula, or “generic descriptions of a particular set of events and their 
relationships” (p. 719). This is the level at which narrative theory emerges and seeks to derive 
its validity by codifying the elements of the stories that are constant across different relations 
of the stories. Finally, the deepest level offers generating mechanisms, building on the ‘motors’ 
of  Van De Ven & Poole (1995). These mechanisms have been suggested as the basic conceptual 
building blocks that underpin all process theories of organizational change and development. 
The analysis that derives from the data collected while using a contextual research approach will 
result in a critical case study that goes past the subjective histories offered by actors with 
different points of view and hopefully approaches the ‘deep structure’ and ‘generating 
mechanisms’ that underlie the discourse11. 
 
4.1.2 Critical discourse analysis 
Two considerations influenced my choice of critical discourse analysis (CDA) as the analytical 
lens for this research. Firstly, the research topic is inherently linked to issues of modernization, 
democratization and globalization, and these issues are of significant contemporary importance 
for the practice of policymaking in developing countries. Secondly, as advanced in the literature 
review, contemporary policymaking is a discursive process, where the use of language as 
structured in narratives plays a key role in establishing, reinforcing and disrupting institutions 
that, in turn, enable and constrain social action. These considerations fit well with CDA’s 
                                                          
11 See, for example, Morlacchi and Nelson (2011) for an application of this approach to the study of co-
evolution of technology and organization in the context of medical practice and policy 
53 
 
 
 
objective of “correct[ing] a widespread underestimation of the significance of language in the 
production, maintenance, and change of social relations of power and increas[ing] consciousness 
of how language contributes to the domination of some people by others, because consciousness 
is the first step to emancipation” (Fairclough, 1989: 1). To further establish CDA’s 
appropriateness within the present methodology, we should first unpack “discourse analysis”. 
Discourse analysis can be considered a study of “language in use”(van Dijk, 1985). This means 
that it is a method concerned with examining how language shapes and is shaped by social order 
(Jaworski and Coupland, 2006: 3). The increasing emphasis on discourse as an explanatory 
mechanism over the past three decades can be traced to the rise of post-modernism and the 
attendant ‘shift in epistemology’ that occurred, thus causing researchers to question how 
people (including researchers) apprehend and represent their environment, i.e. how they know 
what they know.  
Contemporary discourse analysis takes place at the confluence of multiple academic disciplines 
and this is reflected in its many historical traditions, including: speech act theory, conversation 
analysis, discursive psychology, ethnography of communication, interactional sociolinguistics, 
narrative analysis and critical discourse analysis (Schiffrin et al., 2003). The disciplinary focus in 
these traditions includes linguistics, literary studies, social psychology and sociology.  
The key objective of CDA, therefore, is the deconstruction of the practices, structures and 
institutions that underpin the apparently objective, normative and factual bases of social life. 
The critical element of critical discourse analysis is drawn from its foundation in critical theory, 
thus distinguishing it from other forms of discourse analysis by focusing on ideological analysis, 
particularly with the view of discourse as both “the instrument of power and control” van 
Leeuwen (1993: 193) and “the instrument of the social construction of reality” (ibid). As such, 
critical discourse analysis is oriented to social change by firstly seeking to “understand social 
changes in the ideological use of language” (Jaworski and Coupland, 2006: 29) and secondly to 
“resist social changes that curtail liberty [and/or democracy]” (ibid). Important entries in the 
practical CDA literature include Fairclough (1995, 2003), van Dijk (1993), Wodak (2001), and 
Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter (2000), all of which emphasise the asymmetrical power 
relationships, and hence, asymmetrical influence of actors in the shaping of discourse.  
The connection between the text being examined through CDA and its social impact can be 
illustrated with reference to the concept of ‘discursive events’. According to Fairclough (1992: 
4), "[A] discursive event can at once be seen as text, discursive practice, or social practice". 
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As text, the focus of analysis of the discursive event is "to understand how a discourse links 
together its utterances according to distinctive discursive forms; for example, referential, 
narrational, persuasive, expressive, or poetical" (Fischer, 2003: 74). The result here is of primary 
importance to linguists. As discursive practice the focus of analysis is understanding "processes 
of text production and interpretation", that is, examining "... which types of discourses are 
employed in particular contexts, especially which discourses are privileged in particular areas of 
policymaking and which are excluded" (ibid). This type of work is the province of literary 
scholars. Finally, with the discursive event as social practice the focus of analysis is "the 
institutional and organizational circumstance of the discursive event and how that shapes the 
nature of the discursive practice" (ibid). This is done by examining "the kinds of assumptions that 
underlie practices of particular policy institutions—for example, the way an office of education 
might be governed by a particular educational philosophy..." (ibid). It is this level of analysis that 
produces findings relevant to social science, and more importantly, to this thesis (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 – Dimensions of discourse and discourse analysis (source: Thompson, 2004b: 6) 
 
Working definitions 
Discursive practice refers to configurations of “discrete, unique utterances, or combinations of 
idioms, references, inferences or phrases with a particular ‘order of discourse’ such as 
‘development’” (Thompson, 2004b: 6). 
An order of discourse can be understood as “the totality of discursive practices within an 
institution or society, and the relationships between them” (Fairclough, 1992: 43). 
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Speech genres are “linguistic devices which apply horizontally across various orders of discourse 
… which any researcher might be likely to find when performing CDA in other domains” 
(Thompson, 2004b: 6) . 
Discursive types are “formations which are ‘vertically’ identifiable as part of a particular order of 
discourse and which are likely to remain specific to a particular domain of study” (Thompson, 
2004b: 6) . 
For the foregoing reasons CDA is considered well suited to producing deep critical explanatory 
narratives of social change in a particular context. There are reservations, however, concerning 
its applicability in a structured manner to repeatable empirical analysis. This is because analysing 
discourse is not amenable to specification in a set recipe of procedures, as it is dependent in 
large part on the skill and reflexivity of the researcher.  
Combining multiple methods improves upon the explanatory potential offered by any single 
one. For this study, although CDA is the primary means of eliciting discursive events from the 
various sources of text (documents and interview transcripts), content analysis was considered 
to assess the effect of those discursive events on their audience by quantifying their frequency. 
Because of the empirical focus on narratives at the societal level of events and across multiple 
texts, content analysis – which would have necessitated a more granular unit of analysis - was 
not eventually utilised, but the findings generated by CDA were subjected to review by a few 
key informants to assess their validity. 
 
4.1.3 Case Selection 
Why study ICT4D policy in T&T? 
ICT4D is a field that has been the subject of much interest in policy and academic circles in 
developing countries in general12, and in Trinidad and Tobago and the rest of the Caribbean in 
particular. My tenure at the Ministry of Public Administration within the Government of Trinidad 
and Tobago began in 2005 in the wake of a major policy development thrust to conceive Trinidad 
and Tobago’s first national ICT4D strategy, dubbed “fastforward”. The following three years saw 
major foundational developments take place that established the platform for advanced 
                                                          
12 As evidenced by the field’s three major journals: The Electronic Journal on Information Systems in 
Developing Countries; Information Technology for Development; and, Information Technologies & 
International Development. 
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telecommunications, informatics and electronic commerce that became commonplace by the 
end of the decade.  
The drive to apply information and communication technologies in new ways so as to improve 
the efficiency and productivity of the public and private sectors did not commence with the 
development of fastforward, however. From as early as the mid-1980s plans were set in motion 
to modernise the telecommunications infrastructure that underpinned much of the “ICT” and 
Internet-centric activity that took place from the mid-1990s onward.  
Three factors reinforced my decision to conduct research in this area: the wealth and availability 
of research material; the ease of access to that material afforded me because of my prior 
occupation; and, the relevance of this type of research for policy development in other small 
island developing states. 
Why focus on the specific case chosen? 
The case was selected because it provided examples of situations wherein policy change that 
spanned a number of years was influenced by multiple stakeholders operating at different 
levels. The case was therefore reflective of the theoretical propositions of the research. 
Furthermore, examining these situations provided an opportunity to improve the understanding 
of policy change and policy development processes among practitioners in small developing 
states by correcting misconceptions commonly held and extending the literature. 
 
4.2. Mixed Methods of Data Collection 
Data were collected on site during the period July to December 2011. I categorised the data into 
two main tranches: documents and interviews. The documents include policy proposals, 
strategic plans, formal reports, acts of Parliament, cabinet meeting minutes, newspaper articles, 
and presentation slides. Documents in paper form were electronically scanned into digital form 
for ease of search and manipulation later. The interviews took the form of twenty-seven in-
depth key informant interviews (Fontana and Frey, 2005; Kvale, 1996; Sherman Heyl, 2001) that 
were captured via digital audio recordings as well as notes that were written down either during 
the interviews or immediately afterwards. The key informants were selected via the sampling 
selection method detailed in Section 4.2.2. Selected portions of the interviews were later 
transcribed. Both the transcripts and the documents were included in the textual corpus for CDA 
(Fairclough 1995, 2003). A third originally planned component, non-participant observation 
(Emerson et al., 2001; Tedlock, 2005) of policy forums, conferences and meetings, did not 
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generate the data originally anticipated owing to event rescheduling and cancellations. Upon 
review I determined that those events were mainly useful for identifying and making contact 
with additional key informants while I was in the field.  
I spent the first two (2) weeks working out of my old office at the organisation that had become 
the National ICT Company of Trinidad and Tobago Ltd (branded as iGovTT) which had formerly 
been known as the National ICT Centre (NICTC) of the Ministry of Public Administration. During 
this time I re-established communication with former colleagues, familiarised myself with the 
new organisational culture and began sifting through stores of archived documentation left 
behind by the Telecommunications and Infrastructure Unit that had previously been responsible 
for supporting the Government’s telecommunications policy function.  
I developed a database of all research materials using NVivo qualitative data analysis software. 
Use of this software enabled me to compile a robust collection of documents, case study notes, 
digital voice recordings and early-stage analytical narratives. I also developed a simple database 
of interview participants, both prospective and those I eventually actually interviewed. This 
database captured all details on affiliations, contact details, interview schedules, and brief 
interview notes. 
I structured my data collection efforts into three discrete work packages, each intended to 
collect and streamline data associated with one or more of the sets of actor relationships at the 
four levels of analysis identified in Chapter 3:  
 a government actors package to capture data concerning the intra-governmental 
(between government agencies/departments) interactions and extra-national state-
focused (government-to-government/quasi-government; and government-to-
multilateral organisations) interactions;  
 a local third-party actors package that would collect data relating to intra-national 
(government-civil society-academia-enterprise) interactions;  
 an international third-party actors package that focused on data relating to interactions 
with multinational ICT corporations (e.g. Microsoft and Fujitsu) and funding agencies 
(e.g. IDB). 
Each work package involved two phases: document handling (identification, organisation and 
collection of documents) and interviews. To identify potential interview participants I started 
with a database of stakeholders kept on file for policy consultations (provided by a contact 
within the Ministry) and gravitated first to those with whom I had previously worked, then used 
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their recommendations to identify and make contact with other pertinent interviewees 
(snowballing technique). 
Starting with the government actors package, with the help of former colleagues I was able to 
access unpublished draft policy position papers, reports, and even fourteen years’ worth of 
Cabinet Minutes (1997-2011) - the formally documented outputs of weekly Cabinet meetings 
that outline all Government decisions - which I was authorised to use by appealing to provisions 
of Trinidad and Tobago’s Freedom of Information Act of 1999 (as amended).  Such documents 
provided insight into a range of important policy decisions – from the establishment in 1997 of 
an Information Technology Policy for the Public Service, to the creation of a National ICT 
Strategy, branded fastforward, in 2002, among others. The participants I interviewed during the 
course of this work package included a former Minister, three Permanent Secretaries and the 
Regional Representative of the UNDP. Most participants have been employed in different 
government departments over several years across different political administrations and so 
were able to recollect the political climate around major paradigm shifts which occurred during 
momentous events such as the establishment of an independent telecommunications 
regulator13, and the building of the communications network14 that links all government 
ministries and departments across the country. 
To investigate the local third-party actors package I began by cross referencing watershed events 
recorded in official government documents with news reports from local media archives, 
specifically those of the two prominent daily newspapers, the Trinidad Express and the Trinidad 
Guardian. This comparison provided insights into the media’s influence on policy agenda setting, 
which is a theme that relates to at least two of my subordinate research questions. This exercise, 
conducted over a span of several weeks, provided a collection of thousands of news articles and 
editorials spanning the period 1995 (the earliest year for which electronic archives of either 
newspaper exist) to 2011 on subjects related to a range of terms (“computers”, “information 
technology”, “information superhighway”, “digital divide”, “telecommunications”, “internet”, et 
al.) which had appeared regularly in the government documents. In parallel, I conducted 
interviews with other stakeholders who worked outside of government, yet undoubtedly have 
played a part in the shaping of the domestic ICT4D policy discourse. These included a journalist 
whose weekly technology column15 is “the oldest continuously published column on technology 
in Trinidad and Tobago”, the former head of the Trinidad and Tobago Computer Society, and 
                                                          
13 TATT, or Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad and Tobago 
14 The Government Wide Area Network, or Backbone as it is commonly referred to 
15 BitDepth. Available at: http://lyndersaydigital.com/bd/current.html 
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two university professors who at one time served on a telecommunications advisory board that 
existed in the interim between the passage of the Telecommunications Act (2001) and the 
establishment of the Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad and Tobago. 
Negotiating access to participants from the international third-party actors package proved the 
most intractable activity of my field research. Unanswered calls, unreturned messages and being 
palmed off onto assistants were the order of the day. Representatives of multilateral funding 
agencies such the Inter-American Development Bank (the agency that provided counterpart 
funding for the Modernization of Telecommunications Programme) were very helpful in 
providing information and making themselves available for interviews. On the other hand my 
efforts to secure meetings with private sector stakeholders, such as executives of Microsoft 
(provider of enterprise software to many public and private sector organisations), and Fujitsu 
(co-contractor responsible for the installation of the Backbone network), or ICT firms of local 
origin but regional reach such as Infotech Caribbean Ltd, were often futile. The relative lack of 
direct input from this important stakeholder group has left a gap in the map of actors that I 
sought to construct of Trinidad and Tobago’s policy discourse construction process. While I have 
been able to garner perspectives of the role of the private sector from other participants, my 
understanding of this sector’s view of themselves in the events under consideration as well as 
their take on the rest of the environment is limited. The ramifications of this lacuna for the 
production of a valid and reliable account of the policy processes under investigation are 
identified as a limitation in the final chapter. 
4.2.1 Documents  
In terms of establishing the relevance and validity of information, I put emphasis on formal 
documents such as reports and policy documents produced by established organisations, such 
as ministries, and used secondary documents such as newspaper reports for triangulation, or 
for selection of excerpts that exemplified particular analytical points. 
The following are the categories of documents used as data sources, along with a count of the 
number of each type16: 
Table 1 – Document types collected and used for the analysis 
Concept Notes 2 
Constitution 1 
Secondary Interview Transcript 1 
Loan Programme Donor's Memo 1 
                                                          
16 See Appendix II for a summary list of the documents collected and used in the analysis 
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Conference Report 1 
Cabinet Minute 34 
Legislative Acts of Parliament 6 
Policy document 3 
Budget statements 11 
Consultancy Reports 2 
Multilateral Trade Agreements and related documents 4 
Policy guidebook 1 
Regional development strategy 1 
Technology column articles 24 
General newspaper articles 173 
Market reports 5 
 
 
 
These documents were created by a range of actors, including:  
- Academics 
- Civil Society 
- Consultants 
- International Development Banks 
- Government Ministries and Departments 
- Inter-Governmental Organisations 
- Media Houses 
- Parastatal Agencies 
- Regulatory Agencies 
 
I applied a purposive sample to sift through the documents, guided by my knowledge of the 
research area, literature and initial indications provided by desk-based research. This was 
further stratified by reputational case selection (Goetz and Lecompte, 1984; cited in Merriam, 
1988), that is, recommendations from key informants, and inter-documental references. 
Documents were added to the corpus until no new relevant insights were produced from 
addition of more participants or documents, where relevance was defined by the key 
informants. This provided a good sense that the sample was complete. 
4.2.2 In-depth semi-structured interviews  
Documents provide a codified source of the discourse being explored in this thesis. The choice 
of a range of different type of documents produced by many different groups of actors allowed 
me to identify comparable and contradictory perspectives on ICT and development held by 
individuals, and between and within groups. Documents are themselves, however, snapshots of 
history. Owing to their static nature, an analysis of documents would not have allowed me to 
interrogate the changing collections of meanings that actors referred to in the pursuit of their 
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job functions, nor the processes by which those systems were co-produced through social 
interaction. Except in cases where a document was explicitly or implicitly referred to in a critical 
manner by its sponsors, analysis of a given document could say little about how it was received 
and interpreted by its audience. This is a critical element of the process of sense-making for 
which it was necessary to engage with the actors involved and assess those meaning systems 
and sense-making processes in context – a call that has been made one of the most vocal 
proponents of CDA (see Fairclough, 1995: 9-10). For this reason semi-structured in-depth 
interviews (Fontana and Frey, 2005; Sherman Heyl, 2001; Kvale, 1996) were conducted. The 
analysis of the documents undertaken in the first stage of research, and the recommendations 
of key informants were used to inform the initial selection of suitable interviewees. However, I 
also recognised that references within the loosely connected network of those persons 
identified by informants might also serve to improve the variety of perspectives represented 
and limit the influence of the informants in shaping the perspectives of those interviewed.  
Hence a further selection of people to interview was conducted using a snowballing technique.  
My ability to gain access was facilitated by my prior role as a Technical Analyst attached to the 
National ICT Centre of the Ministry of Public Administration (MPA) between 2005 and 2008. I 
started with a list, acquired from MPA, of stakeholders (people and organisations) typically 
approached by MPA during policy consultations. I then asked a former colleague who had long-
term knowledge of the policy processes (Peter Mitchell) to identify key contacts within the list. 
Among the people identified as key contacts, I initiated contact with those with whom I already 
had a professional relationship. All were briefed that I was now engaged in a research project 
without a specific political aim regarding the current government, or seeking to exacerbate the 
established problem of ‘information silos’ between Ministry divisions and departments. I 
increased the sample frame by asking each interviewee who else I should interview, and was 
thus introduced to people who were either unknown or only casually known to me. This was 
repeated until no new people were suggested. 
The selection procedure resulted in the production of a list of twenty-seven interviewees whose 
input can be considered germane to the case (see Table 1). During the interview period, they 
were senior-level representatives of government ministries and agencies, research institutions 
and universities, international and regional multilateral agencies, and civil sector associations 
and NGOs. 
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Table 2 – Interviewee sampling 
Interviewee Reason 
Dr. Kim Mallalieu – Senior 
Lecturer, Dept. of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering, The 
University of the West Indies 
Was once a member of the Telecommunications 
Advisory Team that preceded the formation of the 
Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad and Tobago; 
long-time advocate for telecommunications 
development.  
Prof. St. Clair King – Senior 
Lecturer, Dept. of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering, The 
University of the West Indies 
Was once a member of the Telecommunications 
Advisory Team that preceded the formation of the 
Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad and Tobago; 
Member of the Infrastructure Working Group during the 
creation of fastforward. 
Cintra Sooknanan – former 
Director, Trinidad and Tobago 
Computer Society 
 
Former head of one of the few civil society organisations 
related to ICT4D in T&T (T&T Computer Society) and co-
founder of the T&T chapter of the Internet Society; Is an 
attorney by profession, so she brought a legal 
perspective to bear on the discussion. 
David Little – President and 
founding Partner, PSTG 
Consulting 
Head of the Canadian consulting firm, PSTG Consulting, 
that coordinated the production of the T&T National ICT 
Strategy 2003-2008 (fastforward) 
Devindra Ramnarine – Partner, 
PSTG Consulting 
Former head of the National ICT Secretariat in the 
Ministry of Public Administration and Information during 
the time of the creation of fastforward; Also sat on the 
National ICT Steering Committee; later became a partner 
of PSTG Consulting 
Vashtie Dookiesingh - 
Multilateral Investment Fund 
(MIF) Specialist, Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) 
 
As MIF Specialist, Ms. Dookiesingh acted as one of the 
liaisons between MPA and the IDB during the 
Modernisation of Telecommunications Project 
Adam Montserin – former 
Executive Manager, e-
Government, NICTC 
Was originally hired as a specialist during the 
implementation of the Backbone; Promoted to Executive 
Manager of the e-Government Unit just before it was 
incorporated into the NICTC, and then led that unit 
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Interviewee Reason 
during the fastforward era. Was a member of the 
Government Working Group during the creation of 
fastforward. Was no longer employed by government by 
the time of interview 
Arlene McComie – former 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
Public Administration (MPA) 
Permanent Secretary of MPA during the period 2007-
2010 
Atiba Phillips – former Executive 
Manager, e-Business, NICTC; 
then Chairman, iGovTT  
Led the e-Business Unit of the NICTC during the 
fastforward era. Later left the organisation and returned 
as its Chairman after it had been transformed from NICTC 
to iGovTT. Had previous experience in other ICT 
initiatives in GoRTT, such as the National Y2K Secretariat 
Cleveland Thomas – former 
National Chief Information 
Officer (NCIO); then Chief 
Executive Officer, iGovTT 
Led the NICTC during the fastforward era. Was a member 
of the Economy and Finance Working Group during the 
creation of fastforward. Left to lead the Caribbean Area 
office of the ITU around the time of the interview. 
Denyse White – former 
Executive Manager, Policy, 
Metrics and Stakeholder 
Engagement, NICTC 
Led the Metrics Unit of the NICTC during the fastforward 
era. Was originally hired as a specialist in the e-
Commerce Secretariat in the Ministry of Trade. 
Participated in the Economy and Finance Working Group 
during the creation of fastforward. 
Gerard James – former Executive 
Manager, Telecommunications 
and Infrastructure, NICTC 
Led the Telecommunications & Infrastructure Unit of the 
NICTC during the fastforward era.  
Gillian Macintyre – former 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
Public Administration 
 
PS of MPA during the period 2010-2015. Chaired the 
Government Working Group during the creation of 
fastforward. 
Jacqueline Wilson – former 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
Public Administration and 
Information  
PS of MPAI during the period 2002-2007; Was a member 
of the National ICT Steering Committee during the 
creation of fastforward. Had a brief stint with the 
Commonwealth Secretariat in their “Commonwealth 
Connects” programme. 
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Interviewee Reason 
John Mollenthiel – former 
Deputy NCIO, NICTC / Deputy 
CEO, iGovTT 
Was the 2nd-in-command of the NICTC, under Cleveland 
Thomas, during the fastforward era. 
Joy Lange-Syriac – former Senior 
Manager, e-Government, NICTC 
Was closely involved in implementation and 
administration of the Backbone project. Was a member 
of the Government Working Group during the creation of 
fastforward. 
Kenwyn Austin – former 
Director, and later, Consultant at 
the e-Government Unit 
Was instrumental in leading Phase I of the Backbone 
project. Wrote two reports that provided data for the 
Backbone case. Was a member of the Government 
Working Group during the creation of fastforward. 
Kwesi Prescod – former 
Executive Manager, Policy and 
Metrics, NICTC 
Was the Telecom Advisor before leading the Policy and 
Metrics Unit of the NICTC. Was instrumental in some 
aspects of telecom sector reform and the Backbone 
project. Contributed a lot of institutional knowledge. 
Dr. Lenny Saith – former 
Minister of Public Administration, 
2002-2007 
Was hand-picked by the then Prime Minister to 
spearhead the production of a national ICT development 
strategy. He did so by chairing the NICT Steering 
Committee. Highly regarded in Cabinet, partially as a 
result of previous business success (Trinmar and the 
creation of the Pt. Lisas Industrial Estate) 
Peter Mitchell – Asst. Director – 
Socio Economic Policy Planning 
Division, Ministry of Planning and 
Development; former Senior 
Manager, Policy and Metrics, 
NICTC, Ministry of Public 
Administration 
Longstanding contributor to telecommunications policy 
development. Was seconded from Ministry of Planning 
to the Telecommunications Division, before it was 
incorporated into NICTC and he moved to the Policy Unit. 
He wrote a report that provided data for the telecom 
liberalisation sub-case, and was the main liaison with IDB 
during the Telecommunications Modernisation Project. 
Was a member of the Government Working Group 
during the creation of fastforward. 
Bernadette Lewis – Secretary 
General (SG), Caribbean 
Telecommunications Union (CTU) 
As SG, she headed the CTU – the regional body created 
by CARICOM to advocate and organise telecom (and 
later, ICT) development policy initiatives. 
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Interviewee Reason 
Edo Stork – Deputy Resident 
Representative, United Nations 
Development Programme 
(UNDP) 
At the time of interview he had responsibility for the 
"Democratic Governance" focus area of UNDP TT's work. 
He was formerly involved in ICT4D work in the South 
Pacific. He contributed a chapter to a book entitled “ICT 
Policy Formulation and eStrategy Development – A 
Comprehensive Guidebook” by Richard Labelle, which 
provided data for the fastforward sub-case. 
Nigel Cassimire – 
Telecommunications Specialist, 
CTU 
Once worked at incumbent telecommunications 
operator, TSTT, and then briefly at iGovTT. Provided 
insight into the process of creating the National ICT 
Strategy which was useful for the fastforward sub-case. 
Also provided some insight about the CTU’s relationship 
with regional governments in their policy advocacy role. 
Was a member of the Infrastructure Working Group 
during the creation of fastforward. 
Mark Lyndersay – Journalist  Author of the longest running technology column in T&T 
– BitDepth – and occasionally wrote critically of 
Government’s ICT4D initiatives. The back archives of his 
column provided data for the telecom liberalisation and 
fastforward case studies. 
Bernard Mitchell – Chief 
Implementation Officer, Evolving 
TecKnologies and Enterprise 
Development Company Ltd. 
(eTecK) 
Was once the Chief Operating Officer at TSTT. He shed 
light on the relationship between GoRTT, TSTT and C&W. 
Also discussed the relationship between eTecK and 
iGovTT as complementary and competitive arms of 
GoRTT’s ICT4D function. Was a member of the 
Infrastructure Working Group during the creation of 
fastforward. 
Cris Seecheran – Executive 
Director (ag.), 
Telecommunications Authority of 
Trinidad and Tobago (TATT) 
Once worked at TSTT. He discussed the relationship 
between TATT and MPA vis-à-vis ICT4D policy 
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Interviewee Reason 
Annie Baldeo – Policy, Pricing 
and Research Analyst, TATT 
Formerly worked at the NICT Secretariat. She also 
discussed the relationship between TATT and MPA vis-à-
vis ICT4D policy 
   
4.3. Data Analysis 
In setting out to conduct this research I have realised that the processing (Wolcott, 1994: 24) or 
data management that are involved in data analysis are not straightforward activities. 
Nonetheless, I have attempted here to present in a fairly structured manner the approach I took 
to analysing the data that I collected in the field.  In particular I have tried to be mindful of the 
pitfalls of analysis identified by (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 263), namely: 
1. Holistic fallacy: “interpreting events as more patterned and congruent than they really 
are, lopping off the many loose ends of which social life is made” 
2. Elite bias: “overweighting data from articulate, well-informed, usually high-status 
informants and underrepresenting data from less articulate, lower-status ones” 
3. Going native: “losing your perspective or your ‘bracketing’ ability, being co-opted into 
the perceptions and explanations of local informants” 
 
Pre-analysis: During and after data collection I wrote down "narratives" (ex-ante) to state my 
assumptions about the policy institutions that enable and constrain the policy process. This was 
done prior to analysis so that the narratives produced could be informed by insights gained from 
the interviews and preliminary document categorization done in the field while I was still 
temporally and cognitively close to the circumstances under investigation. Had this been done 
before data collection the narratives I would have come up with would have been informed only 
by de-contextualized theory, whereas after data collection but before analysis I was able to 
“see” the data in a more coherent and relevant way. 
I pursued the stages of qualitative case study data analysis outlined by Miles and Huberman 
(1994): data reduction, data display, and, conclusion drawing and verification.  
Stage 1: Data reduction 
 Developed an overall chronology of all major events across the entire time period of the 
macro case, drawing on primary and secondary sources.  
 Constructed an event history database for each of the three sub-case studies 
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 Applied a sampling strategy to the collection of textual data to pick out key texts and 
interview excerpts, and thereby produce a manageable corpus of text for CDA. This 
sampling strategy comprised using my own judgment (based on my knowledge of the 
context, the literature and evidence arising during data collection), which was then 
further refined by suggestions made by participants generally (snowballing) or by 
participants with specific expertise (key informants). 
 
Stage 2: Data display 
 Working through each category sequentially, I reviewed the definitive portions of 
documents (preambles, introductions, and summaries) and coded (Miles and Huberman, 
1994: 55) excerpts to "free nodes" in the following categories: 
- types of events or activities "that have discrete temporal and spatial boundaries and 
that are ecologically and culturally meaningful in the setting under study" (Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997: 106) 
- types of actors "defined in terms that are relevant to the actors themselves... to focus 
attention on activities characteristic of those who fill a particular role and on interactions 
between people who occupy positions in a role set" (ibid) 
- types of behaviour "such as expressions of conflict, coordination, or information giving" 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 107) 
 Reviewed free nodes and assembled them into larger narratives (ex-post) 
 Used interview excerpts as guides that exemplified theoretical points and substantiated 
the narratives. I then arranged the narratives according to the sub-case study they 
constituted. After doing so, I further refined the sub-case studies by adding additional 
supporting texts. At each step I triangulated with official records of major events 
 Used critical discourse analysis on exemplary selections of text to identify and categorise 
the discursive strategies and speech genres used to construct the policy meanings and 
subject positions that constitute the narratives. 
 Produced visual representations of network of core texts, interviews and actors 
 
Stage 3: Conclusion drawing and verification 
 Compared and contrasted ex-ante and ex-post narratives to distinguish between my 
assumptions going in and my reflections after having actually analysed the data 
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 Examined trends within narratives over time, such as changes in discourse associated with 
major step changes such as general elections, and more gradual changes such as those 
that occur within a particular political administration’s governmental term. 
 Removed narratives to which no nodes were coded 
 Reviewed remaining narratives to reduce them to the main “sub-themes” that I interpret 
as comprising the policy institutions 
 Considered and refuted alternative explanations for the production of institutions if they 
were not supported by evidence 
 Revised explanations to incorporate alternative explanations if they provided a better fit. 
 Compared and contrasted institutions across cases  
 
Throughout this process I was preoccupied with increasing the confidence of the reader in the 
information found and the interpretations that I proffered. The literature suggests that this 
could be done by linking three levels of understanding: “the meanings and interpretations of our 
informants, our own interpretations of those meanings, and our confirmatory, theory-connected 
operations.” (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 263)  
To establish these links and thereby validate the interpretations I employed the following 
process. I started by selecting the narratives that were identified most frequently from the 
interviews in each sub-case and discussing them with key informants to ensure that researcher 
bias was not introduced due to any lack of reflexivity on my part. I then looked through the 
corpus for supporting texts that were referenced within the event history of each sub-case to 
gather corroborating evidence for the narratives.  
Texts that were produced by authoritative sources such as Cabinet meetings, ministry 
departments or intergovernmental agencies were weighted more heavily for their authenticity 
when compared to texts such as newspaper articles or blog posts because of the generally higher 
level of rigour under which the former were produced, and the fact that they tended to be 
produced for specialist rather than general audiences which resulted in more detail being 
incorporated within the text. Even by following this approach, there were some narratives that 
were found to be frequently occurring, but for which I could find no supporting texts to 
substantiate them. Further investigation of these narratives led me to trace their origin back to 
well-networked individuals who had been able to influence many other informants with stories 
they had told, but which lacked any objective evidence. Such narratives were then excluded 
from the discussion.  
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A discursive analysis generates interpretations arising from the patterns discerned in textual 
relationships. As such, there was risk of some interpretations arising from circular reasoning or 
other logical fallacies. Such errors were mitigated by in-depth discussions with my supervisors, 
one of whom was experienced in the methodological approach I undertook, while the other was 
an expert in the policy domain under investigation. Proposing and defending each general and 
specific interpretation by in-depth discussions and debates with both supervisors significantly 
increased the confidence that the interpretations were valid and relevant for theory.  
 
4.4. Limitations of the Methodology and Research Methods 
The principal limitations of the methodology adopted for this thesis are linked to three factors. 
Firstly, my experience as a technocrat in the Trinidad and Tobago public service would have 
prefigured my reflexivity, thereby constraining to some degree what I was able to perceive 
during data collection. Secondly, scheduling challenges combined with limitations of my ability 
to secure interviews with private sector players, particularly those representing multinationals. 
This point can be addressed through further research. Finally, the limitation of using a 
snowballing technique to identify the whole social network, even in a small society such as 
Trinidad and Tobago, meant that my sample was subject to the possibility of only uncovering 
some of the ‘small worlds’ that exist, and not others. The likelihood of this being a problem is 
highlighted by the siloed character of the various stakeholder groups in general, and 
government agencies in particular.  
 
4.5. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I have explained the methodology used in this research, as well as the methods 
employed to operationalise the methodology in the conduct of this research. The methodology 
is a contextual case study, which means that it is processual, embedded and longitudinal in 
character. In this chapter I also sought to justify CDA as a suitable analytical lens for the type of 
investigation being undertaken. The second section covered the details of the mixed methods 
of data collection employed: documents and semi-structured interviews.  
We now move on to discuss the contextual background information that illustrates the 
contextual background in which the case study is embedded. 
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5. Contextual Background 
 
This chapter presents the contextual setting of the study. This is necessary to frame the 
analysis in terms of the specific historical, cultural and political situated factors so as to allow 
the reader to evaluate independently the findings presented later in the thesis. This contextual 
background information also assists the reader in assessing the wider validity and reliability of 
the implications of this study in other policy contexts, as presented in the concluding chapter. 
The next section details the particularities of Trinidad and Tobago in terms of its political history, 
society, smallness and insularity. A brief history of T&T’s economic development policy and 
strategy is offered in section 5.2.  
  
5.1. Particularities of Trinidad and Tobago 
5.1.1. Political Economy 
The twin-island state of Trinidad and Tobago was a British colony from the end of the eighteenth 
century to the country’s independence from the United Kingdom in 1962. It later became a 
republic in 1976, thereby replacing the British Monarch as Head of State with a similarly 
ceremonial position of President. It has been widely covered elsewhere that during the colonial 
period in Trinidad and Tobago, as in other colonies, what can now be considered commonplace 
rights such as education, business and property ownership, and political self-government 
through adult suffrage were not afforded to the widest proportions of society but were instead 
the exclusive province of the elite colonial class or their income-earning equals (John, 1991). The 
country’s economy was largely based on its manufacturing industry during that period, which 
consisted in the processing of raw materials, such as rum, sugar and oil for export to the 
metropolitan pole. Consequently, public policy of the day served mainly to advance the colonial 
agenda. 
On the subject of the mechanics of the Trinbagonian variant of a modern democratic system 
Mottley (2008) provides critical and eye-opening insight. Given his role as a two-time 
government minister in two different People’s National Movement (PNM) administrations, his 
views warrant some attention. He points out: 
“Trinidad and Tobago operates a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. In 
theory, there is a separation of powers: among the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary. However, there is a long history and prevailing culture of centralized 
authority in Trinidad and Tobago which was ruled under a system of ‘Crown Colony’ 
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government in colonial times. Under this system, decisive power was centralized in 
the colonial governor as the representative of the British crown.  
In the 46 years since independence in 1962, the government has been drawn for 36 
of those years from one party, the People’s National Movement (PNM). The 
formative years of the PNM were dominated by its charismatic founder, Dr Eric 
Williams. His instincts were closely aligned with the authoritative centralizing model 
of government he inherited.  
Local government has little revenue-raising capacity or free determination of 
expenditure. Parliament rubber stamps cabinet decisions, exercising pragmatic 
restraint only when bills require a special majority for passage. The judiciary is largely 
independent, but does require cabinet and parliamentary approval for discretionary 
spending. In this system, real power lies within the Cabinet and, in the Cabinet, the 
Prime Minister is supreme.” (Mottley, 2008: 106) 
As highlighted by Mottley, a governance style which can be characterised as ‘command and 
control’ was prevalent in the Trinbagonian political system. This was influenced by the country’s 
history as a British colony, the relatively short duration of its status as an independent nation, 
and the dominance of a single political party in the country’s leadership through much of that 
time. These characteristics influence the hyper-competitive nature of both inter-party politics 
and intra-Cabinet power struggles. 
Trinidad and Tobago is a high-income country with per capita GDP of over US$30,000 that is rich 
in natural resources, with mature oil, gas and petrochemical industries. Between 1994 and 2008, 
the country’s output grew at an impressive average rate of approximately 7% which exceeded 
the regional average of 3.7% over the same period. The country has been characterised by the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) as having a dual economy (Artana et al., 2007). Its 
energy sector is very productive, export-oriented, and exhibits high rates of return on 
investment. However, according to World Bank data, over the decade 2005 to 2014 while the 
energy sector represented 90% of foreign exchange earnings, 66% of exports and 44% of gross 
domestic product (GDP), it only provided 3.1% of employment. On the other hand, the non-
energy sector is underdeveloped, attracts little investment and, largely depends on government 
subsidies and transfers. Crude oil has been explored and produced in the country for over 100 
years, but the real driver of growth in the past two decades has been the return on investments 
(both foreign and domestic) into production of liquefied natural gas, petrochemicals (ammonia, 
methanol and urea) and steel, supported by high energy prices. Over the last decade, average 
annual GDP growth in the petroleum sector averaged 9.7%. The non-energy sector on the other 
hand exhibited much slower growth rates with a decade mean of 3.6% (Longmore et al., 2014). 
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According to Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago statistics17, on average over the period 2010 
to 2015 the country’s agricultural sector employed 3% of the workforce, while manufacturing 
accounted for 8%, and services (including government) made up 60%. 
Nonetheless, as is common in resource-based countries, T&T’s economy has historically been 
quite volatile and particularly vulnerable to commodity price shocks. The 2008 global financial 
crisis and its aftermath have exposed the structural weaknesses of the T&T economy. While its 
commodity producing Latin American neighbours registered positive growth throughout the 
international crisis, Trinidad and Tobago's economy contracted by 3.5% in 2009 and remained 
flat in 2010. This was due mainly to falling output in the energy sector. This situation highlighted 
the extent to which the country’s growth performance remains dependent on its energy sector, 
and the need to exploit new sources of sustainable growth through economic diversification 
toward more innovation-driven activities.  
T&T has been characterised as suffering from Dutch disease18, the effect of which has been a 
chronic struggle to effectively diversify its economy beyond the energy sector. According to 
Artana et al. (2007) other contributory factors to this malady include: the effect of natural 
resource abundance on public policies, particularly fiscal policy which tends to be pro-cyclical 
with energy prices, thereby diminishing the credibility of the government and increasing the 
macroeconomic risk perceived by the private sector; low research and development (R&D) 
capability and output in both public and private sectors; insufficient innovation capacity and 
technological readiness of firms outside the energy sector; infrastructure bottlenecks; and, 
finally, crime. 
5.1.2. People & Society 
T&T has successfully maintained a diverse mix of ethnic and religious people groups without 
having suffered the associated upheavals and violent eruptions so often found in other countries 
that are similarly composed, including neighbouring Guyana. This generally harmonious state of 
interaction (if only superficially so) once caused renowned South African social rights activist 
Desmond Tutu to refer to the twin-island state as a “rainbow country”.  
T&T's cultural, ethnic and religious diversity was borne out of a history of immigration that 
commenced with European colonisation of the native Amerindian population, proceeded 
                                                          
17  Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago Data Centre – Annual Labour Force data - http://www.central-
bank.org.tt/content/labour-force-annual-0 [last accessed on 26th March 2016] 
18 Dutch disease broadly refers to the harmful consequences of large increases in a country’s income, 
whether as a result of natural resource discovery, sharp surges in natural resource prices or foreign 
assistance. 
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through African slavery and Indian indentureship19 (both intended to provide labour for sugar 
cane cultivation), and culminated with the immigration of Chinese, Syrian-Lebanese and 
Portuguese nationals right up to the early part of the twentieth century. At present, people of 
Indian descent and those of African descent make up the two largest ethnic groups, but there is 
notable representation from all other groups, as well as various mixtures. 
Being such a plural society has had a peculiar effect on the political mobilization of the country's 
people. As Farrell (2012: 7) writes “[t]he greater significance of Trinidad and Tobago's ethnic or 
“tribal” segments is that the political parties have tended to draw the majority of their 
membership from one or other of the main ethnic groups. The support for the People's National 
Movement (PNM) has come mainly from the urban Afro-creole population distributed along the 
East-West Corridor and San Fernando, the second largest city, whereas the support for the main 
opposition party has been drawn from the East Indian population located in Central Trinidad. 
Tobago has shifted allegiances depending on which party more resources and more autonomy 
for Tobago are likely to come from. This has meant therefore that the policymakers have come 
predominantly from one ethnic group or the other, depending on which party has emerged 
successful in the general elections.” 
What this has meant in practice over the fifty odd years since independence is the 
establishment, or at least certainly the perceived establishment, of monopolies on power and 
control of state resources held by one or the other large social group to the exclusion of others. 
La Guerre (1999: 41) rationalises this as follows: 
“In plural societies ... the cultural cleavages are more deep-seated. Indeed so 
profound are these cleavages that they have given rise to a theory that such societies 
in which there is divergence in institutional practice at basic and secondary levels are 
sui generis. In such societies the family, economic and education systems are 
different for the various ethnic groups. Even secondary associations and institutions 
such as pressure groups, intellectual groupings, and voluntary activities follow the 
lines of ethnic cleavage. In such cases a culture constitutes a bloc of associations and 
institutions and closure within segments is at their greatest. In the case of Trinidad, 
it is important to recognize the plural nature of the society and its differences from 
other societies of the Caribbean.” 
                                                          
19 The system of indentureship of Indian immigrants was intended to replace the abolished practice of 
slavery of Africans who had been transported to the New World to provide labour for agricultural 
production. For further information on the history of Indian arrival in Trinidad and Tobago, please see the 
website of the National Council of Indian Culture - http://www.ncictt.com/indian-arrival/history [last 
accessed on 22.03.2016] 
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This would suggest that at a fundamental level, T&T is configured in such a way that multiple 
discursive spaces and a variety of disparate narratives is constantly at work in the discursive 
construction of every social institution, including the national policy system. Farrell (2012) 
suggests that this peculiarity has had a negative influence on policymakers since they may 
perceive a stable bloc of support regardless of the efficacy of their policy choices. Further, this 
scenario regularly raises questions among the general public as to the equity of distribution of 
resources across ethnic groups as well as geographic regions of the country. 
5.1.3. Smallness & Insularity 
Trinidad and Tobago has a population of 1.3 million people – tiny by the standards of most other 
countries in its income bracket. This small population affords the country a similarly minute 
domestic market which has precluded the attainment of economies of scale and has had a 
stunting effect on the development of customer and business sophistication, characteristics 
which are essential on both the supply and demand ends of the production system for crafting 
an innovation-driven economy.  
Trinidad and Tobago’s smallness is also exhibited in its “populist politics”. While such a 
phenomenon is also prevalent in several Latin American countries, the Caribbean variety of 
populism that is displayed in Trinidad and Tobago has been exacerbated by a post-colonial 
identity crisis. In this regard populism can be understood as a mechanism used by politicians for 
appeasing the broadest base of constituents at any cost, often devoid of any particular 
philosophical or economic ideology. The effects of Caribbean populism are more acute than 
those which affect Latin American countries because of the limitations that are typical of small 
states, such as: small goods and labour markets; limited indigenous skills and resource base; 
diseconomies of scale, etc. In the Caribbean such limitations are extended further owing to the 
fact that countries such as Trinidad and Tobago are Small Island Developing States (SIDS), a 
status which is accompanied by a series of vulnerabilities that are social, economic and 
environmental in nature20.  
Trinidad and Tobago, like the rest of the Caribbean, is passively integrated into the global 
economy. This is because, even with independence and well-developed oil, gas and 
petrochemical industries, asymmetrical preferential trading agreements with the metropolitan 
states (e.g. the Lomé Conventions21 I-IV with Europe) created a false sense of comfort among 
                                                          
20 For more detailed coverage of the constraints of small size faced by Caribbean countries see Demas 
(1965) 
21 The Lomé Convention was a trade and aid agreement that existed between the European Economic 
Community and 71 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states that was first established in 1975, was 
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local policymakers, and hence, did not instil in them the drive to establish the necessary 
framework conditions to encourage the non-energy firms in the country to grow and become 
more innovative and export-orientated in the intervening years since gaining independence. 
Upon establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995 the US lobbied successfully against 
asymmetrical trading arrangements, thereby bringing an end to Lomé and making way for the 
CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). It was anticipated that a revamped 
trade policy framework would facilitate development among the Caribbean countries that are 
party to the Agreement. Having been shocked out of their lull, Caribbean policymakers (as 
compared to those from other parts of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and Group of 
77) responded too eagerly to the EPA – a choice that has been roundly criticized in some 
quarters22. The consequence of this approach will only become fully known from 2015 and 
beyond as the EPA comes into full effect.  
T&T’s geographical location (10.6667° N, 61.5167° W i.e. the southernmost islands of the 
Caribbean archipelago) puts the country within close reach of the large Latin American markets 
of Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil. Yet, despite its geographical closeness with its Latin American 
neighbours, for historic, linguistic, political and other reasons, both North America and Western 
Europe remain key trading partners for T&T. This is a poignant example of the “insularity” first 
pointed out by Clarke (1976) and revisited by Girvan (2001) that arises from the country’s 
stunted and fragmented identity as a manufactured nation of immigrants with a persistent 
longing for the former colonial masters (or neo-colonial masters, in the case of the US). 
From another perspective, the lack of customer sophistication, and aversion to exploiting new 
markets expressed by business owners means there has been little impetus for firms to grow 
their capabilities to create new products through innovation. The introduction and take up of 
advanced telecommunication services during the mid-1990s to mid-2000s helped reverse this 
trend, but overall, the proportion of firms with a high capacity for innovation is low23. Such 
behaviour can also be attributed to low domestication of ICT and the Internet as an adaptive 
                                                          
renegotiated and renewed 3 times (hence versions I-IV), and subsequently brought to an end when the 
US petitioned the WTO on the grounds that the Convention violated WTO rules. 
22 See, for example, Havelock Brewster’s (2008) “The Anti-Development Dimension of the European 
Community’s Economic Partnership Agreement for the Caribbean”, available online at: 
http://www.normangirvan.info/the-anti-development-dimension-of-the-european-communitys-
economic-partnership-agreement-for-caribbean-havelock-brewster/ [accessed 18 Feb. 2015] and 
Brewster, Girvan and Lewis (2008) “Renegotiate the EPA”, available online at: 
http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/renegotiate-the-epa-rev1.pdf [accessed 
18 Feb. 2015] 
23 Trinidad and Tobago’s low capacity for innovation places it 105th of 144 countries surveyed in the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2014-15. The evidence of this characterisation is borne 
out by the country’s rank of 90th of 143 countries in the Global Innovation Index 2014 
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system since the range of internationalisation techniques are dependent on the level of analytics 
integrated into business operations, and the willingness of company leadership to take risks. 
This state of affairs has not hindered the country’s ability to dominate CARICOM markets, 
however24.  
 
5.2. A history of economic development policy and strategy 
Consistent with the popular perspective of development as economic growth at the time, 
developmental initiatives in the country from its independence until 2011 took on a primarily 
industrial character, intended to transform and develop the national economy, with the 
expectation that such transformations would provide the financial windfall to facilitate societal 
change. 
After winning general elections in 1956 the PNM-led government engaged in an initiative of 
national progress by industrialization, which was characterised by a series of five-year 
development plans commencing in 1958. According to Wendell Mottley’s (2008) chronicle of 
the country’s industrial policy history, “[i]ndustrialization was an important economic goal in 
these plans which the nationalist government believed would give economic expression to 
political independence.” (p. 9) 
Mottley went on to explain how Trinidad and Tobago came to mimic Puerto Rico's strategy of 
‘industrialization by invitation’ by establishing its own Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
in 1959 in the mould of the Puerto Rican Industrial Development Corporation (PRIDCO). The IDC 
was opened up to external input as it was headed by a non-national, David Weintraub.  At the 
time the Trinidad and Tobago government also employed fiscal incentives such as tax holidays, 
duty-free raw material and capital goods imports. Owing to a lack of preferential legislative 
conditions such as were present in Puerto Rico (via the US Internal Revenue Code which created 
incentives for US investment in that country), Trinidad and Tobago moved on to an import 
substitution model of industrialization post-1966. In this new dispensation, the IDC, now headed 
by nationals, implemented some alternative mechanisms to encourage domestic 
manufacturing, such as: legislative protection in the local market by way of a negative list that 
restricted imports, and later, the introduction of high import tariffs; and subsidization of capital 
                                                          
24 In 2010, Trinidad and Tobago enjoyed a net positive Balance of Trade with CARICOM of EC$ 5.23 billion, 
and over the period 2005-2010 experienced an average annual share of intra-regional exports of 77.8%, 
according to (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005) CARICOM’s Trade – A Quick Reference to Some Summary Data: 
2005-2010, available online at: http://www.caricomstats.org/caricomtrade_quick_ref.htm [accessed 
16th February, 2015] 
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expenditure via the establishment of factory shell buildings on industrial estates. Declining 
product quality of locally produced goods, combined with allegations of institutional corruption 
in the issuance of licences for import led to a revocation of these policy measures by the early 
1990s (Mottley, 2008: 11). 
On the social relations front, besides a greater potential for self-governance, one of the 
purported rationales for the PNM coming into power and seeking an end to British rule had been 
the decolonisation of society. The class divide that existed while under colonial control was 
understandably a sore point for the working class masses. And so, in parallel with the economic 
developments of the early post-Independence era, levels of social unrest came to a head in 1970 
in what has been termed the “Black Power revolution” due to what was perceived as a slow 
pace of social change from pre-Independence social stratification (La Guerre, 1999: 154).  
In the early 1980s the Government introduced a series of subsidies aimed at encouraging 
manufacturers to increase their export output. These incentives, along with the presence of very 
cheap electricity rates, spurred, and still maintain a net positive trade balance with the rest of 
the Caribbean in non-energy sectors.  
Despite the discovery of oil in 1866, the petroleum industry did not take off until commercial 
production began in 1908. Refining began shortly after and climaxed in the 1950s with the 
purchase and expansion of the Pointe-a-Pierre refinery by American oil giant Texaco. At the 
time, the refinery sustained higher production levels by processing imported oil from other 
countries. Mottley (2008) proposed four major developments in the 1960s and 1970s that 
propelled the petroleum industry in T&T to its current place of prominence: 
 1969 - Amoco and the Pan American Oil Company discovered major oil deposits off the 
east coast of Trinidad 
 1970 - Amoco and other oil companies find natural gas deposits during further oil 
exploration  
 1973 - Arab/Israeli war prompted global ‘oil price shocks’ which raised oil prices from 
US$2.50 to US$34.00 per barrel  
 1974 - T&T government introduced taxation measures to increase government revenue 
from oil resources 
These events precipitated the ‘oil boom’ period of 1974 to 1984 wherein the petroleum 
industry's contribution to GDP increased substantially, and the total revenues from petroleum 
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exceeded US$12 billion over the same period (a remarkable feat, given that the country's entire 
economy in 1970 was worth US$863 million) (Mottley, 2008: 13). 
The windfall earnings provided to the Government by the petroleum industry during the boom 
years fuelled unprecedented largesse in the form of public sector expenditure - public goods 
and services, and state-led industrial expansion. State enterprises established during this period 
spanned a range of productive sectors, namely: “airlines, shipping, cement, printing, food 
processing, property development, hospital management, telecommunications, hotels, finance, 
quarries and the energy industry” (Mottley, 2008: 15). In the economic decline that set in when 
oil prices stabilised after the boom ended such practices proved unsustainable. The ensuing 
economic depression and shock to the system of a populace reared with a dependency 
syndrome precipitated a massive political change: the incumbent PNM was ousted from 
Government in 1986 for the first time in the twenty-four years since Independence. As Pantin 
(1991: 78) put it:  
“In December 1986, the PNM was literally swept out of office after a 30-year reign 
by the coalition NAR which captured 33 of the 36 Parliamentary seats. The NAR was 
elected on a Manifesto that promised to turn around the economic decline which had 
begun to exhibit itself from as early as 1982. Two trends dominated the first two 
years of the NAR in office. First, the perhaps unavoidable errors of learning, given the 
fact that only two of the NAR Ministers had any prior experience of holding office. 
Second, an increasingly bitter internecine struggle among members of the coalition, 
culminating in the expulsion of most of those who were previously associated with 
the predominantly sugar - and the East Indian-based - United Labour Front (ULF). The 
corrosive trend in the country's external accounts was ignored until mid-1988, when 
it became clear that foreign debt service payments could not be sustained. It is in this 
context that IMF Agreements were negotiated. The policy conditionalities attached 
to these IMF Agreements, as well as a Structural Adjustment Loan from the World 
Bank, have had a, by now well-known, negative impact on the most vulnerable 
groups in the society.” 
Although generally characterised as a laid-back society, before this period Trinidad and Tobago’s 
citizenry had previously expressed their proclivity for social unrest during the 1970 Black Power 
Revolution. Back then, just as in the mid-1980s period summarised above by Pantin, one of the 
main bones of contention between the general public and the politicians was the perceived slow 
pace of progress, and the uneven distribution of wealth, which was considered particularly 
unacceptable in a post-colonial environment. In the intervening period since independence, 
many felt that not enough was done to turn the country’s fortunes around, and that what little 
progress was made during the oil boom years had been squandered. And so it was that the policy 
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prescriptions of fiscal belt-tightening espoused by the Washington institutions made their way 
into the practice of Trinbagonian economic policy.  
The 1990s into the early 2000s was a period of economic resurgence for Trinidad and Tobago, 
fuelled by a prolonged phase of the advance of "neoliberal" policy prescriptions, even across 
changes in administration. By neoliberal, I am specifically referring to an approach that espouses 
market mechanisms as the main growth driver, and that defines the state as facilitator through 
infrastructure and human capital development. This represented a notable shift from the 
approach taken during the previous decades, wherein the government had played the role of 
lead investor/entrepreneur. According to Farrell (2012: 180) all political parties that retained 
power during the period 1993 to 2008 [the UNC-NAR coalition, the UNC and the PNM] sustained 
similar policy motifs without explicit reference to ideological labels. Instead, in each 
administration, pragmatism took the lead in recognising the urgent need for foreign investment. 
As expressed by Farrell (2012: 181): 
"Foreign direct investment was encouraged because the government did not have 
the resources to invest itself. Fiscal discipline and consolidation was emphasized 
because revenues were constrained, debt service was high, and the IMF and World 
Bank were active in monitoring macroeconomic policy. Exchange controls were to be 
abolished, not so much because of a commitment to free-market determination of 
the exchange rate, but because they had become bureaucratic, a source of 
corruption and a hindrance to business activity. What was clear was a shift in favour 
of supporting the private sector and business investment consistent with the 
Washington Consensus, and the notion that government regulations should be clear, 
simple and transparent." 
The changes during this period were fuelled not only by policy but by more wide-ranging global 
developments such as calls for increased democratization, deepened integration of economic 
spaces, and technological changes that directly affected individuals as well as companies.  
The World Wide Web burst onto the scene during this period, leading to the "dotcom" boom 
(and eventual bust) that entrenched the knowledge-based industries of the ICT sector in the 
public consciousness. These developments were followed swiftly by the expanded rollout of 
broadband Internet and mobile computing/telephony, both of which exacerbated the gap - aka 
the "digital divide" - between the digital haves and have nots, the former of whom were often 
more likely than not located in developed as opposed to developing countries. 
The arrival of the Telecommunications Act of 2001 was the single most important legislative 
change that heralded the new phase of digital industrial development in Trinidad and Tobago. 
This Act sought to allow the entry of new providers of mobile telephony and broadband internet 
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services, interconnection between those providers, effective spectrum management - all under 
the oversight of an independent telecommunications authority. Shortly thereafter in 2003, the 
country’s first national ICT for development strategy was released. 
 
5.3. Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented a broad landscape of contextual background information that is relevant 
for analysing this case. Trinidad and Tobago is a former British colony that has inherited many 
of Great Britain’s political and legal norms, though in the post-war era, the United States has 
also had a significant cultural, economic and political impact.  
Political power is concentrated in central government, and particularly in the Cabinet. Given that 
the culture of political dialogue tends to be centred on the electoral cycle, with minimal citizen 
engagement outside of those periods, the government’s policymaking and Parliament’s 
legislative functions are susceptible to capture by elites, making widespread corruption and the 
perceived inequitable distribution of energy sector windfalls a regular bone of contention.  
The country is ranked as high income due to the fact that its economy is largely based on its oil, 
gas and petrochemical industries. However, very few of its citizens directly interact with those 
industries through employment. Out of the other productive sectors, services play the most 
important role, of which government services contributes the lion’s share. Consequently, the 
country’s internal economic system is one characterised by wealth redistribution facilitated by 
the government. 
There is a diverse mix of ethnic and racial groups. However, while the general societal motif is 
one of multiculturalism and even cultural hybridisation, there are marked cleavages in the 
political system along ethnic and racial lines.  
Trinidad and Tobago is paradoxical in its smallness. On the one hand its industrial makeup 
necessitates interaction with trading partners the world over, and there is a steady inflow of 
imported goods to satisfy local consumption patterns. There is also a significant and vibrant 
relationship with the Trinbagonian diaspora across the globe, even though they are largely 
concentrated in North America and Western Europe. Yet despite the country’s geographical 
closeness to Latin America, there is relatively little done to foster productive relationships with 
countries on the South American continent, with primary external focus instead placed on 
English-speaking neighbours in CARICOM, and the aforementioned US and UK links. A 
consequence of this phenomenon that does not bode well for ICT-enabled growth strategies is 
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that opportunities for expansion of goods and labour markets, as well as recruitment of skilled 
resources from Latin America tend to wither on the vine.  
Each of the issues discussed here presents opportunities and challenges for the use of ICT to 
organise society, politics and the economy in Trinidad and Tobago, hence the preceding 
discussion will allow us to locate the case within a specific historical, cultural and political context 
as it is unpacked in Chapter 6. The information will also be relevant for the theoretical discussion 
in Chapter 7. 
We now move on to the case study.  
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6. Case Study: 3 cases of discursive construction of ICT4D 
policy in Trinidad and Tobago 
 
This chapter presents the contextual case study of the construction of ICT4D policy in 
Trinidad and Tobago. This case study is structured as three sub-cases: telecommunications 
sector liberalization; public sector reform through the introduction of e-Government, and 
particularly, a Communications Backbone network; and, the development of Trinidad and 
Tobago’s first national ICT strategy, dubbed fastforward. The sub-cases are presented in the 
order in which they emerged in real time, although strictly speaking, they are not necessarily 
sequentially linked. While there are periods of overlap across the three sub-cases, the data 
suggests that the actors and events described in each were only tangentially linked.  
 
 
Figure 3 – Temporal windows of sub-cases 
The temporal window of each sub-case is illustrated in Figure 3. The telecommunications sector 
liberalization sub-case is traced back to a significant discursive event in 1985 and the narrative 
is carried through until a significant legislative event that epitomizes the process occurs in 2005. 
The Backbone sub-case opens in 1999, also with a major discursive event and proceeds until the 
conclusion of the second phase of the network’s installation in 2008. The fastforward sub-case 
formally commenced in 2002, but was pre-figured by some of the events that were chronicled 
in the telecommunications liberalization sub-case. It also proceeded until the end of the 
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strategy’s execution timeline in 2008. In all cases, the events immediately succeeding the end of 
the sub-case are also presented and discussed.  
Each sub-case exemplifies a particular configuration of events, texts, narratives and institutions, 
as per the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2. The idea is to explore the construction 
of ICT4D policy along 3 dimensions: infrastructure upgrade (the telecom liberalization sub-case); 
e-Government-led public service reform (the Backbone sub-case) and societal change (the 
fastforward sub-case). Each sub-case is presented as a thematic narrative, so that the initial 
events are first introduced, then developed by showing how they produced key texts which in 
turn influenced a particular course of action. Those key texts embodied particular narratives, so 
that wherever competing narratives were identified, the competition between contested 
narratives was explored in some detail before closing off with a statement of the resolution of 
the sub-case, in so far as resolution occurred.  
We commence the case study with the sub-case that chronicles the story of Trinidad and 
Tobago’s telecommunications liberalization. 
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6.1. Missing Link: catching up via telecommunications liberalization 
6.1.1. Origins 
The mid-1980s was a period of major transitions in global telecommunications and this was no 
less evident in Trinidad and Tobago. There were two telecommunications operators in the 
country at the time with a very clear division of labour: Telco (Trinidad and Tobago Telephone 
Company Limited) that provided domestic telephone service, and which was 100% owned by 
the State; and Textel (Trinidad and Tobago External Telecommunications Company Limited) that 
operated the international gateway and provided the facilities to interconnect with the 
operators of all foreign countries, and which was 51% owned by the State, and 49% owned by 
British telecom giant, Cable & Wireless (C&W). Telco, at the time, served a user base of 
approximately 160,000 customers that were largely concentrated along the country’s so-called 
East-West Corridor. Telco was regularly characterized as slow to respond to customer feedback, 
and in some cases, indifferent to customers’ desires for cheaper rates on domestic and 
international long-distance telephone calls, since data communications had not yet become 
widespread. As the decade drew to a close both companies began straining under the pressure 
of increased demand for services which consequently necessitated the installation of modern 
(understood as digital electronic) telecommunications infrastructure25.  
The country’s citizenry was just over two decades into celebrating its status as an independent 
nation and began demanding an accelerated rate of introduction of advanced telephony services 
(such as International Direct Distance Dialling, call waiting, call forwarding and conference 
calling) to accompany their aspirations to upward mobility. With the new services there was the 
expectation of a concomitant reduction in prices26 since, at the time, telephone service was still 
widely seen as a luxury. Discontinuities were evident at multiple levels. On the global level in 
December 1984 the seminal ‘Missing Link’ Report, also known as the Maitland Report27, was 
published by the Independent Commission for World Wide Telecommunications Development, 
a commission that had been convened in 1982 by the Plenipotentiary Conference of the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). This report, which has since been cited by 
                                                          
25 Although periodic incremental upgrades had been introduced since the 1930s, the major modern 
infrastructure upgrades actually started at the beginning of the 1980s, with Telco’s owner, the 
Government of Trinidad and Tobago, turning to Nippon Electric of Japan and Northern Telecom of Canada 
for provision of the required lines, switches and other equipment to start the transition to a digital 
network. 
26 This demand was fostered by feedback from the growing T&T Diaspora that had settled in the 
metropolitan cities of the US and the UK, as well as a steadily increasing diet of American consumerism 
via television shows and other media. 
27 So named after the Commission’s chairman, Sir Donald Maitland 
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practitioners and academics as a landmark document in the field, zeroed in on 
telecommunications development, and particularly the improvement of telecommunications 
infrastructure as a critical precondition for socioeconomic development.  
In advancing a set of roles for telecommunications, the Report underlined the growing need for 
timely exchange of information in a range of applications: emergencies and health services; 
global travel and transport to facilitate commerce; and, increasing demand for improved 
efficiency of public administration systems to support economic activities.  
One respondent summarised the events as follows: 
“Back in 1985, there were not too many directives as far as national policy. Textel 
had responsibility for ensuring external or off-island communications, and so their 
focus was on ensuring that their service provision surpassed the demand. We were 
technologically way ahead of Telco - we had established the satellite earth station 
that carried most of the international traffic. The international networks were well 
in place, but they had bottlenecks with the domestic network. Around 1985 Telco 
was in the process of upgrading their equipment, while Textel had already gone fully 
digital since 1982. The end of the Shareholder's Agreement between GoRTT and 
Cable &Wireless in 1990 led to C&W buying into Telco and a new Shareholder's 
Agreement was put in place that covered both the international and domestic 
networks. This process resulted in the creation of TSTT28 - specifically, Textel was 
vested into Telco.” – Interview with Cris Seecheran, CEO of TATT, discussing his time 
working at Textel 
In Trinidad and Tobago, the receptivity to this new direction had been prefigured by another 
major player, the World Bank, to whom the Government of Trinidad and Tobago had turned for 
financial assistance to fund its telecommunications development programme in 1974. As the 
1980s wore on the Bank became another significant proponent of telecommunications reform, 
calling for privatization of state-owned operators. The Bank’s rationale for involvement in 
telecommunication have been recorded by Mitchell29 (2007: 5–6) as follows: 
 "[telecommunication] has become a strategic investment for economic development, is 
a critical factor for the success of many bank operations, and results in efficiency gains 
throughout the economy;" 
                                                          
28 Telecommunications Services of Trinidad and Tobago Limited 
29 Peter Mitchell has worked for the Government of Trinidad and Tobago on telecommunications policy, 
and eventually ICT policy, since 1998, spanning a range of research and management roles across all the 
various ministries and departments to which the telecommunications policy portfolio was assigned. Mr. 
Mitchell is an economist by profession, and played an important role in advising the government during 
Trinidad and Tobago’s telecommunications reform programme. 
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 "[telecommunication] requires a comprehensive approach to sector policy linked to 
overall country economic strategy, which commercial and bilateral organisations are 
neither inclined nor equipped to handle;" 
 "[telecommunication] can lead cross-sectoral policy reforms, public sector restructuring 
and regulatory development;" 
 "[telecommunication] can be an essential component of private sector development 
programmes;" 
 "[telecommunication] offers tangible results and low project risks." 
After the major upgrades of the 1980s were completed, the end of the Shareholder's Agreement 
between the government and C&W in 1990 led to C&W buying into Telco and a new 
Shareholder's Agreement was put in place that covered both the international and domestic 
networks. This process resulted in the creation of TSTT - specifically, Textel was vested into Telco 
– with a 51/49 ownership split between the Trinidad and Tobago government and C&W. 
C&W’s purchase of 49% of TSTT was not wholly positive, however, as it curtailed local 
determination of telecommunications development. One such example cited by Noguera (1998: 
13) concerned the closure of Telco’s R&D department:  
“In the mid-1980s two government-owned telcos --the Trinidad and Tobago 
Telephone Co Ltd and Telesur, in Suriname, became the only two equipment 
manufacturers in the region. 
T&T's then director of research and development, Dr Stephan Gift, developed a 
device, dubbed the subscriber pair identifier, to identify local faults on the main 
distribution frame. It was subsequently patented. A Canadian distributor has made 
it available to the small, regional telco operating companies in that country, and it 
has been sold to other Caribbean telcos. Influenced by Cable & Wireless, which 
became a 49 percent owner in 1991, T&T has eliminated research and development. 
The stated rationale is that it is too costly for a small country to undertake 
effectively.” 
Other entries within the literature that chronicled the negative impact of C&W on Caribbean 
telecommunications include Dunn (1991, 1995) and Sutherland (2009, 2010). 
In September 1986 the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations commenced. This 
Round was part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that spanned from 1986 
to 1994 and involved 123 countries as “contracting parties”. The objectives of the Uruguay 
Round included: reducing agricultural subsidies; lifting restrictions on foreign investment; and, 
most pertinently to this case study, starting the process of opening trade in services such as 
banking, insurance, intellectual property and telecommunications.  
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The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT in 1994 resulted in the creation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) to serve as the new mechanism for multilateral trade negotiations. 
Criticism about the GATT process itself and its outputs was raised by a number of NGOs such as 
Oxfam, Health Gap and Global Trade Watch on the grounds that too many constraints were 
imposed on developing countries in the areas of intellectual property and industrial tariffs, 
thereby hampering the future policy-making initiatives of those countries. Finger and Nogués 
(2002) have advanced three factors which contributed to what they considered an unbalanced 
outcome for developing countries: 
 The developing countries’ lack of experience in WTO negotiations, particularly their lack 
of knowledge of how the developing economies would be affected by what the 
industrial countries wanted in the WTO new areas 
 An intensified mercantilist attitude of the GATT/WTO’s major power, the US 
 A decision making structure within the WTO that went against the GATT tradition of 
decision by consensus by ejecting dissenting countries 
The Uruguay Round also introduced the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). When 
the Round ended in April 1994 it opened the way for GATS, which eventually took effect in 1995. 
At the time the Ministers with responsibility for telecommunications decided to extend 
negotiations on trade in basic telecommunications, with the aim of capturing the lessons learned 
from the regulatory reforms in telecommunications that were taking place at the time. The 
negotiations were undertaken by the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications (NGBT) 
which comprised of 53 WTO member governments, with 24 governments that were in the 
process of accession to WTO participating as observers. These negotiations were scheduled to 
conclude in April 1996, but were then further extended to February 1997. This process produced 
the Fourth Protocol, which was annexed to the GATS and came into effect on 5 February 1998, 
at which time the commitments on basic telecommunication services became part of the overall 
GATS commitments that had come into force since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.  
The impact of GATS began to be felt at the domestic policy level in Trinidad and Tobago at the 
conclusion of the NGBT’s work. The Fourth Protocol of GATS imposed legally binding 
commitments on WTO member countries concerning the liberalization of their telecom sectors. 
As a result, sixty-nine (69) countries which accounted for ninety-five percent of the global 
market for basic telecommunications services, including five CARICOM states (Antigua & 
Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago) confirmed their list of country-
specific commitments to the WTO. GATS also provided a template for the required telecom 
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sector reform - the Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles - within which a key feature was 
the establishment of an independent telecom regulator. This move precipitated the need for a 
strategic approach to establishing a competitive domestic telecom environment, which for 
Trinidad and Tobago meant the creation of a telecom sector development plan.  
To attend to the impact of the GATS commitments on Trinidad and Tobago a Ministerial 
Committee on Telecommunications was formed, which was headed by the Minister of Planning 
and Development. The Committee’s role was to review the existing legislation with the aim of 
aligning it with the GATS commitments. To achieve its purpose, the Committee established a 
Working Group on Telecommunications which was chaired by the Governor of Central Bank, 
Winston Dookeran. 
Another landmark event concerning telecommunications took place in 1997 as well. US 
telecommunications carriers lobbied the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to reduce 
the termination rates that they had been paying out to foreign telecom operators, on the 
grounds that the rates were not in line with actual costs of service provision, and that the net 
effect was foreign firms being subsidized by American telcos. Developing countries had received 
about $35 billion in net settlement payments from US telecom operators between 1985 and 
1998, annual payments had been growing exponentially over that period (Wallsten, 1999) and 
as of 1995 some developing countries derived up to 50 percent of their telecommunications 
revenues from international settlements (Braga et al., 1999). 
 
Figure 4 – Developing countries most vulnerable to telecommunications accounting rate reform, 1995 (source: 
Braga, Forestier and Stern, 1999) 
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In response to these circumstances, and taking into consideration the Basic Telecommunications 
Services Agreement that had been established in February, the FCC unilaterally established its 
Benchmarks Order in August 1997, which established settlement rates according to the foreign 
countries’ level of economic development along with deadline dates for compliance by the US-
licensed carriers, as follows:  
Upper Income   15¢ January 1, 1999 
Upper Middle Income   19¢ January 1, 2000 
Lower Middle Income   19¢ January 1, 2001 
Lower Income   23¢ January 1, 2002 
The Order anticipated that US telcos would negotiate proportionate reductions in termination 
charges so that they scaled downwards to the benchmarks within the respective transition 
periods. This change netted significant savings for US telcos (and by extension, US consumers), 
while causing a significant decline in revenue for developing country telcos. In the FCC’s view, 
high international telecommunications prices were caused either by obsolete regulation that 
hindered competition, or by artificial inflation of settlement rates that were significantly above 
cost since, in many cases, national carriers in developing country were state-owned and the 
revenues they earned were used for other development purposes (Cowhey, 1998). 
Unsurprisingly, this action generated a huge amount of policy debate, both leading up to and 
subsequent to the publication of the Order, with developing country telcos claiming that the 
FCC’s decision (especially when seen in the context of the new overarching GATS regime) would 
substantially hamper the development of their telecom sectors (Finger and Schuler, 1999). 
Despite strenuous objection, this notion was debunked by Wallsten (1999) through empirical 
analysis of settlement rate changes, telecom traffic and investment into telecom infrastructure 
across 179 countries from 1985-1998. He concluded: 
“I find that telecom traffic is sensitive to settlement rates. Reduced settlement rates 
lead to increased telecom traffic, and the biggest price effects occur in the poorest 
countries. That is, the poorest countries are likely to see the largest increase in 
telecom traffic as a result of decreases in the settlement rate. I also find no evidence 
that settlement payments are used to fund telecom investment. Settlement 
payments, while significantly correlated with telecom revenues, have no effect on 
mainline growth or imports of telecommunications equipment. In short, the data 
suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, settlement payments have not been 
invested in domestic telecom networks in developing countries.” (Wallsten, 1999: 18) 
In addition to the FCC’s Benchmark Order itself, the case put forward by Wallsten (1999) played 
a key role in delegitimising the common practice among developing countries of generating 
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extraordinary revenues from international settlements to use for other development purposes. 
Hitherto, any counter-productive effects of such practices (for example, discouraging foreign 
direct investment and hindering the development of local telecommunications-based 
industries) were overlooked by developing country governments as they looked to international 
telecoms to extract their share of the global telecommunications pie by extending taxation to 
those with the ability to pay and to compensate for the difficulties in collecting revenues from 
forms of taxation. In effect, that practice was bound to come to a close since it was contrary to 
the general neoliberal argument against cross-subsidisation. Having US telcos act in a 
coordinated fashion to break the cycle with the backing of the US Federal Government in 
defence of US business interests was simply inevitable.   
By the following year, in 1998, the Trinidadian Working Group on Telecommunications 
completed their analysis and produced what came to be known as the “Dookeran Report” – a 
strategy for domestic telecommunications development. The Report has been cited as Trinidad 
and Tobago’s first formal foray into telecom policy:  
“The Dookeran Report was the very first time we ever had a - what I would call - a 
codified telecom policy because before that we relied on statements by the Minister, 
so that prior to the Dookeran Report there was no single telecom policy framework 
or document to refer to. The closest reference was the Macro Planning Framework 
'89-'95 in the NAR administration, but it only had a paragraph in terms of what they 
planned to do. It didn't say anything about policy, just what government was 
planning to do in telecom and that was more or less focused on TSTT.” – Interview 
with Peter Mitchell, on T&T’s early attempts at formalising its telecommunications 
policy. 
The Report advocated for elevation of T&T’s position in the global marketplace through 
“management of the evolution of an information-based economy [which] would offer significant 
export opportunities and earnings, create new and challenging employment opportunities, 
diversify the economy and contribute to rural growth”. The report authors opined that the state 
of the telecom sector at the time was a hindrance to such an information-based economy since 
the sector was characterised by “poor quality of service, low penetration rates, relatively high 
prices and inadequate access to modern telecommunication and information services.” In the 
report the Working Group further noted that the globalisation of telecommunications services 
and the resulting interdependence of countries meant that Trinidad and Tobago was not 
sequestered from the major changes taking place globally. This framing put forward by the 
Dookeran Report endorsed and therefore conflated two parallel narratives. On the one hand it 
invoked speculation concerning the benefits of the ‘information-based’ economy which were 
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not guaranteed to be reaped by T&T. At the time there was no direct path to achieve the 
elevation in the global marketplace since there was only one globally competitive industry 
operating in the country30 and even in that regard, T&T was a relative minnow. On the other, 
the Report set out an argument for modernisation that had a broader political appeal. 
Approaching the year 2000 it would have been foolhardy for any developing country politician 
not to have espoused similar rhetoric. 
Although initially convened to treat with the GATS commitments the Dookeran Committee was 
no doubt influenced by the impact of the FCC Benchmark Order. Specifically, the Dookeran 
Report’s conclusions mirrored the arguments of the WTO Reference Paper on Regulatory 
Principles in recommending new legislation to liberalise the telecom sector and the creation of 
an independent regulatory agency as a means for modernising the sector. However, in this 
regard, the Dookeran Report also served as the mechanism for translating the FCC’s rationale 
for the de-legitimisation of leveraging excessive international settlement fees, i.e. buying into 
the prospects for market growth in an information-based economy rather than extracting tax 
revenues. In one fell swoop, TSTT went from being perceived as a national darling that was the 
country’s primary window to the outside world, as well as a popular provider of “safe permanent 
employment”, to being the biggest hurdle in the country’s way of becoming a major player in 
the global information society. The stage was set for a new telecom regime in Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
6.1.2. Contestation 
Despite the publication of the Dookeran Report in 1998, it would be three years before its 
recommendations came to be reflected in legislation as a key milestone on the way to bringing 
them into effect. The delay was due in part to the unexpected furore caused within the Public 
Service by the Y2K bug31, and in part to the disruptive shuffling and re-assignment of Cabinet 
responsibility for telecommunications policy, and eventually, ICT policy among various ministries 
as follows: 
 
                                                          
30 That is, the oil and gas industry which was not geared to generate significant knowledge spillover effects 
31 The Year 2000 Compliance Problem, or Y2K bug, concerned the manner in which dates were stored in 
computer systems that resulted from the practice of truncating a four-digit year to two digits. This made 
year 2000 indistinguishable from 1900 to a computer, resulting in various errors concerning, in particular, 
the automated ordering of dated records or real-time events. In Trinidad and Tobago, a Year 2000 
Compliance Committee was established by Cabinet Minute No. 1931 of July 31, 1997 within the National 
Information Systems Centre to lead the process of identifying the extent of the problem and finding 
solutions to it. 
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 1998 – Ministry of Information, Communications, Training and Distance Learning 
 1999 – Office of the Prime Minister 
 2000 – Ministry of Communications and Information Technology 
 2002 – Ministry of Science, Technology and Tertiary Education 
 2002 – Ministry of Public Administration 
While the first re-assignment ostensibly occurred as a result of increasing pressure to act due to 
the GATS commitments, the subsequent reshuffling of Ministerial portfolios could have 
represented one of at least three different realities.  
Firstly, there were evolving perspectives on telecommunications policy, the convergence of 
telecommunications and ICT, and the role of the latter in development, all of which would have 
been weighed among a number of competing priorities faced by the Cabinet. This may have 
been exacerbated by a lack of understanding within Cabinet of the nature of ICT policy, the 
prospects for short term gains from moves toward the information-based economy and 
eagerness among politicians to demonstrate tangible results. The comments from a former 
Permanent Secretary who worked under multiple administrations supported this view: 
“When I went into Public Admin I had Wade Mark [as minister] who came from IR 
[industrial relations] but not public admin systems. Now, although Dr. Saith didn't 
have public admin [qualifications], engineers understand systems and building 
blocks, so he got it. I'll give you an example, because I try not to judge anybody - 
Wade Mark had seen an example of the ttConnect Service Centres working in Bahia, 
in Brazil. He saw these mobile buses going out fully loaded that could deliver services 
to people in rural communities. And he gave us three months to initiate something 
like that in Trinidad. We didn't even have the Backbone yet. And therefore you know 
there was no way that was going to happen. So I don't know what he was committing 
to the Cabinet, but based on that lack of understanding of systems and change he 
might have communicated expectations that were not achievable.” – interview with 
Jacqueline Wilson, on unrealistic expectations of policymakers 
A second perspective is that changes in the Executive arm of government as a result of general 
elections tend to bring about realignment of ministerial portfolios, and in this case it should be 
noted that general elections were held three times in as many years (2000, 2001 and 2002) 
during a period of unprecedented instability in Trinidad and Tobago’s Parliament.32 However, a 
senior public officer who worked in telecom policy through that period offered a dissenting view: 
                                                          
32 In 2000, the UNC won the general elections 19-17. But in 2001, the UNC Government collapsed after 
three of its MPs Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj, Trevor Sudama and Ralph Maraj fell out with the party. Prime 
Minister Basdeo Panday was forced to call an election which ended in an unprecedented 18-18 tie. 
President Arthur NR Robinson, acting in accordance with section 76(1) of the constitution, appointed PNM 
leader Patrick Manning as Prime Minister on December 24, 2001. But Manning was unable to govern as 
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“Our commitments to WTO gave us certain stability in policy between the UNC and 
PNM. Nothing changed when Dr. Saith took over [as Minister of Public 
Administration]. What would have caused the break is the internal capacity. In doing 
some research I came across some authors who suggest that the change in 
government may not have been the cause of delay for some countries in coming to 
liberalize, but maybe [the problem was] the capacity of their resources. And knowing 
how Trinidad operates - if you don't understand how to get through ... how to get 
Notes to Cabinet and so on... [you won't be successful]” – interview with Peter 
Mitchell, on policy stability through changes in political administrations 
This then lends support to the third perspective, which is that the while the Public Service 
personnel involved in this area were sufficiently capable of operating within a known context, 
they lacked the required technical and organisational competencies to deal with the changes 
brought about by liberalization, hence the perceived need by politicians to shift things around 
to try to find a right fit.  
“I think also we were not ready. We didn't know what we didn't know. That is an 
important point. We didn't know what we didn't know. What do I mean? I'm saying 
that you hear 'competition' but you didn't know what that means. You didn't know 
the steps that were required. You couldn't just take the Canadian or the UK [model] 
and just bring it here. The conditions were totally different. And the circumstances. 
So we didn't know what we didn't know and therefore as you came up to it [you had 
to deal with unforeseen problems]” – interview with Cleveland Thomas, former 
National Chief Information Officer (2005-2011) 
Peter Mitchell, who was involved throughout the period as a senior technical resource, provides 
a perspective on what the changes felt like at ground zero: 
“Prior to 1998, telecom policy never had a "home". We had ministries overseeing the 
Telecoms Division, when Ragbir was in charge. Now, Ragbir was both regulator and 
policy maker, which was an untenable situation. It's only when Dr. Prince became PS 
he recognised that he needed to have a Policy Unit to do the research - because Mr. 
Ragbir was not from the research side, he was more technical. And the reform 
programme was getting very intense at the time with all the conferences about 
creating regulatory agencies, and interconnection reared its head for the first time. 
So we created a Research Unit in 1998 under Dr Prince and I was involved in that and 
the rest is history. From that moment on it was me alone and then when telecoms 
went back to the Prime Minister's office for a brief moment we created a Unit that 
had a lot of people to deal with telecom reform issues. That's when Carol Clark 
became PS and Dr Prince went to do his secondment to ITU. Of course, for one year 
there was a separate ministry for ICT under Ralph Maraj, and I was Acting Director 
of Research and Planning for that. And then it was merged with Human Development 
                                                          
the House of Representatives was unable to elect a Speaker, and consequently had to call another election 
in December 2002, which the PNM won outright, garnering 20 seats to the UNC’s 16. 
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to form what we know today as [Ministry of] Science, Technology and Tertiary 
Education, which ICT [policy] has gone back to because it was originally part of that 
ministry. The Ministry of ICT existed for about one year from December 2000 to 
November 2001. In that one year everything got more intense because we were 
really focusing on the whole reform thing and we had a lot of meetings with the CTU 
and ITU regional meetings. In November 2001 we had the regional conference in 
Trinidad for the first time - the Region 2 meeting - that provided the input into the 
[ITU’s] Plenipotentiary Conference and the World Telecommunication Development 
Conference [2002]. Most of the time during that period when we were a separate 
ministry for ICT was spent laying the ground work.” – interview with Peter Mitchell, 
on the whirlwind changes in ministerial arrangements to support telecom policy 
after the increased emphasis on telecommunications reform took effect. 
An example of the many meetings Mr. Mitchell described was the one hosted by the Caribbean 
Association of National Telecommunication Organisations (CANTO) in November 2001 (Figure 
5). These served an important discursive purpose - to reinforce the WTO’s dominant narrative 
by facilitating the interaction of local, regional and foreign subject matter experts, thereby 
allowing them to connect and integrate their localised narratives with the global one. 
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Figure 5 – Article published in the Trinidad Guardian on 20th November, 200133 
 
During the period 1998 to 2000 the new Telecommunications Act was drafted, with technical 
assistance from the ITU and the Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation (CTO). 
Financial assistance for the initiative was provided by the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) which was used to hire an American legal firm to assist the Government in its negotiations 
with Cable & Wireless to bring the latter’s monopoly operation to an end. Funding was also used 
to draft attendant legislation to the Act that conformed to GATS commitments.  
The Government did not have an easy time making the Telecommunications Bill into law, 
however, as they fielded significant debate from both the Opposition and Independent benches 
                                                          
33 Please note that due to the format in which the Trinidad Guardian Ltd.’s archives were output, no page 
numbers are available. 
CANTO discusses telecoms 
By Caribbean Media Corporation 
Tuesday 20th November, 2001 
The Caribbean Association of National Telecommunication Organisations (CANTO) will stage two seminars in 
Antigua from today to Wednesday for the benefit of telecommunication operators, regulators and policy 
administrators in the Caribbean. The region is at the cross roads because most governments currently are 
developing policy to open up the telecommunication sector to competition not only to satisfy their 
obligations to the World Trade Organisation, but also because they genuinely believe the sector is an 
important driver of economic and social development," it said in a release Friday. Policy makers also believe 
a competitive telecommunication environment would facilitate their developmental goals."  
An inherent aspect of a liberalised telecommunication sector is the establishment of a regulatory 
framework that ensures the orderly development of the sector. Inter-connection of networks is a key 
requirement in an open telecommunication market. While inter-connection is recognised by both 
operators and policy makers as a requirement, it does pose challenges that must be understood and 
appropriately addressed, Canto said. Inter-connection Challenges for Operators and Regulators" will be held 
at the Jolly Beach Hotel. The seminar will cover regulatory rules, technical aspects of inter-connection, costing 
and pricing issues and inter-connection agreements. Dr Jeff H Rohlfs and Joseph H Weber of the Strategic 
Policy Research Inc will conduct these sessions.  
On the second day, Dr Mark Jamison, University of Florida, will discuss two cases in telecommunication 
regulations:  
 Interconnection Dispute Resolution  
This case examines the roles regulatory commissions play in inter-connection. The regulator must 
deal with competitive issues, transparency, legitimacy and credibility, while being objective and 
impartial to the incumbent and the new entrant.  
 The Aftermath of Entry  
This case considers the policy issues and technology developments that regulators face as 
telecommunications competition develops beyond the initial entry phase.  
On the third day, Dr John Prince, the ITU representative based in Barbados, will update participants on the 
various cost models that have been developed by the ITU to help developing markets to cope with a 
competitive telecommunication environment. The second seminar will be held on the November 26 at the 
same venue. [/end] 
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in Parliament during the debate on the Telecommunications Bill. Most of those concerns raised 
stemmed from questions relating to the power ascribed to the Minister to interfere in the 
operations of the Authority. As one independent senator put it: “the Authority as proposed, 
might be nothing but a working servant to the Minister; a domesticated animal with the heavy 
hand of the Minister breathing down its neck. We've moved from a semi-independent authority 
to a quasi- independent authority”, with the major risk being that “an amalgam was being 
formed between the Minister and the Authority… [because of which]… the Authority could run 
the risk of sending mixed signals and stymie the reform process it is supposed to facilitate.”34. 
While another commented, “certain clauses in the Telecom Bill suggested the Minister was the 
bossman and denoted an antiquated outlook, [harkening] back to the colonial days”35 
In response, the Communications Minister Ralph Maraj, the main driver of the Bill through 
Parliament, responded that “government was not trying to enforce dictatorial control over the 
proposed Telecom Authority, but said the Minister should not sit by and allow a loose cannon to 
develop”36. By “loose cannon” the Minister was alluding to a probable situation whereby the 
Telecommunications Authority, as a State agency, would have unfettered freedom to act 
without opportunity for political oversight – a potentially troubling thought for the Government, 
given that, at the time, they still maintained 51% ownership of the main telecom operator, TSTT. 
Such statements conflicted with Minister Maraj’s earlier comments that: “…the bill will facilitate 
the implementation of pro-competitive policies. Today, as we all know, our overseas services are 
currently priced well above international norms. These current high calling tariffs do not serve 
the best interests of our population and artificially depress the number of calls we would make 
to friends and relatives and to potential business partners overseas.”37  Through this and similar 
utterances he had demonstrated that he was enrolled in the prevailing narrative communicated 
through the Dookeran Report about the importance of a liberalized sector, and further that he 
had bought into the speculation concerning knowledge-based economy prospects, clothed as it 
was this time in the more populist terms of communicating with ‘friends and relatives’. 
Nonetheless that enrolment had not translated into an imperative for the Government to 
relinquish its majority ownership of TSTT in the face of a soon-to-be-liberalized telecom sector, 
even though it was widely accepted that TSTT’s monopoly status was contributing to the 
retardation of the country’s development. 
                                                          
34 “Senators question the role of Minister in Telecom Authority” – Trinidad Guardian; 14th March, 2001 
35 “Valere sees harking back to colonial days” - Trinidad Guardian; 5th April, 2001 
36 “Maraj: No Govt dictatorship in Telecom Bill” – Trinidad Guardian; 10th April, 2001 
37 “Telecommunications Bill in Senate Tuesday” – Trinidad Guardian; 12th March, 2001 
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The critical review of the Bill as it made its way through the Senate yielded over eighty 
amendments – most having to do with reducing the Minister’s control over the Authority’s 
operations - before it arrived at the Lower House for debate and eventual passage. 
The Dookeran Report’s recommendations finally came to fruition with the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act in both houses of Parliament in 2001. This landmark event in the 
development of domestic telecommunications ushered in the modern age of 
telecommunications for Trinidad and Tobago. The Telecommunications Act of 2001 set out a 
framework that allowed for the liberalization of the sector, by repealing the previous legislation 
that governed telecommunications since the pre-Independence era - the Wireless Telegraphy 
Ordinance and the Cable and Wireless (West Indies) Limited Ordinance. Specifically, the Act 
established a formalised legal structure for promoting, authorising and managing an open 
market for the provision of telecommunication services in the country. Prior to the official 
proclamation of the Act, the dominant domestic provider of telecommunication services, TSTT, 
operated as a monopoly or quasi-monopoly in the various product markets it served - 
international voice telephony, international data communication, domestic voice telephony and 
domestic data communication. In the markets where it was not actually operating alone – such 
as internet access – it still exercised quasi-monopoly power. Since 1995, other vendors had been 
allowed to retail Internet access domestically, but they all purchased their uplink connections 
from TSTT whose wholesale pricing structure for international trunk lines and total control of 
essential infrastructure – such as the international gateways, or landing points for submarine 
optical fibre and satellite earth stations – meant that any other operators were effectively 
restricted to small market niches, often associated with geographic areas of the country in which 
TSTT had not yet installed the required facilities.  
In an attempt to signal to stakeholders their seriousness about telecom reform, Cabinet moved 
swiftly to establish an interim Telecommunications Advisory Team immediately upon the Act’s 
passage as an interim measure until the full Telecommunications Authority could be instated. 
The Team’s mandate was:  
“To review and evaluate recommendations of the Telecommunications Division with 
respect to the issuing of license to ensure consistency with the policy objectives 
regarding the telecommunications sector and to advise the minister on the granting 
of such licenses.  
To consider matters referred to it by the Minister or Permanent Secretary, with a 
view to rendering strategic advice on telecommunications issues and 
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To assist the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology in the 
establishment and operationalisation of the Telecommunication Authority.”38 
Cabinet’s main aim was to ensure no delay in implementing those short-term policy measures 
which did not require further legislative change, such as instituting a fair and transparent 
approval process for telecommunications licences. 
The passage of the new legislation in Parliament turned out to be only the first hurdle to be 
crossed in achieving liberalization of the Trinidad and Tobago telecommunications sector. The 
newly created regulator, the Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad and Tobago, 
encountered its own teething problems as a result of criticism drawn from than the former 
Director of Telecommunications-turned-Consultant, Winston Ragbir, and former minister with 
responsibility for telecommunications, Roodal Moonilal, both of whom been displaced by the 
general elections of December 2001 (Figure 6 & Figure 7).  
  
                                                          
38 “Telecommunications advisory team named” – Trinidad Guardian; 17th May, 2001 
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Moonilal: Put a hold on Telecom Authority 
By Sherry Ann Singh 
Sunday 3rd February, 2002 
Former Telecommunications Minister Roodal Moonilal is advising government to hold its hand on the 
appointment of a Telecommunications Authority.  
He says such an appointment would be pointless unless Parliament can be convened. Provisions were made 
under the Telecommunications Act 2001 for the establishment of the Authority to govern the sector as it moved 
towards liberalisation. And last week, Hedwige Bereaux, the Minister who now has responsibility for telecom, 
said he will shortly go to Cabinet with recommendations for the setting up of the authority. However, Moonilal 
said the Authority will be incapable of functioning since their job entails the drafting and implementation of 
regulations to govern the sector, and this would require parliamentary approval. 
Without parliamentary support government may not be able to implement the telecoms authority act and this 
is another delay the government is forcing upon an industry earmarked for growth," he stated.  
Moonilal, like outgoing Director of Telecommunications, Winston Ragbir, has also suggested that government 
may have no choice but to grant licences to all thirteen companies that applied for cellular licences. He suggested 
the Minister seek proper legal and technical advice on how to proceed now that it is no longer pursuing a Privy 
Council appeal of a constitutional motion brought against it by Caribbean Communications Network (CCN). CCN 
failed to make the government shortlist for a licence but was successful in its constitutional motion in both the 
High and Appeal Courts. This is not as easy as withdrawing the appeal," Moonilal said. While the courts ruled 
CCN should be considered for a licence there were nine other applicants who did not meet the criteria and a few 
of the nine were rejected on the same grounds as CCN. So if you go the way of considering CCN, then all the 
other applicants may also have a case." Moonilal added that the International Telecommunications Union 
advisors had supported two of the nine rejected applications and may also have a claim under the new 
dispensation. [/end] 
Figure 6 – Article published in the Trinidad Guardian on 3rd February, 2002 
The objections of both Moonilal and Ragbir stemmed from the fact that, according to the Act, 
any new operator authorised to operate in Trinidad and Tobago had to do so in accordance with 
regulations made pursuant to the Act. Such regulations were meant to govern issues such as 
interconnection between networks, the requirement to contribute directly or indirectly to 
universal service across the entire country, and most importantly, authorisation to use any radio 
frequency spectrum to deliver a telecommunication service.  
  
100 
 
 
 
 
Ragbir raises concerns over telecom body 
By Sherry Ann Singh 
Thursday 8th August, 2002 
Even as a new supervisory Authority picked up the telecommunications reigns on Monday, questions were being 
raised about its ability to control the sector in the absence of regulations.  
Telecommunications Consultant Winston Ragbir has questioned the ability of the Telecommunications Authority 
to function under such circumstances. The Authority was given life under the Telecommunications Act 2001, but 
the Act has failed to outline the rules and regulations by which players in the industry must operate. Ragbir says 
this is the reason only part of the Act those sections relating to appointments and staffing were proclaimed 
automatically when the Act was passed in Parliament. He said other sections relating to licensing could not be 
proclaimed without rules to govern the players in the industry. He said that leaves the Authority in a catch-22 
situation. That's because in the absence of a sitting Parliament, regulations for the sector cannot be drawn up nor 
made into law.  
On the other hand, even if the second part of the Act were proclaimed, the Authority would still face the same 
problems. Proclaiming the act in its entirety would result in the repealing of the previous legislation, the Wireless 
Telegraphy Ordinance Chapter 36 (2) under which companies previously operated. But Ragbir says when that is 
done, the new act has to kick in and that cannot be done without regulations. But the absence of regulations for 
the telecommunications sector will not hamper the operations of the Telecommunications Authority, newly 
appointed Chairman Dr Ralph Henry stated.  
Henry said although regulations to accompany the telecommunications Act 2001 have not yet been drafted, the 
Authority will still be able to carry out its duties. While the regulations may not be fully elaborated at the moment, 
I'm sure the Board is going to have a sense of what is appropriate in the present and evolving circumstances," he 
said in an interview following his appointment.  
He was one of 10 people appointed to the authority that will govern telecommunication matters, make 
recommendations on the granting of concessions and ensure there is compliance in the industry. Henry says the 
absence of rules ought not to be a problem. [/end] 
Figure 7 – Article published in the Trinidad Guardian on 8th August, 2002 
Given that such regulations could only be passed in Parliament, which was an impossible task 
during 2002 due to the Parliamentary deadlock mentioned previously, their objections were 
understandable. 
6.1.3. Resolution 
After the December 2001 elections the incoming PNM administration continued the thrust of 
telecom sector liberalization by adopting the Medium Term Policy Framework for the period 
2002-2004 which had been published in September 2001 by the previous administration. As a 
means of creating a “globally competitive and technologically-driven economy” this document 
emphasised the implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 2001, starting with the full 
establishment of the Telecommunications Authority, and setting out a plan to approach the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to provide financial assistance by way of its Multilateral 
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Investment Fund (MIF). This funding was to be used to procure “technical assistance in the form 
of legal, economic and engineering consultancies to strengthen policy formulation in 
implementation and regulatory management” (Finance, 2001: 18). The MTPF also prefigured 
the development of a National Information and Communication Technology Strategy and the 
continued execution of the National e-Commerce Action Plan by the National Electronic 
Commerce Secretariat that had been established in 2000. Both the IDB funded “Modernization 
of Telecommunications” technical cooperation agreement and the National e-Commerce Action 
Plan kicked off in earnest during 2002. Once again, the cycle of externally-mediated policy 
change was about to begin, as it had five years before:     
“Everything turned on its head with the Uruguay Round when trade in services in 
telecom came in. It was the Uruguay Round, particularly the Reference Paper on 
Regulatory Principles that set the framework for how we were supposed to reform, 
where 'your regulator must not be aligned to your operator', and 'you must have 
transparency in licensing' and 'interconnection must be at the most feasible technical 
point'... those principles. Like everything in Trinidad it was that external force that 
pushed us to come up with a telecom policy to conform.” – interview with Peter 
Mitchell 
Mr. Mitchell’s comments were echoed by the former National Chief Information Officer: 
“…looking at what was happening in the world and recognising this whole thing 
called liberalisation and I think the impact of the WTO for our Region really had 
tremendous influence in the next steps. That through the international trade 
agreements and the uniting of continents, to compete there was a need for a shift 
to keep up with the type of development. [Therefore] we knew we had to do 
something different. I believe that external [forces more] than internal, pushed the 
Government of Trinidad and Tobago to look at a national strategy and plan. Now 
that external plan was based on best practices [which proposed certain benefits of 
liberalisation] versus monopoly, because monopoly [gave rise to] a lot of waste, 
limited resources, no choice, high prices... all the negatives. Whereas competition 
[provided] efficiency.” – interview with Cleveland Thomas 
The pattern suggested here is that despite localised discontinuities that added fuel to the fire 
for change, the main driver was the force of the WTO-mandated reform. Even in the face of 
rising evidence of local origin that telecom reform was required, this change was not instituted 
without external influence. There was insufficient political will and organisational skill within the 
Public Service to effect telecom reform prior to the GATS. The WTO Reference Paper on 
Regulatory Principles, on the other hand, provided a set of principles that was founded on 
international best practice (a powerful institution and rationale for action within the 
government). Possibly also contributing to the inertia in telecommunications development prior 
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to 2001 was the fact that there were no alternative narratives with which to mobilise some 
alternative vision of how this reform might proceed. In this way, it can be argued that the 
narrative of the "Missing Link” Report, as expanded and embedded in the WTO Reference Paper 
on Regulatory Principles, was finally institutionalized via the passage of the Telecommunications 
Act (legislative change) and the creation of TATT (organisational change). The narrative was 
operationalized via publication of a series of regulatory documents that were produced pursuant 
to the Act (e.g. Interconnection Regulations, Spectrum Management Plan, Pricing Regulations) 
to herald the start of the sector liberalization process in Trinidad and Tobago.  
As a demonstration of the effect of this action, the following chart (Figure 8) shows the growth 
in ICT users (specifically, mobile subscribers and Internet subscribers) over the decade 2000-
2010. For mobile, the significant jump post-2004 (the year TATT was created) is telling. 
 
Figure 8 – Mobile & Internet Subscriptions in Trinidad and Tobago (2000-2010) [data source: TATT Annual Market 
Report 2010, available via https://tatt.org.tt/] 
6.1.4. Sub-case Summary  
This sub-case demonstrated some interesting themes for the discursive construction of policy. 
Firstly, as the first formally codified telecom policy document, the Dookeran Report represented 
a shift from the previous paradigm of telecom policy being whatever the Minister pronounced 
it to be. The Report was also an important mechanism for translating the WTO’s liberalization 
narrative into the local context, and for delegitimising a previously popular, if 
counterproductive, action as regards international telecommunications settlement rates. We 
also examined globalization’s effect on the country’s sovereignty and the subsequent impact on 
local policymakers’ ability to determine the country’s telecommunications development 
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pathway. And finally, we explored the process of shaping new legal & regulatory institutional 
changes, especially how that process was mediated by subject matter experts who were 
engaged both directly (as a result of the IDB support programme) and indirectly (at the various 
regional meetings that occurred to discuss approaches to liberalization). Next, the sub-case on 
the Communications Backbone project is developed and presented, to highlight a case of 
attempted public sector reform through a technology initiative.  
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6.2. One Stop Shop: reforming the Public Service through e-government 
6.2.1. Origins 
With the journey to create an information-based economy underway, it followed that the 
subsequent policy step was to attempt to encourage electronic commerce, or e-commerce.  In 
1999 the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Consumer Affairs established a National Electronic 
Commerce Policy Committee (NECPC), made up of key Private and Public Sector representatives, 
small, medium and large business enterprises, NGOs, and other interest groups. The 
Committee’s mandate was to develop a policy to guide the development of Electronic 
Commerce in Trinidad and Tobago. The NECPC produced an interim report in 1999 that called 
for immediate attention towards strengthening voice and data communications infrastructure, 
increasing e-commerce, clarifying marketplace rules, and building marketplace confidence in e-
commerce. The NECPC’s final report produced in June 2000 also recommended the 
establishment of an Electronic Government Unit to take responsibility for improving the speed 
and efficiency of government operations. This work took place in parallel with, and largely 
separate from, ongoing efforts at the time to liberalize the telecom sector as set out in Section 
6.1. Kenwyn Austin, the first Director of the e-Government Unit, recalls the initial sequence of 
events as follows, starting with his time at his previous employer – the state-owned oil company, 
Petrotrin39: 
"Around 1999 the government had gotten interested in an ICT strategy. They had 
encapsulated it into a document - an e-Commerce policy document. In that document 
they identified a role for electronic government. At that time the popular term that 
was being bandied about for this automated technology that was a tool to do 
business was ‘e-Commerce’. So in our computer department in Petrotrin we got 
introduced to this term 'e-Commerce' and we had one or two little discussions and 
seminars and people came and spoke about what e-Commerce was, what were the 
implications of e-Commerce, and how we would know whether we were joining the 
wider world in participating in processes that were really involving e-Commerce, and 
whether e-Commerce was going to help us do business in Petrotrin and whether, by 
extension, it was going to help business in Trinidad. What were the issues? Ok, it was 
a nice term, but how would we jump on this bandwagon - what was needed?" – 
interview with Kenwyn Austin, on the introduction of ‘e-Commerce’ into the 
business vocabulary of a major state-owned enterprise, and subsequently, the 
government 
                                                          
39 Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago Limited (Petrotrin) is a state-owned oil company in Trinidad 
and Tobago. The company was established in 1993 by the merger of Trintopec and Trintoc, two state-
owned oil companies. 
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Mr. Austin’s somewhat sceptical insight most likely came from his long career in the private 
sector (albeit a state-owned company) and thereby having been exposed to multiple change 
initiatives. As such he was wary of putting too much stock into new trends. He provided a 
glimpse into the mind sets of both the senior public service leaders who advanced the National 
Electronic Commerce Policy, as well as the anticipation of the somewhat more business-oriented 
executives at the national oil company when grappling with the introduction of the latest ‘hot 
topic’ in ICT4D.  
He went on to characterize his early days upon entering the government service as follows: 
"I find that in the ICT world a lot of things are encapsulated in terms and then you 
spend a lot of time trying to define the terms. One of these terms was 'the digital 
divide'. We started getting invited to international fora on 'the digital divide' and I 
spent some time trying to understand other countries' concepts of 'the digital divide' 
and how they measured it. At that time they were caught up with these enterprise-
wide systems, and without knowing well what they wanted to do with these terms - 
'e-Government' and 'e-Commerce' - they wanted standalone systems. They wanted 
systems that could serve more than one department or ministry. So they had these 
players - these computer vendors and business software vendors and strategists 
trying to sell products. There were some popular brands of enterprise-wide software 
that were going to solve all your problems. At that time they were talking about 
things like 'Total Quality Management' - more ways of getting people to do more 
work for the same pay, to produce more with the same faculties that you had. And 
clouding it with nice terms like 'training' and 'development' to get you to work harder 
- to give more of your time to the companies. So that was the environment in which 
I went to work for the government. 
I was seconded from Petrotrin for the last three months of my term there, and 
officially retired on November 30, 2000. On December 1, 2000 I started as the 
Director of e-Government, but was largely involved in the evaluation of the 
Integrated Human Resource Information System (IHRIS) that was based on 
Peoplesoft. The hot thing in the country was the development of a 
telecommunications network based on IT, separate from telephones. By then, 
information technology and telecommunications had been incorporated into the 
same discipline, whereas before they were separate disciplines. We were good at the 
telecommunications part of it - telephone systems and so on - but we were babies as 
far as international data network access. Around that time the term 'intranet' 
became common and people started having these little closed networks where they 
connected their PCs together, and then started thinking about linking their networks 
together via dialup connections. So that was the environment in which the 
government found itself when it started looking for an international human resource 
information system. The packages that were being sold were based on Internet 
technology. It was topical, it was fashionable and it was what the government felt it 
needed to do to keep up with the world of technology and close their position in the 
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digital divide, which at that time was being measured by a few spurious metrics - the 
number of PCs in the country, the number of televisions in the country, the number 
of people with access to telephones, that kind of business. They were using that as a 
yardstick to create indices to determine where we were." – interview with Kenwyn 
Austin, on the major events and organizational environment at the start of his 
tenure as Director of the e-Government Unit 
In seeking to implement a government-wide HR management system the government was 
embarking on familiar road to ICT development that had been tried elsewhere. The sarcasm in 
Mr. Austin’s comments (“these computer vendors and business software vendors and strategists 
trying to sell …  some popular brands of enterprise-wide software that were going to solve all 
your problems.”) also demonstrate his wariness about the potential for proceeding along a 
technology development path that may have been appropriate in its original text but less so in 
its transplanted context. These comments can be identified as part of a narrative of ‘catching 
up’ in the context of the speculative gains on offer from widespread investment into ICT. Mr. 
Austin’s recollection of events coincided with the account offered by other key informants, such 
as Peter Mitchell, as well as documents such as Cabinet Minutes, but offers valuable critical 
insight into the way the narratives surrounding various ICT4D terms were being perceived in 
government.  
Immediately following the publication of the NECPC’s report, Cabinet decided to develop a 
Communications Backbone for the Public Service (confirmed in Cabinet Minute No. 1176 of 28 
June 2000). According to a report40 written by Mr. Austin, the Request for Proposals (RFP) for 
the Communications Backbone not only set out the purpose of the infrastructure to be procured 
for the network, but re-established the vision for a new way of operating the Public Service that 
had been espoused in the National Electronic Commerce Policy. Specifically, the 
Communications Backbone was envisioned as an intranet that was meant to: “increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of Ministries and Departments; improve communication between 
Ministries and Departments; and, improve the quality and delivery of service to customers” 
(Austin, 2005: 7). The report went on further to describe the government’s vision for the Public 
Service and ICTs, as well as imperatives for the programme of public service reform that was 
being embarked upon: 
Vision for the Public Service: the Public Service [will] be transformed into an Electronic 
Governmental Organization operating in an accessible, responsive and interactive 
                                                          
40 The Report was written in November 2005 as a deliverable of a short term consultancy for which he 
had been engaged by the Ministry of Public Administration and Information during the period 1 
September 2005 to 30 November 2005. 
107 
 
 
 
environment, enabling G2G, G2C and G2B communications and services, through the 
establishment of a Public Service Information Architecture.  
Vision for ICTs: ICTs will be used to improve the education system; improve family 
health and safety; promote economic prosperity; improve the quality of life; and 
promote good government” (ibid) 
Consequently, the Public Service imperatives were identified as (ibid):  
 Show greater dynamism and be more responsive to customer expectations 
 Review the existing structures with a view to eliminating where necessary 
and appropriate, existing bureaucratic hierarchies 
 Place more emphasis on commitment than on command and control 
 Be open and networked 
 Evolve into an environment of empowerment, using technology to enable 
the sharing of information, intelligence and decision making with and 
amongst end users 
 Establish and maintain policies and standards 
 Begin with the transformation process now 
Within the context of these expansive vision statements and in support of achieving the above 
imperatives, ICT was framed as an extremely beneficial and powerful information society 
imaginary - a public utility service like water, electrical power and telephones, that was expected 
to: “link all Government buildings, departments, agencies and institutions, to and amongst 
themselves and the wider community, and facilitate interactive collaboration across physical and 
bureaucratic boundaries, and islands of information and services; with citizens evolving from 
being customers ‘in line’ to becoming customers ‘online’” (Austin, 2005: 7).  
Seven critical success factors were identified to ensure the transformation of the vision into 
reality: infrastructure; access; understanding; trust; resources; executive commitment; 
management. The Communications Backbone was targeted at addressing the first factor. 
Specifically, Phase 1 of the project dealt with infrastructure to enable email, messaging and 
scheduling, while Phase 2 was aimed at providing general information such as contact details on 
government representatives and a list of services offered per ministry41. No additional evidence 
was available in the Report to inform how the rest of these monumental goals were to be 
achieved42, nor what exact role the successful bidder for the RFP would play in bringing all of 
                                                          
41 Phases 3 and 4 were, respectively, supposed to deliver web-enabled services to automate standard 
services such as applications, and re-engineered business processes to take advantage of Internet 
technologies. 
42 Except for a passing reference to need for “the appropriate change management initiatives, including 
the necessary training and communication strategies to ensure success” 
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them into reality. What was clear was that the expected outcome of the efforts could be 
summed up in a single term: “a one stop shop” for government services. Judging from Mr. 
Austin’s quote below, all emphasis appears to have been placed squarely on the infrastructure 
element: 
“A tender was being prepared to go out at around the time I joined. Some people had 
already developed a framework of what they wanted in terms of connectivity. They 
had it packaged and ready to go out to invite firms to tender to create this 
telecommunications network. When I came in, part of what I had to oversee was the 
continuation of that process. The tenders went out and I became involved in the 
evaluation committee. Eventually I became head of the committee as a result of a 
few accidents. Then I oversaw Phase 1 of the Backbone project, as it was then being 
called.” – interview with Kenwyn Austin 
Due to slow bureaucratic processes and ‘normal’ Public Service behaviour (e.g. irregular 
convening of evaluation committee meetings, low visibility and weak ownership of the Project 
by senior Public Service executives, inordinate delays in the responses from the Central Tenders 
Board) there was a three year gap between the close of tenders (Dec. 2000) and the start of 
project implementation (Oct. 2003) (Austin, 2005: 12).   
What is noteworthy is that while the entire thrust towards e-Government had initially taken off 
with the intention of improving government operations as a complement to the parallel push 
for encouraging e-Commerce43, in the intervening period the responsibility for driving e-
Commerce had been devolved to a separate e-Commerce Secretariat, leaving the new e-
Government team to focus only on public sector reform through implementation of the 
Backbone project. It is arguable that given the limited number of personnel with the requisite 
technical and managerial skills available in the Public Service at the time, this move was 
counterproductive since it resulted in multiple embryonic initiatives taking place in parallel 
without leveraging an opportunity to exploit economies of scale, benefit from shared learning 
or establish communities of practice.  
The gap in implementation unearthed a separate set of issues, as described below: 
“Because that project took three years to procure, the technology that was accepted 
as the proposal was submitted, was three years old. So at the point of 
implementation, you're implementing technology that was three years old. And that 
was a big...challenge. Because, really and truly, if at the point of implementation it's 
three years old - and implementation itself was carded to take a year and a half – 
then at the end of the project you're really looking at four-and-a-half-year-old 
                                                          
43 Ostensibly on the grounds that e-Commerce was seen as a major means of “elevating the country’s 
position in the global marketplace” 
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telecommunications infrastructure that you're putting in that is supposed to address 
the needs of Government moving forward. So there were major contradictions in 
that whole approach. So we met with the Minister, Devindra, the Permanent 
Secretary… and we fought major battles. And, the challenge was in the procurement 
side of things, because [we realised that] if we were to say at that point in time – 
[given that] the budget was also a major restricting factor - "We don't have money 
for the upgraded technology and let's go back through the procurement process", it 
literally would've taken another three years. So you have a choice. You could either 
implement something that will partially address the needs and then, grow it, so to 
speak. So, change it out modularly. And that was what was agreed to by the Minister. 
So, eventually we said ‘ok let's go, we moving’. This was the first ICT project, I think, 
that Government really implemented that involved such a wide base.” – interview 
with Adam Montserin, former Executive Director of the e-Government Unit (after 
Kenwyn Austin’s initial tenure), on the initial procurement delay that hindered 
Backbone implementation (emphasis added) 
Here Mr. Montserin highlighted a point that came up repeatedly in discussions with other 
respondents throughout the data collection process – the information asymmetry between the 
politicians who wanted to achieve significant technology-driven change, the public service 
officials who were tasked with implementing the political agenda, and the private sector 
vendors who sold the hardware and software led to notable inconsistencies between the 
objectives and implementation approach for these types of projects.  
Another key factor which contributed to the delay was the result of the Parliamentary instability 
referred to in Section 5.1. 
“The political climate was unstable, Ministries were being restructured, redefined, 
and in some cases dissolved and then recreated; senior public officers were being 
transferred and reassigned; Divisions, Departments, projects and personnel were 
being transferred to new Ministries; new Senior Public Officers were being appointed, 
etc.” – (Austin, 2005: 12–13) 
Despite all the pronouncements made by the associated Ministers at the time, and the 
significant bet put on ICT in general and the Backbone in particular (as per the vision statements 
above) to be the catalyst for reform, and despite the assertion that the Backbone was “the 
largest ICT project that Government had engaged in to date”, even after the perilous delay in 
procuring the equipment, the e-Government Unit was initially staffed with only a skeleton crew 
of “specialists” (who had no actual experience implementing e-Government projects) 
augmented by a team of “On The Job Trainees” (graduates who were fresh out of university or 
technical schools), thereby signalling a lack of support from the administrative arms of 
Government. During our interview, Mr. Montserin explained the situation as “the Permanent 
Secretary wasn’t really interested in e-Government or those type of things”. Specifically, the lack 
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of support demonstrated that the Permanent Secretary had not really been enrolled into the 
expansive vision, and possibly saw the effort as incidental to his primary responsibilities.  
Nonetheless, the e-Government Unit engaged in a considerable effort to try to obtain buy-in 
from all stakeholders to get on board with the public sector reform initiative, as explained by 
one of the e-Government specialists. 
"NISC had given us a little trouble but we worked with them. They were already 
established and when they saw us they were probably wondering 'where are these 
people coming from?' They would have looked at us like a bunch of individuals doing 
work that they figured they were supposed to do. In the end it all worked out, 
however, because all of that is part of stakeholder engagement. We got a lot of 
respect, we had really good relationships with all of the ministries, and that was 
because of our approach. It wasn't a dictatorial approach, it was 'Hey, this is what 
we're trying to do. Come let's show you the benefits. This is a project that will benefit 
government as a whole, and there are agencies and ministries that are lagging 
behind, so this will help everyone. We want to help everybody to standardize the 
infrastructure across the Public Service.' We met with every single IT Unit and agency. 
We did a schedule and sat and talked with everybody. We didn't go in with an 
attitude of 'Hey, we know everything, we're the experts'" – interview with Joy Lange-
Syriac, former Strategic Information Systems Planning Specialist with the e-
Government Unit 
The team therefore pushed forward using the goodwill garnered through the initial stakeholder 
engagements. 
6.2.2. Contestation 
Technical challenges plagued the project implementation, thereby weakening the legitimacy of 
the project team with their stakeholders. Even though large and supposedly reputable vendors44 
had been selected to implement, their local personnel apparently lacked the technical capability 
to integrate the disparate components of such a large scale project. Given the monumental 
expectations of what the Backbone was supposed to deliver, and in the absence of being able 
to review the final contractual arrangement, I can only surmise that the source of the problems 
can be traced back to the procurement process, particularly unspecific user requirements, hard 
limitations on expenditure (a fixed-price contract was issued) and the requirement to work 
through a Central Tenders Board which itself had not yet benefited from the renewed focus on 
responsiveness to customer expectations that the Backbone project was trying to engender. 
Here again, however, Mr. Austin’s report provided some additional context, which suggested 
                                                          
44 Namely a joint alliance between TSTT and Fujitsu, with Microsoft, Nortel, Checkpoint and local firm 
Infotech selected as sub-contractors 
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that the incorporation of new technical members on the side of the Government’s team also 
contributed to delays as the new members sought to put their stamp on the scope of works by 
questioning all foregoing decisions: 
The latter stages of the selection process, attracted the attention of some new, highly 
qualified professionals in the ICT arena who had just entered the Public Service as 
contract officers, eager and thirsty to contribute and add value. There was an 
uncanny but perhaps not totally unexpected rush to review, comment and make 
recommendations on any and all aspects of the Government Backbone – whether it 
was the composition and work of the evaluation team itself, the selection process, 
the selected Contractor Alliance, the proposed technical network design (already 
recommended and accepted by the CTB), the technology being employed, the carrier 
services to be used, the reputation, capacity and capabilities of the firms which 
comprised the selected Contractor Alliance, the accepted and approved  solution 
versus a “broadband solution” – it did not seem to matter whether any or all of this 
made sense or not…. If ever there has been a real example of “Analysis Paralysis (AP)” 
in the Public Service of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, then this was certainly 
it. - (Austin, 2005: 13) 
Mr. Montserin provided additional insight into the nature of the technical challenges faced by 
the contractors: 
 “The technical side had significant challenges. Both because of the age of the 
technology that was being implemented, also because the providers... this was the 
first time a network like this was really being, you know, rolled out in the region. So 
it's not as though these people have ... experience. They are big companies and they 
have a lot of experience in a lot of different areas but this required all of it to come 
together as one. So, the integration of the network - real, real, real challenges. We 
set up, as part of the project, a test lab where we set up the actual network - physical 
network - on a small scale in the test lab. All of the components - the network layer, 
the edge devices... because the network also looked at security, which is antivirus 
plus firewall, which is Checkpoint, as well as mail. So, I mean real, real... when I talk 
about real challenges. Technical challenges, you know, in order to get the whole 
thing working smoothly. But eventually, those challenges were overcome. We 
actually failed one or two of the tests and had to go back into previous stages as the 
project moved forward. And that was, of course, I mean a major source of contention 
with the contractors, you know. But it was really...things worked very, very well on 
their own, you know, but when you had that integration it was real, real, real...real 
challenges.” – interview with Adam Montserin, on the technical problems faced 
during the Backbone implementation that related to integration and customization 
of the equipment to suit the local context 
Further complicating matters was the resistance from the various IT Departments across the 
Public Service which was attributed to three causes: i) a perception that the quality of service 
being offered by the Backbone was inferior to existing solutions that were already in place; ii) 
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perceived infringements on ‘turf’ by the Backbone team (and the ICT Division more generally); 
and iii) because of a less-than-stellar job of managing such a massive change. The following 
interview excerpts provide some evidence for the lack of clarity concerning the nature of 
applications needed and the priority of technological capacity over user need. 
"Ministries still want to be able to do for themselves. So the question is 'do you want 
the ICT Division/coordinating agency to implement?' or 'do you want the 
coordinating agency to set guidelines, be facilitative, and leave the ministries to 
implement for themselves. Ministries felt dictated to about the choices made for the 
implementation of the Backbone. While we did stakeholder engagement, it seemed 
that for a number of them it still came from left field because they didn't see the 
point. Also, there were some key ministries who we felt we would have gotten a little 
more support from and it turns out those particular ministries felt that we were 
taking up part of their space. It was a ticklish phenomenon where we had 
responsibility to do 'X' but the ministries were saying 'let's wait and see what's going 
to happen'. I guess it was because of the immaturity of the Public Service at the time, 
because you're now finding that ministries are saying 'I don't want to deal with this 
ICT issue. You deal with this and provide me with the services I need'. Previously the 
talk had been about infrastructure... infrastructure... infrastructure. And the 
ministries were comfortable dealing with infrastructure themselves. You had IT 
managers within the ministries who were infrastructure people, so there was, in a 
sense, a kind of competition. Whereas our message was 'if we deal with the 
infrastructure, you can deal with the databases, applications and so on', but 
depending on the capabilities and comfort level of the individuals you faced in a 
ministry, you either got resistance or support." – interview with Joy Lange-Syriac, on 
difficulties faced by the ICT Division in their attempts to lead the public service 
reform effort through the Backbone project 
 
 “The major challenge was getting the agencies involved to buy in and really support 
it. Because you had agencies that were far ahead - Ministry of Planning and so on, 
they already had their network in; Ministry of Finance, you know, they had the 
financial network that was running financial applications together with the iHRIS 
[Integrated Human Resource Information System]. So, there were already sub-
networks that were running across government. So a major change initiative was 
initiated as part of that project. Not as part of the contractor deliverables, but we 
took it on because we realised that unless you get the buy-in, you're simply going to 
have a network in place and people won't utilise it. So, we eventually expanded it to 
bring in some change consultants and we launched an initiative called ‘the New 
Systems Facilitators Initiative’ where the project looked at hiring ‘change agents’, in 
every single ministry that the Backbone was connecting to. To be able to really 
identify tangible ways to show, and to get the buy-in and the usage up, that kind of 
thing. That actually came on board about six months after the actual project started. 
And that was one of the flaws of the project. We didn't lead with the change 
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initiative. You know, we led with the technology implementation initiative... with the 
telecommunications implementation initiative. So, we met quite a bit of resistance 
and tried to address it through simply moving forward with the deliverables as 
opposed to the change initiative, and particularly, the grassroots approach which we 
had developed” – interview with Adam Montserin, on the early failings of the 
Backbone implementation team to lead the change across the Public Service 
Even the approach to utilise New Systems Facilitators (NSFs)45, as belatedly as it was introduced, 
achieved some successes but eventually stalled, as recounted by the former Strategic 
Information Systems Planning Specialist: 
"The vendor had decided that they were not going to go forward with the change 
management framework they had originally proposed since that framework was 
discontinued. So we had to make a decision about how to handle the change. So we 
worked a lot with the Public Sector Transformation Division and it took some time 
for us to scope that deliverable. We also had to gain agreement between government 
and the vendor. We wrote the Cabinet Note and went through the whole process of 
hiring the NSFs. It was really new. We looked at how change management had been 
done in the Public Service, and examined the learnings from the PeopleSoft 
implementation project, where individuals had been assigned to help out with 
change management activities in the ministries, but they had substantive positions. 
They had other work to do and the change management activities were considered 
extra work. They were therefore being asked to do something in which they had no 
vested interest, and still do their regular jobs, so that approach didn't work. That's 
why the idea came in to have people dedicated to the function, who would have dual 
responsibility to the ministry in which they worked, and to the Ministry of Public 
Administration. The difference was that these people would be based at the target 
ministries, so they would have been perceived as being part of those ministries rather 
than an imposed outside force. They would have been acceptable to the ministry. 
They were expected to operate at a level where they could influence Permanent 
Secretaries and thereby work on projects of the ministry. As it turns out, there were 
some instances where there were problems because of how the NSFs were viewed 
within the ministries. There were one or two cases where the PS in a ministry would 
not work with them, and so on. Others, however, were quite effective - it depended 
on the individual... how they approached the work and so on. It was the first time 
that this was tried and I think that it was fairly successful. Where things went haywire 
is when the Head of the NSFs demitted office. That person had all the institutional 
history and rationale for why the NSFs were needed, and that knowledge wasn't 
transferred. When that person left the momentum changed. There was no longer a 
clear understanding of what to do. It was something that suffered from a lack of 
leadership." – interview with Joy Lange-Syriac, on the origins of the idea to use New 
Systems Facilitators, and their effectiveness in easing the transition 
                                                          
45 Approved via Cabinet Minute 1646 of 17 June 2004 
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Lofty ideals, lack of specificity about requirements, inefficient bureaucratic processes and a 
botched change management process all interacted during the Backbone’s implementation 
phase, resulting in missed targets and frustration. Poor communication and ineffective 
leadership appeared to have characterised the order of the day during the period. The next 
section, however, addresses how the conflicts were eventually resolved. 
6.2.3. Resolution 
As it turned out, the Backbone and the other major government ICT project at the time, the e-
Government Portal, were both finally installed - though behind schedule and over-budget – 
connecting all the various Ministries and Departments via a unified communications 
infrastructure, and providing a single source of information on Government services (though, 
not actually allowing end-to-end online delivery of e-services as was originally envisioned) 
through a web interface. The main objectives of the projects were to unify the various ministries 
and departments in their use of a common IT infrastructure, and to facilitate a single point of 
contact, or “one stop shop” for users to access and utilize government services. Had those 
objectives been met? When asked about this during an interview (in 2011), nine years after they 
had commenced on the journey to e-Government, but thirteen years after the initiative was first 
fomented, one specialist who had been involved with the Unit from inception was unable to say 
that they had: 
"You realise [now] that ministries are pretty much hampered. Not only from the 
perspective of coordination - which is still not there - but the level of cooperation and 
communication that takes place across government hasn't reached to the point 
where I think you can really reap the benefits of having interconnectivity and 
interoperability and the like. Ministries are still very much operating competitively... 
they are still competing for resources. The question is always 'who's driving?' I 
remember we always had this discussion about where ICT [policy] was supposed to 
be placed. Should it have been placed in a higher authority to give it more 
prominence so that it could be driven from the top? From the Office of the Prime 
Minister, for example? Maybe that will make the case, but I'm not so certain that 
even if you placed it in the Office of the Prime Minister and just dictated [to 
ministries] that the ICT development would happen" – interview with Joy Lange-
Syriac, on the effect of the purported ‘one stop shop’ approach, via the Backbone 
and Portal projects, to public sector reform. 
More telling, however, was the summary of lessons learned and recommendations documented 
in Kenwyn Austin’s Final Report as the lead Consultant46 on Backbone Phase II, after he had been 
brought back in to oversee the final stages of implementation of the Backbone and Portal. All 
                                                          
46 His 3rd stint with the e-Government Unit, which ran from January to July 2008 
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his points speak to the perennial inability of Government to implement complex projects of this 
nature, and some of his recommendations were not dissimilar to those raised three years prior 
(Austin, 2008: 23–24): 
 a thorough current state and functionality assessment, inclusive of the length and 
breadth of the services that are currently in production, should have been completed 
 All necessary authorizations and privileges should have been obtained by or on behalf 
of the implementing contractor beforehand to minimize the risk … of possible resistance 
or diminished enthusiasm 
 Arrangements should have been made to secure the appropriate human resources 
 Ensuring effective leadership and team building should have been a priority 
 The procurement phase was interminably long, and was actually longer than the 
implementation phase 
By the concluding remarks of the Report, Mr. Austin’s exasperation with the entire experience 
was palpable: “If all that has been achieved by the foregoing is the agony of the reader having 
to peruse material that is not new, then I believe that I have achieved my intention. And that is 
to demonstrate through this medium that perhaps absolutely no skill is necessary to achieve 
astounding success in a number of very important areas, except perhaps the ability to sustain 
the commitment that is necessary for success, and to rigorously follow the steps and processes 
that are established, especially if we assume shared ownership of them.”(Austin, 2008: 28)  
Even though the project was completed, the broader objective to which the narrative of e-
Government alluded was only partially achieved because the narrative did not fully translate 
into an institution to influence the action of the intended stakeholders – the public officers 
within the Public Service. 
 
6.2.4. Sub-case Summary 
This sub-case chronicles the role and discursive strategies of various actors (such as public 
service technocrats, and sales and marketing personnel from commercial ICT hardware and 
software vendors) in contributing to the paradox created by major ICT4D projects such as the 
Backbone. That paradox can be characterised as the competition between competing narratives. 
One pair of narratives was the “centralisation of power in the determination of public service 
reform priorities, resulting in a perception of almost dictatorial control thereby leading to lack 
of user engagement and take up” versus “distributed, ‘democratic’ user-needs direction with 
perpetually slipping timelines and expanding budgets owing to unspecific, ‘everything but the 
kitchen sink’ requirements specifications”. Other narratives that were exposed and which had a 
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material effect on the outcome of the sub-case are: technological determinism (“the 
introduction of ICT will improve our capabilities, and ultimately reinvent the Public Service”); 
modernisation (“fear of being left behind as a motivator for change”); and incomplete 
translation of objectives from political directorate down through the ranks of the public service 
(“we don’t know why this project is being done, so we don’t agree with it and we won’t 
cooperate”). In the next section the sub-case on the National ICT Strategy, fastforward, is 
developed and presented, as a case of societal change towards establishment of an information 
society.  
  
117 
 
 
 
6.3. fastforward: drawing “the blueprint for a knowledge-based 
society” 
6.3.1. Origins 
Prior to the Dookeran Report, T&T did not have any sort of formal telecommunications policy 
document. Even that Report was not considered a full-fledged policy document by those who 
received it, but rather a framework to guide the critical activity of telecom sector liberalization. 
Given that convergence was making the distinction between IT and telecommunications 
obsolete, the next big jump for T&T was to create a policy for ICT development – a process which 
started in 2002. Engaging productively with the Internet for education, commerce, public 
services and social communication figured largely in the objectives, and subsequently, the 
details of T&T’s first National ICT Strategy.  
The early foundations for such a strategy, however, first appeared during the mid-1990s as 
various rationales were advanced via the press to justify an IT-enabled national developmental 
agenda (Figure 9).  
“[…] The windfall profits enjoyed by the local banks over the past few years have made it possible for financial institutions to 
lead the private sector's thrust for new business technology. The competition within the local banking system has forced market 
players to continually strive to maintain an edge. And, more bankers are realising the competitive edge that technology can give. 
The focus on technology is not new but it has only started to pick up over the past five years.  
The first bank to install an automatic banking machine (ABM) was Workers' Bank on their Charlotte Street Branch in the early 
1980s. In the subsequent years, the other banks continued to pay little attention to technology.  
The belief then was that Trinbagonians liked the personal touch of tellers, so the banks focused on providing personal banking 
services.  
The banking industry is still customer driven, but today's customers seem to be asking for convenience, security and ease of 
access to their money. This is reflected in banking policies. The trend towards a more high-tech service is also part of the local 
financial community's quest to keep up with advances made by their international competitors and partners. As a result, by the 
mid-1980s all but one of the local commercial banks had established an on-line ABM network. […]” – excerpt from article titled 
“Technology: the competitive edge” published in the Trinidad Guardian on 23rd July, 1995 
[…] Works Minister Colm Imbert has said that his Road Improvement Programme is being hampered by public utilities digging 
up newly-repaved roads.  
And any motorist knows the frustration of having traffic backed up for miles because of work in progress". Very often, the utility 
involved is the target of complaints and abuse. A public utility in the United Kingdom has found an answer to that problem. 
Welsh Water, a privatised water company, is using virtual reality to show customers why a busy road must be absolutely dug up 
and how this will affect local communities. The system has replaced costly" and less flexible" rigid models of the proposed work. 
[...] 
Such a system could soon become a reality in Trinidad and Tobago as well, with the growing popularity of Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) locally. In fact, the Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA) is reported to have already spent some $5 million to 
map its underground water mains all over the country on computer and is currently working on making full use of other aspects 
of the GIS. […] – excerpt from article titled “Virtual repairs for the hole in the road” published in the Trinidad Guardian on 21st 
May, 1995 
[…] Computers are changing the way in which people interact. While computer technology will not replace old fashioned Trini 
liming", it can broaden our scope of social interactions, and we don't even have to leave the room.  
Bulletin board systems and internet enables us to interact with someone in another part of Trinidad or another part of the world. 
Benefits are reaped not only by businessmen, but anyone with access to a computer. New friends can be found or maybe 
something more... anything is possible.  
This might sound fantastic to those of us who believe in the traditional way of meeting-actually going out and socialising and 
talking to people face to face. But lo and behold! People abroad have already begun placing ads on the internet, in the manner 
of the personals we see in the newspaper. Men and women seeking companions and spouses place notices on the net with the 
hopes of finding a suitable match. The long distance relationship is nothing new. The difference is that technology makes 
communication more immediate, faster, frequent. Kathryn and Michael provide a good example. Kathryn is Trinidadian, Michael 
lives in England, they have known each other a year, are engaged, even though they have met only once. Sounds uncanny? Well, 
the truth is stranger than fiction. […] – excerpt from article titled “Long distance love affair” published in the Trinidad Guardian 
on 22nd October, 1995 
 
Figure 9 – Excerpts from newspaper articles published in the Trinidad Guardian 
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Each of the above examples is emblematic of a narrative that appealed to the needs and desires 
of a different group of stakeholders - the private sector’s drive for improving competitiveness in 
the face of ever-increasing competition; the civil servant’s desire to deliver public services 
without incurring the complaints of the customer; the private citizen’s search for amorous 
exploits. Almost universally, these rationales subscribed to a very technologically deterministic 
narrative that suggested “ICT is capable of changing the world we live in and make our lives 
better.” 
Politicians were not far behind the technophiles in expressing interest in capitalizing on the 
promise of new information technology. While addressing a symposium on the development of 
a National Information Infrastructure in May 1996, Prime Minister Basdeo Panday in an 
unusually apologetic tone promised an uptake in the integration of IT into the public sector so 
as to improve the quality of service to the public: 
“It is imperative that governments in developing countries promote the diffusion of 
information technology at the national level by setting an example and using it 
extensively. This would be a sure way of increasing speed, volume and accountability 
of transactions. Speaking for myself, I regret very much that, in the past few years, 
we have placed such high demands for service on our public sector. Unfortunately, 
however, the tool to improve the level of customer service, information technology, 
was not generally widely available to the public service.” (Trinidad and Tobago 
Guardian, 15th May, 1996) 
Shortly after the Prime Minister’s address a committee comprising senior officials of both the 
public and private sectors was convened to develop an IT Policy for the Public Service. While 
addressing the inaugural meeting of the committee, and after charging them with the specific 
responsibility of distilling their deliberations into a policy document and action plan for the 
attention of Cabinet, the Minister of Public Administration, Senator Wade Mark, remarked: “I 
expect that this gathering will also address the issues pertinent to human resources and human 
capital. For example, training, academic qualifications, compensation, position descriptions, and 
the whole range of human resource management issues specific to IT.” He further added: “If 
anything can re-invent and re-engineer government, it is IT used to its maximum potential.” The 
Policy document was eventually completed and accepted by Cabinet in July 1997, with the 
expectation that it would be summarily disseminated. The expectation did not, however, match 
the outcome in producing the desired transformation, as recounted previously in the Backbone 
sub-case. 
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As the world approached the new millennium, the task of catching up to the world’s more 
developed countries via technology upgrading increased in importance for T&T’s policymakers. 
Momentum was being built towards the formulation of a grand strategy for ICT development. 
ICT-related terms became regularly injected into public pronouncements by local politicians and 
other public officials as they sought to show themselves to be knowledgeable about 
contemporary development strategies and thus, legitimate holders of the power afforded them 
by their offices. 
Building practical action upon the rhetoric was a more difficult task, however. The challenges in 
coordinating the policy activities of the various ministries with some form of responsibility for 
elements within the overall context of national ICT4D was introduced in the previous sub-case, 
and has been cited by knowledgeable persons as part of the reason for the decade-long delay 
experienced between the initial recognition of the importance of ICTs and the eventual 
formulation of an ICT4D strategy. 
By 1999, a number of initiatives to encourage IT’s spread throughout society had been put in 
place by the Government to complement its broader national development plans: 
- Development of policy guidance for the impending liberalization of the telecommunications 
sector 
- Provision of interest-free loans for the acquisition of Personal Computers by public servants 
- Removal of Value-Added Tax (VAT) and Customs Duty on computers and peripheral 
equipment 
- Establishment of distance learning programmes at state-operated institutions of higher 
learning 
Intertwined with all the technophilic narratives advocating the benefits of ICTs, were others that 
brought balance to the discourse by highlighting the negative effects of ICTs. The key point they 
sought to assert was that the technology had wide-ranging effects on various aspects of human 
life, such as family, romantic relationships, privacy and identity. Up to that time the societal 
impact of ICTs had been multi-faceted and unpredictable, especially in developing countries 
where these technologies were mainly adopted rather than being designed or developed.  
As an example, the prospect of using the Internet in T&T brought with it new problems (such as 
hacking), new perspectives on old problems (the negative impact of the abuse of Internet 
pornography on the traditional family structure), and even questions about the nature of the 
further progress of society (such as disruptions to the labour market). These questions were not 
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openly or fully addressed as the modernization machinery rolled on, thereby resulting in missed 
opportunities for dialogue that could shape the trajectory and refine the pathways of progress. 
As it related to employment and the sustainability of businesses, calls were made by the Ministry 
of Labour for trade unionists to “step up to meet the challenge of [information] technology” in 
response to its threat of “outstripping our capacity to cope, making our laws inadequate, 
transforming our mores, reshuffling our economy, reordering our priorities, shifting our concept 
of reality and redefining our workplace” (TT Guardian, 13th December 1995), while similar calls 
were made to bankers by the managing director of hardware and software vendor, Fujitsu ICL, 
Dr. Terrence Farrell,  who claimed that “Information technology is the most insidious and 
dangerous challenge facing the banking industry” (TT Guardian, 2nd April 1996).  
The similarity between both perspectives on the potential impact of ICT introduction is that 
technology was being perceived as an autonomous agent of change that had both positive and 
negative effects on people’s actions, rather than the output of a co-production with humans 
that could therefore be modified to suit the prevailing conditions. 
Joining the growing collection of local policy documents that advocated for a strong push 
towards ICT was the Medium Term Policy Framework for 2001-2003 that was published in 2000. 
The Framework set out a challenge for T&T to compete successfully in the "new knowledge-
driven economy" and emphasized the importance of a competitive ICT industry to facilitate that 
goal. 
6.3.2. Contestation 
The early 2000s was a period of significant acceleration of the government’s efforts to get its 
“knowledge-based society and economy agenda” out of the blocks in earnest. Apart from trying 
to evade the growing impatience of citizens and the private sector, the policymakers were 
chastened by the less-than-stellar image of Trinidad and Tobago painted by a growing number 
of indices and ranking schemes that were published by the multilateral organisations. A number 
of those organisations began to exercise their influence on the emerging information society 
discourse by proffering narratives that put a different spin on the main narrative previously 
advanced by the WTO during the early days of the telecom liberalization thrust. The United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, emphasised the integral role of 
information for “human and societal development”, but as “only one of many needs”. The Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) advanced a view of ICT primarily as an enabler of other 
functions, while the United Nations sought to combat the emergence of a “two-tiered 
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information society”, and hence, a widening and deepening of the digital divide. Let’s examine 
each of these in turn. 
In 2001 the UNDP released the strategic framework arising from their Digital Opportunity 
Initiative (DOI), entitled "Creating a Development Dynamic: Final Report of the Digital 
Opportunity Initiative". The framework was defined in terms of: infrastructure, human capacity, 
policy, enterprise, and content/application. The UNDP advocated for multi-faceted 
interventions and claimed that interactions between strategic interventions in each of the 
various areas would have greater potential for success than individual efforts in any single area. 
Such interactions would purportedly produce a “development dynamic”. 
The DOI Framework emphasised the society-changing/human development aspect of ICT, with 
a primary narrative being ICT’s role in “enabling empowerment and raising productivity”. Their 
work proposed "the poor" as the primary beneficiaries of ICT initiatives.  
Accompanying the DOI Framework in 2001 was the UNDP’s Human Development Report, which 
included a new measurement of development called the Technology Achievement Index (TAI). 
In the inaugural rankings, Trinidad and Tobago was placed 41st out of 72 countries. Speaking in 
response to the launch of the Report, Minister of Communications and Information Technology, 
Ralph Maraj echoed the UNDP’s sentiment that “information was vital to human and societal 
development” and pointed to the legislative foundation provided by the recently passed 
Telecommunications Act 2001 to “provide a strong platform for the growth of ICTs”.  
A notable perspective on the UNDP's characterisation of the information society is the fact that, 
at the time, there was limited empirical evidence of the efficacy of ICTs for reliably and 
sustainably reducing poverty (Heeks, 2010). 
In March 2002, having reframed itself as the de facto development specialist agency for the 
Americas Region, the IDB published a report to recap its activities – one year after the 3rd 
hemispheric gathering of the Americas that had taken place in April 2001. The Report was titled 
“Summit of the Americas: The Agenda of the IDB – Activities and Strategic Programs One Year 
After Quebec". The main narrative of ICT from the IDB’s perspective put ICT in service of other 
human pursuits such as self-sufficiency (through support for telecentres in rural communities to 
improve connectivity) and higher education (through support for the creation of digital libraries 
and modernization of educational agencies), on the grounds that such pursuits were at the 
centre of “democratic process and efficient, equitable and sustainable development.” 
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Priority investment areas identified by the IDB included (IDB, 2002: 34): 
- Regulatory initiatives to promote connectivity 
- Telecenters program for rural connectivity 
- Connectivity program for excellence in higher education 
- Program for the democratization of information technology 
 
In November 2001 the United Nations ICT Task Force was formed by UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan. Intended to “[h]elp harness the power of information and communication technologies 
for advancing the internationally agreed development goals of the Millennium Declaration, 
particularly halving the number of people living in extreme poverty by 2015… serve as a bridge 
between the ICT and development communities and examine how to use ICT to leverage and 
enhance development programmes and projects”, the Task Force was comprised of 
representatives from the public and private sectors, civil society and the scientific community. 
Developing (and transition) economies were represented along with the most technologically 
advanced nations.  
According to an archive of the ICT Task Force website47, the objective of the Task Force was to: 
“provide overall leadership to the United Nations role in helping to formulate strategies for the 
development of information and communication technologies and putting those technologies at 
the service of development and, on the basis of consultations with all stakeholders and Member 
States, forging a strategic partnership between the United Nations system, private industry and 
financing trusts and foundations, donors, programme countries and other relevant stakeholders 
in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions.”  
The UN ICT Task Force’s activities included: 
- Assistance to countries in designing national and regional ICT strategies 
- Supporting universal participation in new international policy and technical issues raised by 
ICT and the Internet 
- Promoting national and international efforts to support local content and application 
creation 
                                                          
47 
https://web.archive.org/web/20040904182146/http://www.unicttaskforce.org/about/mission_stateme
nt.html and 
https://web.archive.org/web/20040206223539/http://www.unicttaskforce.org/about/planofaction.asp 
[both accessed on 15th January 2017] 
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- Promoting ICT for health care and in the fight against HIV/AIDS and other infectious and 
communicable diseases 
- Fostering enterprise and entrepreneurship for sustainable economic development, 
including poverty alleviation 
 
Following the close of the Task Force’s work, the UN organised the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS), a landmark forum for the progression of ICT4D that also drew 
inspiration from the UN’s MDG agenda. WSIS was held in two phases. The first phase took place 
in Geneva hosted by the Government of Switzerland from 10 to 12 December 2003, and the 
second phase took place in Tunis hosted by the Government of Tunisia, from 16 to 18 November 
2005. The Internet Society48 described WSIS as follows: “The World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) was a unique two-phase United Nations (UN) summit that began with the goal 
of achieving a common vision, desire and commitment to build a people-centric, inclusive and 
development-oriented Information Society where everyone can create, access, utilize and share 
information.  The WSIS is a key event in the history of the Internet.  It recognized that it is not 
only governments who should have a say in the development of the Internet’s future, but also 
businesses, civil society, engineers, and everyone who can play a role in its future. Today, annual 
WSIS Forums are an integral part to the follow-up of the World Summit on the Information 
Society, which defined a set of targets, recommendations and commitments to build an 
inclusive, people-centric and development-oriented Information Society.” 
The Geneva Round involved 50 Heads of state/government and Vice-Presidents, 82 Ministers, 
and 26 Vice-Ministers from 175 countries, as well as high-level representatives from 
international organizations, private sector, and civil society, and produced a Declaration of 
Principles and a Plan of Action. The former was a road map for achieving an information society 
that was accessible to all while the latter advocated a strong role for governments in ICT sector 
planning via the creation of national e-strategies, in collaboration with the private sector and 
civil society. The WSIS Action Plan outlined a series of targets to achieve the information society, 
which in turn were filtered down into national e-strategies. The targets were grouped according 
to action lines that covered critical elements such as governance, infrastructure, access, security, 
applications, and local content. 
WSIS was touted as the umbrella framework for guiding global information society 
development. Yet, despite being framed in human-centric terms, WSIS was criticized for 
                                                          
48 http://www.internetsociety.org/wsis  
124 
 
 
 
attempting to advance a utopian, technologically deterministic picture wherein ICTs took on a 
“wholly positive view as tools of development”. Doing so, it was argued, oversimplified a 
complex phenomenon, and intimated a consensus on the role for ICT in development where 
none existed (Pyati, 2005). This was perhaps due to the fact that although the WSIS process was 
regarded as “inclusive”, because it was part of the UN system, only government representatives 
had primary responsibility for drafting the documents that came to be formally adopted as 
outputs of the process. Even though T&T policymakers participated in WSIS and the effects of 
that participation – particularly during the lead up to the events themselves – can be perceived 
in the localised process of creating T&T’s National ICT Strategy, there was insufficient 
engagement with the wider community of ICT stakeholders, including civil society.  
Local civil society groups such as the Trinidad and Tobago Computer Society and the IT 
Professionals Society had been meeting since the mid-1990s and included representation from 
a wide range of early technology adopters and small firms that had been pushing the proverbial 
envelope as regards ICTs in Trinidad and Tobago. However, they had limited impact on the policy 
process. This was due, in part, to the lukewarm approach of the government to consultative and 
participatory policy design and to the shortcomings in the civil society groups’ attempts to lobby 
and advocate strategically. For the better part of the early 2000s within Trinidad and Tobago, 
policymakers and civil society representatives appeared to be talking past each other as neither 
side was able to effectively integrate their respective perspectives on the role of ICT in 
development so as to come to an agreement on how best to organize the various actors in the 
community.49 
At the regional level there was marginally more success in fostering engagement among 
governments and civil society through, for example, the Caribbean ICT Stakeholders Virtual 
Community (CIVIC) – a collection of representatives from the private sector, governments, civil 
society organizations and regional development organizations. In February 2003, in preparation 
for the WSIS Geneva Round, CIVIC published an advocacy brief (CIVIC, 2003) that set out an 
assessment of regional ICT challenges and recommendations, including: infrastructure and 
access, human capacity, policy, enterprise, gender and youth, and content and applications. It 
should be noted that CIVIC members were collectively and individually assisted in advancing 
their lobby through the support of international agencies such as the Canadian International 
                                                          
49 A clear example of this ineffective engagement was the protracted and ultimately unsuccessful 
negotiations that took place between the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, and TTNIC, the company 
that was responsible for the registration and administration of Internet domain named under the TT 
(Trinidad and Tobago) Top Level Domain, over control of the .TT domain. TTNIC was formed by local 
Internet pioneers Patrick Hosein, George Gobin and Feisal Mohammed. 
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Development Agency (CIDA), USAID and the Institute for Connectivity in the Americas (ICA), 
which all contributed development funding and expertise for ICT projects in the developing 
countries in the Western hemisphere.  
Further in-depth discussion on these issues, as well as a review of progress towards a regional 
ICT4D strategy at the time, is available in the following literature: Marcelle(2003, 2004) and 
Thakur(2009, 2012). 
6.3.3. Resolution  
By 2002 the Internet infrastructure bottleneck which was considered the major obstruction to 
the full rollout of the information society in T&T had started to clear as a result of the 
liberalization process that had commenced in 2001 with the passage of the Telecommunications 
Act (see Figure 10).  
 
By that time as well the government was gearing up to roll out a comprehensive national 
development plan, Vision2020, by reframing the Medium Term Policy Framework series as 
Social and Economic Policy Frameworks (SEPF). Taking a cue from the Millennium Development 
Goals, the first SEPF espoused three main focal areas: Human Development Agenda; Economic 
Growth and Diversification Agenda; Environmental Agenda.  
In the new dispensation, the government linked ICT's role to the economic growth and 
diversification agenda, as the lynchpin of a new era of industrialisation founded on “high-level 
technical skills, managerial and entrepreneurial capabilities as well as competence in the 
utilisation of sophisticated technologies” (Finance, 2002: 1). The SEPF also outlined 
Keen battle for broadband 
Local firms join with foreign partners to take piece of the pie ...with the products so similar, the technology will 
not be as important as the quality of service each company offers. 
The race is heating up to provide wireless broadband services in Trinidad. Two products were launched over the 
last week: the Gillette Group's Proximity and Blue Sky from Lisa Communications. Although Blue Sky officially 
launched on Tuesday, it has been in operation since the beginning of the year and has eight customers. Earlier this 
year, Neal and Massy, re-branded as Illuminat, launched Helios, soon followed by Information Technology Alliance 
Ltd (ITAL).  
Broadband provides an alternative to dial-up connections which we have become used to locally. While dial-up 
offers connection rates between 24 and 56 kilobits per second (Kbps), broadband gives permanent access at up 
to three megabits per second (Mbps). While all providers use different technology to provide their service, the 
main difference is in the speeds and packages they offer. […] 
Figure 10 – Excerpt from article published in the Trinidad Guardian on 17th May, 2001 
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government's role to “invest, build and facilitate the development of information technologies, 
telecommunications and internet infrastructures in Trinidad and Tobago.” (Finance, 2002: 100) 
Following the early warning provided by the SEPF, before the close of the year Prime Minister 
Manning mandated the creation of a National ICT Strategy, and a Steering Committee of senior 
public service officials from various ministries and departments with some perceived relevance 
to ICT was convened to coordinate the task. This was not the first time a senior politician had 
called for the creation of some sort of “holistic national technology policy”, but it was the first 
time that action followed the call and produced such a well-published result. 
“In November 2002, the Honourable Prime Minister convened a meeting of senior 
officials from Ministries and Departments that dealt with various aspects of ICT 
matters and mandated that a National ICT Strategy be developed. The Minister 
responsible for telecommunications, the Minister of Public Administration and 
Information was appointed to be Chairman of the Steering Committee comprising of 
Ministers and Permanent Secretaries from the relevant Ministries and Department. 
To streamline the institutional arrangements, responsibility for ICT matters was 
assigned to the Minister of Public Administration and Information (MPAI), who 
already had telecommunications as part of his portfolio. Electronic Commerce and 
Electronic Government were re-assigned from other ministries to MPAI in May 
2003.” – Mitchell (2007: 19-20) 
Following the guidance of the WSIS Action Plan, to ensure coverage of all the desired thematic 
areas, five Working Groups were established and tasked with developing sections of the ICT 
strategy as follows: Infrastructure, Human Resources, Economy & Finance, Government, and 
Legal & Policy. Each working group was chaired by persons who were knowledgeable and well-
respected in the local landscape: Infrastructure – Mr. David Soverall; Human Resources – Dr. 
Noel Kalicharan; Economy and Finance – Mr. Ronald Harford (with Mr. Nigel Mark Baptiste as 
Ag. Chairperson); Government – Ms. Gillian Macintyre; Legal and Policy – Ms. Elizabeth Camps. 
In December 2003 the National ICT Strategy of Trinidad and Tobago (2003-2008) was launched. 
It was branded fastforward and envisioned T&T in “a prominent position in the global 
information society through real and lasting improvements in social, economic and cultural 
development caused by deployment and usage of information and communication technology”. 
By the account of those interviewed who played a role in it, the process of creating fastforward 
was “inclusive and participatory”. 
According to the document, the objective of the country’s national connectivity agenda was to: 
• Provide all citizens with affordable Internet access; 
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• Focus on the development of children and adult skills to ensure sustainable solution and 
a vibrant future; 
• Promote citizen trust, access and interaction through good governance; and 
• Maximise the potential within all citizens and accelerate innovation to develop a 
knowledge-based society. 
fastforward’s targets to 2008 included - 
• All schools with high-speed computers and Internet 
access 
• All libraries with up-to-date computers and high-
speed Internet access 
• Community Connection Programme in place 
• All appropriate Government services available on-line 
• Over 50% of homes with personal computers and 
Internet access 
• Over 50% of population “regular Internet users” 
• Over 50% of businesses on-line and seeing business 
benefits 
The proposed implementation approach consisted of a number of programmes and projects, 
including: 
 The Community Connection Programme, which involved the provision of Community 
Access Centres (CAC) beginning with a pilot study. 
 The Legislative Review and Reform Programme, which will examine the existing legal 
and legislative framework and make recommendations to facilitate the promotion of e-
business activities in Trinidad and Tobago 
 The Knowledge, Innovation and Development (KID) Programme, will through the 
SchoolNet Project of the Ministry of Education, provide up-to-date computers and 
connect all schools in Trinidad and Tobago to high speed Internet service by 2008. 
 The LibraryNet Programme to be executed by the National Library and Information 
System Authority (NALIS) will provide all libraries with computers and high speed Internet 
access. 
 The e-Marketplace Programme will provide an avenue for Small and Micro Enterprises 
(SME) to conduct business online through a SME B2B e-Marketplace. 
 The e-Government Programme will essentially complement the existing 
• Government Wide Area Network (GWAN) Project, which is to connect all Ministries and 
Agencies over a public service communications backbone. 
• The programme will see the creation of an e-Government Portal that will be the single 
point to access all appropriate government information and services by 2008. 
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Given the prevailing national mood as regards a keen desire for societal improvement, it is not 
altogether surprising that the aims and objectives of fastforward appeared to be an 
amalgamation of the various global rhetorics that were in circulation at the time, condensed 
into a single text that was intended to be the playbook that set out the plan for T&T’s arrival at 
its place in the global information society.  
A former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Public Administration and Information 
recounted the formula that facilitated the process of creating and launching fastforward: 
“One of the great things that happened to our ministry at that time was having a 
minister like Dr. Saith - again a key part in your policy environment. Dr. Saith was 
easily the most respected minister in the Cabinet outside of the Prime Minister 
himself. He was the go-to guy in the Cabinet. Anything that was happening anywhere 
that was troublesome you would read in the papers 'Dr. Saith has been asked to 
intervene'. That made me know about it … So that, we had respect, we knew we 
could get the funding for whatever we needed that made sense. There was nothing I 
ever dreamt about in terms of something that was for the development of our 
country that I did not get funding for. So, we were able to launch this [fastforward] 
on time.” – interview with Jacqueline Wilson, on the role Dr. Saith’s (Minister of 
Public Administration and Information, 2002-2007) leadership and power within 
Cabinet played in facilitating the creation of the National ICT Strategy 
Creating the Strategy was an important step, but it had to be followed up with the right team to 
implement it. Again, Mrs. Wilson’s insight was helpful for understanding how the process 
worked: 
“…we immediately went to Cabinet with a structure, but even then we stayed flexible. 
We advertised for a Project Coordinator to head up this ICT implementation. And the 
people who responded were all wrong. And I looked at it and said 'Gillian, we're 
advertising the wrong job. We don't want a technocrat in ICT necessarily. I want 
somebody who could talk to kings and talk to fishermen and inspire both of them. 
This person has to be hugely visionary and strategic, but not necessarily an expert in 
any one of the ICT areas. That would be the gravy, but that's not what we want. We 
want somebody who could build coalitions and get things to happen around them … 
but to get that we can't call it this job. The job has to be big'. As a PS I had no problem 
in hiring people who would get more money than the PS because it didn't matter. 
What mattered was getting the capacity and the capability we needed for the 
country. And, we changed the job to 'National Chief Information Officer'.  
So we went back out and we got two really exceptional applicants - Cleveland 
Thomas and John Mollenthiel. We realised that Cleveland was higher on the policy 
curve than John was, but that they both would bring a lot of value. So we went back 
in-house and mulled over it because the positions at the Executive Manager level 
were not significant enough to attract somebody with John's expertise back to 
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Trinidad. He was in Canada when he applied for this job. And I said 'You know what, 
let us think this out some more because one of the failures of implementation in 
public service change initiatives has been an underestimation of the human 
capacity you need'. So I said 'Perhaps we need to create a position of Deputy Director 
and go back out for that one'. And that's what we did. We went back, we thought 
about it again - this is the position, this is what we want to do - and John got that. 
And then we stepped back and let them run with recruitment and so on. ...I believe 
strongly that the leader had to mould the team, and my job as PS was very clear - to 
be the articulator of the vision, ensure strategic implementation and guidance and 
foresight, get you the resources and leave you to do the job. I was never going to be 
interfering in what you would go on to do. So that was what we tried.” – interview 
with Jacqueline Wilson, on the process of executive recruitment to run the ICT 
Division of the Ministry of Public Administration. 
In both excerpts, the former Permanent Secretary emphasised the importance of holding firmly 
to a vision, yet exercising flexibility in the methods of implementation. What comes through 
clearly from the quotes is the importance of having powerful and savvy leadership at the top 
levels of the line ministry, and in Cabinet, to streamline the execution of policy objectives. 
The ICT Division of the Ministry of Public Administration was subsequently created in July 200550 
with two primary objectives: the provision of strategic guidance on national ICT development 
and the coordination of project implementation under the fastforward programme. 
fastforward was implemented during the period 2005 to 2008. However, speaking with 
respondents and reviewing documentation in 2011 gave the impression that there were still 
loose ends. The techno-centric policy narratives embedded within fastforward did not appear 
to be fully translated into institutions that continued to affect action.  
According to a number of young tech-savvy entrepreneurs I spoke with e-Commerce still is not 
a viable option for T&T firms since critical pieces of the legislative framework (such as the Data 
Protection Act and the Electronic Transactions Act, both passed in 2011) were hamstrung 
through partial proclamation, leaving other crucial elements – such as legal recognition of digital 
currency, and authentication of digital representations of identity – out of their scope.  
Despite the eventual completion of the Backbone Project the Public Service was, in the 
estimation of some critics, not much closer to being ‘joined up’: 
"You still get a sense that there's still things that need to be done. From a holistic 
perspective you find that there are still policy gaps. Individual ministries may want 
to do X, but when you look at it from a 'whole of government' approach you end up 
seeing the gaps. Most of the times, things hinge on legislation and there are 
                                                          
50 As a result of Cabinet Minute No. 2466 of 2nd September 2004 
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implications for policy, implications for staffing, there are implications for a wide 
range of things for which the ministries sometimes just don't have the capacity to 
deal with." – interview with Joy Lange-Syriac 
Even civil society representatives felt slighted by the manner in which the implementation 
process had played out: 
“[Did we get to express our views while engaging in discussions with government 
entities and have our perspectives taken on board?] I would say "express", yes. 
"Taken on board"? You're never really too sure. Even if they take note of it [at the 
session] you always have to double check the legislation. While they would listen, 
and appreciate your point of view, I don't think we [as a country] are really at the 
point where [your perspective as a civil society rep] becomes part of the policy. There 
is still an idea of ‘you separate business from civil society and government and you 
have three separate meetings, and then [the Minister] pick and choose which bits 
you want to put it in’. But to say that we all meet, and thrash out [our ideas] and we 
all appreciate and understand each other's perspective ... or even disagree with each 
other's perspectives... that is not done. It's still a ‘divide and conquer’ kind of 
mentality. If I'm civil society, it doesn't mean that I can't appreciate what the 
government is saying, or what a businessman is saying - he still has to eat! And I still 
have to live in the same society as both of them. So I don't understand why you have 
to waste [effort] gathering information instead of having one huge session broken 
up into sub-groups and at least get a mixed perspective coming out of it. And that 
not only builds rapport and quality of discussion, but it also builds a kind of softness... 
it softens me to the other person's perspective. It's psychological as well. – interview 
with Cintra Sooknanan, former Director of T&T Computer Society and Chair of the 
T&T Chapter of the Internet Society, on the experience of civil society while 
participating in government-led consultations on ICT policy 
Ms. Sooknanan’s lament spoke to a deep concern for wanting civil society to be meaningfully 
involved in the furtherance of Trinidad and Tobago’s information society aspirations. The type 
of involvement that would produce social action and have a positive impact on the citizenry. 
Despite some improvements over time, in her view, fastforward had not turned the needle far 
enough. Further evidence that fastforward did not appear to resonate in the wider national 
community was provided by an article published by in November 2008 by Mark Lyndersay in the 
country’s longest running ICT-centric column titled BitDepth51. 
                                                          
51 According to his website, “BitDepth is the oldest continuously published column on technology in 
Trinidad and Tobago. It premiered in The Express in September 1995 and it ran there until November 1998, 
when it moved to The Guardian.” 
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BitDepth 654 - November 18 
17/11/08 21:04 Filed in: BitDepth - November 2008 
The first five years of Fast Forward are an era of Internet development that the 
Government doesn't want to talk about. 
What about Fast Forward 1? 
 
Fast Forward, we hardly knew ye. After five years of planning and spending, the only public 
gravestone of the first Fast Forward project is a cobweb site that hasn’t been updated for months. 
 
Just over two weeks ago, a senior advertising executive contacted me about the National ICT Symposium that ends 
today. “Nobody I know,” he said, “has heard of Fast Forward.” 
On his agenda was some curtain raising buzz about the symposium. Would I be interested in helping? 
Of course, that’s a no-brainer. Throughout the existence of this column, its one overriding reason for existence is the 
promotion of information and communications technology locally. 
Unfortunately, the way that I interpret that goal sometimes comes into conflict with the mission of communications 
professionals and their clients. 
There was a place for pre-symposium discussion of the Government’s plans for ICT in Trinidad and Tobago, but any 
overture to the future needed to embrace an accounting of what happened over the first five years of the Fast Forward 
initiative, and that’s what I asked for. 
 
What ensued was two weeks of e-mails and calls that ultimately yielded no discernible interest in any discussion of the 
five-year-old Government initiative to build infrastructure, policy and services in support of a tangible improvement in 
Trinidad and Tobago’s ICT profile. 
Nothing would please me more than to be wrong about this, but there seems to be little hope that any part of the ICT 
symposium scheduled to run from its launch on November 16 to its final sessions on November 18 will spend any time 
evaluating what worked and didn’t work for Fast Forward 1. 
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Conducting an evaluation of fastforward is outside the scope of this thesis, so I will not attempt 
one here. What is instructive, however, about the view expressed in Mr. Lyndersay’s article is 
the implication that the Government appeared to stop actively participating in the construction 
of the policy discourse, and hence on the construction of new institutions about ICT4D, after the 
project implementation had, by most indications, run into difficulty in delivering on its promises.  
 
The former NCIO who led the effort to implement fastforward during the period in question had 
this to say about what was achieved: 
“I think we have done some good work. We could have done better. We have done 
some good work in the sense that there was now connection of the ministries and 
departments. There was connection of remote sites and offices... Suddenly we 
started talking about reducing lines [of people waiting for service at government 
offices], now it can be done using technology. So passports, drivers licences, and so 
What was Fast Forward? 
The Fast Forward initiative was born out of the Government’s desire to fulfil crucial measures in order to achieve 
developed nation status by 2020. As part of the Vision 2020 plan, FF-1 was accorded appropriate front burner status 
and launched grandly in the last quarter of 2003, with splashy print and television advertising that sought to position 
the effort as hip, knowledgeable and inclusive. But from the outset, Fast Forward was created with only a dim 
understanding of what would really be necessary to achieve the intimidatingly long list of goals that the consulting 
committees created. 
 
What the project needed was a champion equivalent to Ken Julien in the energy sector. Without that kind of 
leadership talking to the highest levels of Government, Fast Forward’s work stumbled along, its few visible successes 
credited either to the bodies that actually implemented them or to the Ministries with line responsibility for specific 
areas of improvement. 
 
The fast fade 
What was left for the Fast Forward team were the soft and fuzzy bits that nobody wanted to claim, which included the 
ill-starred launch of a Government link aggregation portal meant to fulfil at least part of a mandate to link Ministries 
and Government agencies together and make their services available on the Internet. 
My snarky representation of this unfortunate launch earned an angry response from an inside man on the team. “Until 
you have tried to get information from 20 some odd Ministries and tried to start the necessary process re-engineering 
to make this and other initiatives effective and efficient, then you can talk,” wrote AD in a comment on my blog. 
 
This, unfortunately, is where my concerns as a columnist diverge from those who have undertaken a responsibility to 
produce. Where AD found “a Gov't service which is still run by non-ICT savvy persons, with not enough daring to 
challenge the status quo,” I find myself unsurprised. 
The faltering status of Fast Forward I does not absolve the government of a responsibility to report on the results of 
five years of work and spending. At launch, the project had a five-year budget expenditure pegged at US$82 million in 
2003 and a long list of proposals that remain largely in limbo.  
While it’s important to look forward hopefully with this symposium, there remains outstanding an accounting of 
results against stated expectations, which even a champion of the project described as a “tooth and nail” but wholly 
predictable conflict between fast changing technology and government bureaucracy. 
 
Source: http://www.lyndersaydigital.com/bd/archive/08_files/BitDepth654.html  
Figure 11 – BitDepth article published on 17th November 2008 
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on. So connecting ministries and remote offices became a priority. Connection was 
the emphasis at the time. We also started to utilise some of the people - scholars, 
trainers - to make use of their expertise. Get rid of all these [foreign] people that you 
continued to bring in - you could develop your own. We started to think about [ICT] 
being an alternative source of funds towards the GDP...there was tremendous room 
for diversification of the economy using ICTs. So that was our way of seeing some 
benefits there.  
We had our challenges too. Firstly, we needed to prove ourselves. [We had to prove] 
that this thing [ICT] is really worth it. There were limited resources, especially funds. 
So when the project said it needed one billion dollars [for example] you were getting 
piecemeal monies. You were getting a couple hundred thousand dollars and the 
bureaucracy in the process. There was also the disjointed approach to doing business 
because of the way in which government operates. I couldn't come into your ministry 
and tell you what to do, how to do it or when to do it. There was no single authority 
of government... If it wasn't a priority for that ministry [it didn't work]. Many times 
the budget was cut back. [We also] had the challenge that it was all new to all of us... 
we had to set up a whole [operation]. When I came in we were about fifteen people 
dealing with fastforward. By the time we left there were close to one hundred and 
two people. So there was a movement. The ranking [on international indices] started 
to move. We also found that it was slow in implementation. So we had all of this, but 
because of the system of government where you have [a series of bureaucratic 
procedures, and by the time you get through them all] the technology has changed. 
So technology did not have time for the typical, traditional way of doing business in 
government.” - interview with Cleveland Thomas, on the process of implementing 
fastforward 
Mr. Thomas expressed a range of perspectives in his response. He was proud of what he had 
been able to achieve with his team in terms of influencing the construction of the new institution 
of a knowledge-based society in Trinidad and Tobago, given the numerous challenges they faced 
and the significant cognitive costs of doing so. He referred to partial, but incomplete 
institutionalization by way of the increase of staff at the organization, and hence an increase in 
the number of ambassadors for the new institution. He also, however, pointed to a number of 
issues that were found to be insurmountable, and which appeared to be conditioned by existing 
institutions, such as siloed government operations, slow implementation, and inconsistency 
between the rigid structure of government bureaucracy and the dynamic nature of ICT-enabled 
change processes. 
 
6.3.4. Sub-case Summary 
This sub-case chronicled the process of creating a vision for Trinidad and Tobago’s information 
or knowledge-based society. As in the other two sub-cases an overarching techno-centric 
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narrative was evident – one that speculated on the positive benefits to be gained from investing 
in ICT. In this scenario, alternative narratives did arise, but did not gain support because they did 
not align with the national mood and they were not affiliated with other, more established 
narratives.  
 
6.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented a case study in the form of three sub-cases: telecommunications sector 
liberalization; public sector reform through the introduction of e-Government, and particularly, 
a Communications Backbone network; and, the development of Trinidad and Tobago’s first 
national ICT strategy, dubbed fastforward. 
The first sub-case chronicled the process through which the WTO’s popular telecommunication 
liberalization narrative was transferred into Trinidad and Tobago’s policy environment, and 
embedded into new institutions, precipitating legal and regulatory change along the way. The 
second sub-case explored the paradoxes created through the introduction of the Backbone, 
which arose as a result of competing narratives. The outcome of which was incomplete adoption 
of the network by the beneficiary ministries, and consequently incomplete institutionalization 
of the desired electronic “one stop shop”. Finally, the third sub-case recounted the attempt at 
developing and diffusing a vision for Trinidad and Tobago’s take on a knowledge-based or 
information society. The vision was encapsulated in a techno-centric narrative but was not 
translated into the more widely dispersed societal change that had been anticipated. 
Each section of this chapter presented a different case of discursive construction of ICT4D policy 
in Trinidad and Tobago, mapping out the iterative process of events generating texts, texts 
embodying narratives, narratives competing in discursive spaces, and the competition among 
narratives generating institutions, in some cases, which in turn enabled and constrained 
subsequent events. One of the strengths of a discourse analysis approach, however, is not simply 
understanding the deconstruction of power dynamics underlying policy language, but in the 
provision of mechanisms to allow policymakers to shape policy themselves. In the next chapter, 
more in-depth analysis and interpretations are presented to compare the processes and 
outcomes across the three cases presented thus far with the aim of developing generalised 
explanations of ICT4D policy construction. 
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7. Interpretive Analysis: Policy creolization as discursive 
construction of policy creoles and policy pidgins 
 
This chapter presents an in-depth interpretive analysis to develop and refine the 
contributions of this thesis and ensure that those findings are generalizable beyond the 
contextual particularities of the case. In Sections 7.1 and 7.2 I conduct critical discourse analysis 
on the important events and key texts which frame the sub-cases described in Chapter 6, and 
examine the relationships between events and texts, texts and narratives, and narratives and 
institutions. In section 7.3 I interpret and explain each sub-case as a case of discursive policy 
construction, as a means of introducing a model of what I have termed policy creolization in 
section 7.4. The model categorises the two types of institutions present in the three sub-cases, 
namely policy creoles and policy pidgins, according to the two main factors that influence their 
emergence. I thereby offer policy creolization as a form of hybridization and recombination of 
existing narratives and externally derived narratives in the discursive construction of policy. 
Section 7.5 provides considerations for applying the policy creolization model in other contexts. 
 
7.1. Events & Texts 
The major events that were described in the three sub-cases, and the main texts they generated 
are represented graphically in Figures 12-14 below. For simplicity of representation and ease of 
reference, only the most significant events or texts in each case are referred to here, omitting 
the more mundane activities such as Cabinet meetings or Cabinet minutes.  
In Figures 12-14, the following conventions apply: 
 Each node on the timelines is colour-coded according to the sub-cases 
 Rectangular shapes with the curved bottoms represent texts, while circles (whether 
solid or with a hole in the middle)52 represent discursive events.  
 The relative size of the node is meant to give a rough estimation of the importance of 
either the event or text to the case.  
                                                          
52 The holes are artefacts of the software used to draw the timelines and do not have a specific meaning 
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Figure 12 – Timeline of events and texts (Telecom Liberalization) 
 
Figure 13 – Timeline of events and texts (Backbone) 
*Crossover point 
 
 
Figure 14 – Timeline of events and texts (fastforward) 
 
Colour codes 
 
Telecom Liberalization Communications Backbone fastforward 
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Although events such as Cabinet meetings, and the Cabinet minutes produced therein, would 
obviously have played a role in the translation of narratives from other contexts into Trinidad 
and Tobago, particularly where such translation eventually led to Government-funded action, 
as suggested in the contextual background chapter there was little written evidence of Cabinet 
meetings being used to debate or refute highly technical issues, nor did I have access to any such 
meetings for obvious reasons. One would expect that any technical debates, where they did take 
place, would have occurred at the level of technocrats within ministries or departments, or other 
organisations, leaving more or less ‘fait accompli’ proposals being brought forward for Cabinet’s 
attention. 
As shown in each timeline, the major discursive events all precipitated the production of 
important texts (e.g. the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in 1982 led to the publication of the 
Maitland Report in 1985; the introduction of GATS in 1999 led to the publication of the WTO 
Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles; the formation of the National e-Commerce Policy 
Committee in 1999 generated the first National e-Commerce Policy in 2000; the formation of 
the UN ICT Task Force in 2001 eventually contributed to the creation of fastforward in 2003).  
In the telecom liberalization case locally produced texts only had significant importance on the 
policy discourse construction after expertise had been built up in translating and embedding 
dominant narratives into locally-relevant contextual narratives via the Dookeran Committee. A 
similar experience occurred with the fastforward case. Multiple attempts at framing ICT 
development as a national priority (e.g. via the IT Policy for the Public Service and the Medium 
Term Policy Framework of 2001-2003) did not have significant impact on the policy discourse 
construction until the process of actually putting together the first national ICT4D strategy (the 
fastforward plan itself) had facilitated the development of sufficient expertise. The evidence is 
not as clear in the Backbone case, however, as there were few traces of externally-derived texts 
conveying dominant narratives in that case with which to compare the impact of the locally-
produced texts. 
The production of each text did not have the same impact on social action, however. As 
introduced in the theoretical framework, there are three categories53 of social action carried out 
by actors in relation to other actors as a result of their interface with text: intentional, 
consequential or emergent. In short, these categories represent decreasing levels of 
intentionality on the part of actors to shape the discourse.  
                                                          
53 Intentional – deliberate attempt to convey narrative through text; Consequential – produced as a by-
product of an ongoing discourse and may incorporate other narratives; Emergent – arises from discursive 
contestation in unpredicted ways and subsequently re-contextualized through new connections being 
made 
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How do texts enter policy processes? 
The most common perspective arising from the case study is that texts were seldom generated 
‘greenfield’ in ICT4D policy processes in Trinidad and Tobago. That is, they did not arise natively 
out of a public policy concern, or as a result of locally-generated research. Instead, the analysis 
shows that texts entered the localised policy processes through one of three pathways:  
(1) External events 
(2) Demands arising from international commitments 
(3) Local ‘catch up’ directives aimed at striving for ‘information-based’ modernity 
By ‘enter’ here I refer to texts becoming known to key participants in the policy process and 
used to either guide new activity, or to support or refute ongoing activity. 
 
Table 3 displays the pathway for each of the main documents referenced in the timelines in 
Figures 12 to 14 and categories the resultant type of social action in each case. 
Table 3 – Mechanisms for text entry into localised policy processes 
Case Text Mechanism Type of Action 
associated with 
production of this text 
Telecom 
Liberalization 
Missing Link Report External event Emergent 
FCC Benchmark Order External event Emergent 
WTO Reference Paper 
on Regulatory 
Principles 
External event Intentional 
GATS Protocol 4 External event Consequential 
Dookeran Report Local ‘catch up’ directives 
aimed at striving for 
‘information-based’ 
modernity 
Intentional 
Telecommunications 
Act 
Demands arising from 
international commitment 
Consequential 
Various regulations 
and policies, pursuant 
to Telecommunications 
Act (2001)54 
Local ‘catch up’ directives 
aimed at striving for 
‘information-based’ 
modernity 
Consequential 
Backbone National e-Commerce 
Policy 
Local ‘catch up’ directives 
aimed at striving for 
‘information-based’ 
modernity 
Intentional 
RFP for 
Communications 
Backbone 
Local ‘catch up’ directives 
aimed at striving for 
‘information-based’ 
modernity 
Consequential 
                                                          
54 Even though this includes several documents, they are counted as a single instance since they are all 
part of the same programme of work carried out by TATT – filling out the regulatory framework to support 
liberalization after the main instrument (Telecom Act) came into being 
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fastforward IT Policy for the Public 
Service 
Local ‘catch up’ directives 
aimed at striving for 
‘information-based’ 
modernity 
Intentional 
Medium Term Policy 
Framework (2001-
2003) 
Local ‘catch up’ directives 
aimed at striving for 
‘information-based’ 
modernity 
Intentional 
UNDP Digital 
Opportunity Initiative 
Report 
External event Emergent 
IDB Summit of the 
Americas Report 
External event Consequential 
National ICT Strategy, 
fastforward 
Local ‘catch up’ directives 
aimed at striving for 
‘information-based’ 
modernity 
Consequential 
WSIS Geneva 
Declaration & Plan of 
Action 
External event Emergent 
Vision 2020 Local ‘catch up’ directives 
aimed at striving for 
‘information-based’ 
modernity 
Emergent 
 
Table 4 – Frequency of occurrence of text entry mechanism 
Type Count 
External events 7 
Demands arising from international commitment 1 
Local ‘catch up’ directives aimed at striving for 
‘information-based’ modernity 
8 
 
Table 5 – Frequency of occurrence of text entry mechanism, by sub-case 
Case External 
events 
Demands arising 
from international 
commitments 
Local ‘catch up’ directives 
aimed at striving for 
‘information-based’ modernity 
Telecom Liberalization 4 1 2 
Backbone 0 0 2 
fastforward 3 0 4 
 
The results show that most common route for texts to enter the local policy processes was as a 
result of directives to ‘catch up’ in order to strive for ‘information-based’ modernity, but this 
occurred only marginally more frequently than texts entering as a result of external events. The 
telecom liberalization sub-case was the only one in which a commitment arising from an 
international agreement (GATS) was invoked, which is to be expected since there have been no 
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global agreements on the topics of e-Government, e-Commerce or national ICT strategies, as 
there have been for liberalization of telecommunications sectors under the WTO. Even though 
the Backbone project involved local telecom operator TSTT in a joint alliance with ICT 
multinational Fujitsu, the interviews and case documents suggest very little interaction, if any, 
with Fujitsu Global on the part of the e-Government Unit team, ostensibly since the project was 
considered a fairly standard, relatively low value (in US$) installation, and as pointed out, it did 
not involve the use of cutting edge equipment or the development of new equipment.  
A more general point about the texts described and analysed in these cases is that there is a 
significant diversity of texts – in terms of authors/producers, genre (reports, legislative acts, 
strategies, action plans), time horizons, and functions of the text within the policy process to 
either introduce or reinforce narratives through discourse. Most texts very clearly performed a 
discursive reinforcement of international narratives that originated elsewhere. Some attempted 
to perform a sort of ‘proto-narrative’, that is to say, they attempted to introduce a new or 
somehow distinct narrative from that which was the dominant institution at the time, but they 
were unsuccessful in being translated into institutions themselves. Others were internally 
inconsistent because they were not produced in an appropriate genre, were produced by 
illegitimate authors, or did not align well to existing, well-accepted institutions.  
In the next section we will explore in more detail the nature and interaction of the narratives 
that were embedded within the main texts in each sub-case.  
 
7.2. Narratives & Institutions 
The competition between conflicting, tangential or otherwise related narratives within a given 
discursive space is an important facet of the discursive policy construction process. Non-
specialists seldom grapple with the underlying technical ‘facts’ of an issue. Instead the narratives 
that they perceive, reproduce and reinforce become the primary currency in a discursive 
exchange. According to the theoretical framework being applied in this research, the narratives 
that ‘survive’ the competition are more likely to subsequently become institutions, at which 
point they play a crucial role in moderating both discursive events (what can be said or not said; 
who is allowed to speak or not speak) and social events (which proposals get supported; which 
departments get staff; where projects get funded, etc.). The analysis that follows, therefore, is 
intended to address the combined research sub-questions: What are the competing narratives 
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that interact in the institutional field of ICT4D policy, and how has the competition between 
narratives produced the institutions that comprise the institutional field of ICT4D policy? 
In Tables 6 to 8 below the dominant narrative in the pivotal text in each case is analysed in terms 
of the factors which are likely to influence the translation of texts into narratives, and 
subsequently narratives into institutions.  
 
The pivotal texts being examined are: 
Case Text 
Telecom liberalization WTO Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles (1997) 
Backbone National Electronic Commerce Policy (2000) 
fastforward  National ICT Strategy document, fastforward (2003) 
 
As a reminder, the factors affecting translation of texts into narratives, and affecting the 
production of institutions from narratives were introduced separately in the literature review. 
However, they are reproduced and linked here to show the sequential progression from text to 
narrative to institution: 
Factors affecting translation of texts into 
narratives 
 Factors affecting narratives 
producing institutions 
Characteristics of the text producer  The internal structure of the 
narrative Genre of text 
Consonance between the narrative and 
“widespread and deeply held cultural values” 
 The level of support from other, 
highly legitimate narratives 
Relationship between the narrative and the 
“national mood” 
Relationship of the text to other texts  The level of competition from 
other contradictory narratives Degree of prescription of radical redistribution 
of power or wealth 
 
Consistent with the theoretical framework, I take the view that institutions can only be 
experienced through the actions that they repeatedly enable or constrain. As such the test for 
institutionalization of the narratives is conducted by examining the type and status of the social 
actions that succeeded the introduction of the narrative into the institutional field. The 
framework would suggest that strong institutions would be more successful in supporting (or 
denying) actions than weak ones. 
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Table 6 – Analysis of WTO Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles as main text that constituted the dominant 
narrative in support of telecom liberalization 
Factors affecting 
text-to-narrative 
translation 
Effect Factors affecting 
narrative-to-institution 
translation 
Effect 
Characteristics of 
text producer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Genre of text 
The WTO, as producer of 
the dominant narrative 
(economic and social 
benefits of telecom 
liberalization), was 
considered an authoritative 
and legitimate source of 
knowledge 
 
 
The genre of the text 
(Reference Paper) was 
considered a standard of 
international best practice, 
and hence afforded a 
significant degree of 
prestige. It therefore 
enacted ‘a relevant and 
recognizable genre which 
provided other actors with a 
tool they could use for 
interpretation, motivating 
them to use the text and 
incorporate it into their own 
actions and texts’ (Phillips et 
al., 2004: 643). This in turn 
facilitated its translation 
into a supporting text (the 
Dookeran Report – the first 
‘codified’ national telecom 
policy) in the T&T context, 
which in turn supported the 
development of legislation 
(Telecom Act, 2001) 
 
Internal structure of the 
narrative 
The dominant narrative 
about telecom liberalization 
was considered internally 
consistent because it was 
produced by an 
authoritative and legitimate 
source, and it was 
exemplified in a text whose 
genre was considered a 
standard and which drew 
upon the widely accepted 
institution of “international 
best practice”. The narrative 
was therefore widely 
circulated and referenced. 
Consonance 
between the 
narrative and 
“widespread and 
deeply held 
cultural values” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationship 
between the 
There was a high degree of 
consonance between part of 
liberalization narrative and 
the deeply held 
values/interests of the 
private sector - “telecom 
liberalization is beneficial 
because it can offer 
significant export 
opportunities and earnings, 
create new and challenging 
employment opportunities 
and diversify the economy”  
 
Customers were fed up of 
TSTT’s high prices and low 
Level of support from 
other, highly legitimate 
narratives 
The dominant narrative 
about telecom liberalization 
was supported by the 
private sector because of 
their self-interested pursuit 
of new potential earnings, 
resulting from increased 
domestic market share, 
which in turn would have 
resulted from an increase in 
the overall market size 
(number of subscribers), as 
well as the expected churn 
of customers away from the 
incumbent (TSTT). 
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narrative and the 
“national mood” 
quality of service, and 
further, TSTT’s monopoly 
status was perceived as a 
major stumbling block to 
the country’s development 
 
Relationship of 
the text to other 
texts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Degree of 
prescription of 
radical 
redistribution of 
power or wealth 
WTO Reference Paper was 
interdiscursively linked to, 
and hence derived legitimacy 
from the Maitland “Missing 
Link” Report, which had been 
produced a decade earlier 
and was widely accepted 
within telecom policy circles 
as a formal report issued by 
the world governing body for 
telecommunications  
 
 
The WTO Reference Paper 
did prescribe a change of 
modus operandi between 
developed and developing 
countries which was 
conflictual (de-legitimisation 
of excessive international 
settlement payments) and 
catalysed a shift in power 
that was considered 
disadvantageous to 
developing countries in the 
short term (as a result of a 
reduction in revenue), but 
beneficial to them in the long 
run. 
Level of competition 
from other conflicting 
narratives 
The challenges that were 
raised in objection to the 
main narrative came from 
the governments and 
telecom operators of 
developing countries 
because they foresaw a 
sharp decline in their 
incomes from international 
telecommunications. Those 
objections were linked to a 
narrative of using telecoms 
revenue for national 
development, however, this 
narrative was unsuccessful 
in competing against the 
WTO’s narrative in favour of 
liberalization and bringing 
prices in line with costs, 
which was further supported 
by the general neoliberal 
argument against cross-
subsidization. 
 
 
Did social action occur? Yes 
If so, what was the 
evidence of it? 
The Working Group on Telecommunications (Dookeran Committee) was 
formed and produced their instrumental report, which was a precursor to 
legislative change via the passage and promulgation of the Telecommunications 
Act of 2001. The implementation of the Act via the creation of the 
Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad and Tobago, and the subsequent 
liberalization programme demonstrated that social action occurred arising from 
this discursive event.  
Of what type was it: 
intentional, consequential, 
or emergent? 
This action was cited by many knowledgeable respondents as being 
consequential to the publication of the WTO Reference Paper on Regulatory 
Principles, which intentionally produced to exemplify the objectives of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services for the telecommunications sector. 
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In the telecom liberalization case the Government built regulatory infrastructure, with the 
expectation that the private sector would be attracted to enter the market and build out the 
physical infrastructure to facilitate the increase in availability of ICTs. In Table 6 above we can 
track the path of the WTO’s Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles from the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, through a local expert committee, becoming codified in an 
instrumental local telecommunications policy document and subsequently informing the 
creation of the Telecommunications Act of 2001. Specifically, the narrative was found to be 
internally consistent and was perceived as authoritative owing to its producer and genre. It built 
on a previously espoused narrative that had been produced and diffused a decade prior, and 
hence it gained the support of experts and other elites in the field. The primary opposing 
narrative came from developing country telcos (TSTT included), however that alternative was 
not as well supported by additional texts and narratives, and hence the alternative was 
unsuccessful in disrupting the powerful dominant narrative. Given the significant sustained 
program of activity that followed the passage of the Telecom Act into law, it can be said that the 
narrative was institutionalized. 
 
Table 7 – Analysis of National Electronic Commerce Policy as main text that constituted the dominant narrative 
in support of e-Government 
Factors affecting text-
to-narrative 
translation 
Effect Factors affecting 
narrative-to-
institution translation 
Effect 
Characteristics of text 
producer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Genre of text 
The National Electronic 
Commerce Policy (hereafter 
referred to simply as “the 
Policy”) was developed by a 
committee that comprised 
local public and private 
sector representatives, 
including firms of various 
sizes, NGOs and other 
interest groups. Due to its 
diverse composition and 
status as a Government-
appointed committee, the 
Committee was considered 
legitimate 
  
As a Government policy 
document the text would 
have been considered 
official, and therefore 
legitimate to guide the 
actions of public officers. 
Internal structure of 
the narrative 
The Policy was 
considered internally 
consistent because of the 
status of its producer, 
and because its genre 
was considered 
appropriate to guide 
activity in the Public 
Service. It should be 
noted that the producer 
did not have any 
historical legitimacy 
outside of this particular 
event, because the 
Committee was convened 
solely for this purpose 
and then disbanded. 
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Consonance between 
the narrative and 
“widespread and 
deeply held cultural 
values” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationship between 
the narrative and the 
“national mood” 
The primary narrative in the 
text that related to e-
Government referred to a 
vision for the Public Service 
in beneficial terms such as 
“accessible, responsive, 
interactive, dynamic, 
committed, open and 
empowered”. While these 
terms may have been 
characteristic of individuals, 
none of the respondents 
referred to the Public 
Service as an organisation 
in that way. Further, there is 
no evidence that any 
accompanying exercises 
such as meetings, focus 
groups or surveys were used 
to communicate or distil the 
Policy with the public 
officers themselves, nor 
with their customers, the 
general public.  As such, 
there did not appear to be 
any significant consonance 
between the narrative and 
widespread cultural values 
held by the members of the 
Public Service 
 
The timing of the 
publication of the Policy was 
favourable since it was 
approaching the new 
millennium and there was 
considerable public 
sentiment in all segments of 
society in favour of an 
increased use of ICTs to 
improve various facets of 
life, and particularly the 
Public Service 
 
Level of support from 
other, highly 
legitimate narratives 
The e-Government 
narrative did not enjoy 
support from any widely 
held cultural values at the 
time, however it did align 
with the national mood 
which was supportive of 
the use of IT to improve 
the efficiency of delivery 
of public services. 
Relationship of the text 
to other texts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Policy did not directly 
refer to other texts. In fact, 
the key terms “e-
Commerce” and “e-
Government” were 
relatively new to the 
stakeholders at the time and 
had not yet been 
established discursively. 
Level of competition 
from other conflicting 
narratives 
There was no strong 
evidence of alternative 
narratives, conflicting or 
otherwise, to the e-
Government narrative 
(not considering the null 
case of inertia, which 
would be applicable in all 
change situations 
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Degree of prescription 
of radical 
redistribution of power 
or wealth 
  
Although some public 
officers may have been 
threatened by the main e-
Government narrative 
owing to its implicit call for 
increased professionalism 
(and with it, increased risk 
of punishment in the event 
of poor performance), there 
was no explicit prescription 
of power redistribution, 
hence there were few 
grounds for objection on 
that basis. 
anyway). However, the e-
Government narrative 
was not embedded in or 
linked to other texts that 
were known and could be 
referred to.  
 
 
 
 
Did social action occur? Yes 
If so, what was the 
evidence of it? 
A vendor was procured to design, build, install and maintain the Communications 
Backbone project (a.k.a. Government Wide Area Network). After significant delay 
the project was completed, however, the organizational culture change that it was 
expected to precipitate did not occur in the expected manner, according to two of 
the respondents who were directly involved in its implementation, and who were 
consequently very well familiar with the state of operations in the Public Service 
before and after the intervention 
Of what type was it: 
intentional, 
consequential, or 
emergent? 
This action was cited as consequential to the publication of the National Electronic 
Commerce Policy, and further supported by the establishment of the National ICT 
Centre into which the e-Government Unit, that was responsible for implementing 
the project, was subsumed. 
 
In the case of the Backbone project the Government (through a contracted vendor alliance) built 
physical infrastructure, with the expectation that the public officers would be provided with the 
tools needed to change their organizational culture into one of a progressive and modern Public 
Service. In tracing the path of the National Electronic Commerce Policy through Table 7 it 
appears that although the narrative was put forward in an internally consistent form and did not 
suffer significant competition from any other conflicting narratives, it was not successful in 
gaining support from other legitimate narratives, and hence did not fully become an institution.  
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Table 8 – Analysis of the National ICT Strategy, fastforward, as the main text that constituted the narrative 
of knowledge-based society 
Factors affecting text-
to-narrative translation 
Effect Factors affecting 
narrative-to-
institution translation 
Effect 
Characteristics of text 
producer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Genre of text 
The National ICT Steering 
Committee was comprised of a 
range of well-respected publicly 
known individuals from the 
public, private, and NGO 
sectors in Trinidad and Tobago. 
It was chaired by the Minister 
of Public Administration, who 
commanded significant respect 
in the Cabinet. As such, due to 
its composition and status as a 
Government-appointed 
committee it was considered 
legitimate 
 
 
The National ICT Strategy 
document (hereafter referred 
to as “fastforward”) was a 
Government policy document 
and therefore was considered 
official and legitimate to guide 
the actions of the public sector. 
Owing to the sometimes-
combative relationship 
between the government and 
the private sector, however, it 
is not clear that the document 
would have been as well 
received among firms. Except 
for specific interested 
individuals, the general public 
may not have interacted with 
the actual text, but would 
instead have paid more 
attention to its effects. 
Internal structure of 
the narrative 
The fastforward 
document would have 
been recognized as an 
official government 
policy document, but 
because its intended 
reach was national, it is 
unclear how the text 
producer would have 
been perceived at that 
scale, and hence how 
the internal structure 
of the narrative was 
interpreted by its 
audience. 
Consonance between 
the narrative and 
“widespread and 
deeply held cultural 
values” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main narrative embedded 
in fastforward was framed in 
very general terms, “T&T is in a 
prominent position in the global 
information society through 
real and lasting improvement in 
social, economic and cultural 
development caused by 
deployment and usage of ICT”, 
with specific applications 
provided per category of 
stakeholder. In the absence of 
survey or other data that was 
captured to assess the extent of 
alignment to cultural values, it 
Level of support from 
other, highly 
legitimate narratives 
Evidence from popular 
news articles at the 
time suggested that 
the main narrative 
would have produced 
mixed reactions over 
such a wide audience 
at the time.  
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Relationship between 
the narrative and the 
“national mood” 
is not possible to say how 
widespread or deeply held they 
were. 
  
 
The knowledge-based society 
narrative embedded in 
fastforward appealed to the 
techno-centric and technophilic 
attitudes of many people at the 
time (in the public, private and 
non-governmental sectors), 
however, evidence suggests 
that these attitudes were not 
universally held. Given the 
expanse of the intended reach 
and the lack of corroborating 
evidence, it is difficult to say 
how ‘widespread’ either mood 
around ICT4D was at the time. 
Relationship of the text 
to other texts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Degree of prescription 
of radical 
redistribution of power 
or wealth 
fastforward was visibly linked 
to the broader national 
development strategy, branded 
Vision 2020. Due to the timing 
of its publication, it possibly 
also made connections to texts 
produced in the lead up to the 
Geneva Round of WSIS, but this 
is unclear. 
  
 
 
fastforward advocated 
connectivity, higher education, 
improved public services, an 
increase in business uptake of 
ICTs, and an increase in ICT-
based businesses. There was no 
overt prescription to power or 
wealth redistribution, only to 
optimization of individual 
productive capacity. 
Level of competition 
from other conflicting 
narratives 
Rather than direct 
conflict, the main 
narrative in 
fastforward appeared 
to co-opt the various 
narratives that were 
embedded in the texts 
produced by 
multilateral agencies 
around that time: 
UNDP’s focus on 
“human and societal 
development” and the 
role of information in 
achieving same; IDB’s 
focus on connectivity 
and the pursuit of 
education; and WSIS’s 
emphasis on creation 
of the “information 
society where 
everyone could create, 
access, utilize and 
share information”. As 
such, multiple 
narratives were 
embedded in 
fastforward, but by 
way of bricolage rather 
than through 
rationalization of the 
separate narratives 
into a cogent whole. 
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Did social action occur? Yes 
If so, what was the evidence of it? The fastforward policy document was launched, and resources 
(human and financial) were aggregated, organized and put to use 
for the implementation of the policy. The evidence suggests that the 
outcomes as far as creating a knowledge-based society were 
uneven. 
Of what type was it: intentional, 
consequential, or emergent? 
The action was consequential to the publication of the fastforward 
policy document 
 
In the case of the National ICT Strategy, fastforward, the Government was undertaking a much 
more complex venture than it had done previously since it was attempting to shape the culture 
of the nation as a whole, with the expectation that the majority of citizens and organisations – 
private sector, civil society and public sector - would engage in action that was consistent with 
the Government’s vision of a “knowledge-based society”. Unsurprisingly, the path of the 
underlying narrative in this case was not as easy to trace, and the evidence put forward in the 
case study can be interpreted to mean that the path was much more tenuous and less 
straightforward. The fastforward-embedded narrative was seemingly found to be internally 
consistent and, given its temporal proximity to the national development agenda of the time, 
Vision 2020, it likely would have initially garnered a fair amount of support. The biggest 
challenge was the perception that the fastforward narrative was a bricolage of all the popular 
ICT-related narratives of the day – it attempted to be all things to all men. The programme of 
activity and associated public expectations became so unwieldy that the narrative found 
difficulty in sustaining support, and ultimately the narrative was not institutionalized. This 
perspective is supported by the views shared by the former National Chief Information Officer 
who was directly responsible for fastforward’s implementation. 
 
7.2.1. Additional contingent factors 
Thus far in section 7.2 we have analysed the factors that influenced the text-narrative and 
narrative-institution transitions on a case-by-case basis, and in so doing we have mapped out 
the characteristics and dynamics of narrative competition that influenced the 
institutionalization of narratives through discursive construction. However, there are some 
additional cross-cutting interpretive themes that bear on these processes which are set out 
below. 
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Conflicting temporal scales  
By definition, policy is an activity that is heavily influenced by politics. In the case study, the issue 
of politicians having a ‘5-year term’ mentality was repeatedly mentioned by participants who 
had been regularly challenged to produce ‘visible results quickly’ while pursuing their job 
objectives. This perception was supported by reviewing the annual spectacle that is the National 
Budget debate in parliament. Such a mentality, however, does not align well with a longer term 
developmental focus, particularly when engaging with such a complex issue as ICT4D. The 
complexity of ICT4D is exacerbated by the fact that the societal changes that are sought by ICT4D 
policies occur on a much more elongated time scale than the technological changes associated 
with ICT equipment. Just when new initiatives started to gain momentum, before any newly 
adapted narratives associated with them had an opportunity to be institutionalised, general 
elections would bring about a change in administration. Even though such changes did not 
necessarily bring a change in ideology they were accompanied by significant troughs of 
unproductivity leading into and out of the general election period – into, because ministers 
would be preoccupied on the campaign trail; out of, because any new incoming minister would 
make a point of reviewing, relabelling and readjusting the policy mix in a demonstration of 
his/her dominance. Agenda items that had legal implications (like WTO commitments) were 
more likely to survive such shifts unaffected. 
An overemphasis on equipment as opposed to social change, however, created its own issues 
because the focus ended up being on rushing through change initiatives rather than taking time 
to carry out more complex business process re-engineering and culture modification. This was 
observed in more than one case, but the Backbone case was emblematic of this problem. A 
project that was intended to result in encouraging public officers to “show greater dynamism 
and be more responsive to customer expectations”, among other laudable objectives, ended up 
being primarily set up as an equipment installation and maintenance project.   
Another downside to ‘equipment-focused’ techno-centric plans described in the case study is 
that they engendered great anxiety in persons who feared that “technology was advancing too 
quickly for our bureaucratic system to keep pace”, with the resulting effect being either chronic 
incompletion of new initiatives, or aversion to engage with technological issues outright. 
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Lack of interactional expertise  
According to multiple respondents as presented in the case study, the Public Service lacked 
sufficient human resource capacity to strategise, plan and execute developmental programmes 
that matched the expectations and pronouncements of the politicians. Where this lack of 
capacity was appraised critically, support was sought to compensate (e.g. from the IDB via its 
Telecommunications Modernization Project funding). Where the enthusiasm to deliver 
outmatched a grounded assessment of capacity, projects (such as the Backbone) became 
hamstrung by technical or operational problems, such as - incomplete user requirement 
specification; incorrect assessment of maturity of infrastructure platform, leading to purchase 
of outdated equipment; and, cost overruns due to both of the above.  
A related consideration is the type of leadership required to make complex development 
projects work. In the fastforward case, the project initially appeared to thrive under the 
charismatic, transformational leadership of the Permanent Secretary who demonstrated public 
sector entrepreneurship in her approach to recruiting private sector-trained specialists into the 
Public Service. For example, bringing the ICT Division into being in an environment where the 
National Information Systems Centre already existed, and continued to function, generated 
competition between the two departments that drove each to excel for a time. 
What these examples demonstrated was that more often than not, the most valuable 
capabilities demonstrated by those in leadership positions were less about an ability to 
manipulate ‘bits and bytes’ and more about their ability to internalise and translate social and 
economic objectives into technical language and vice versa, and in so doing, motivate and 
mobilise a diverse set of persons from different professional backgrounds and with different 
core interests to execute the same vision. From a discursive standpoint, the concept of 
“interactional expertise” as proposed by Collins et al. (2007: 660–662) is helpful here. They 
describe interactional expertise as “the product of a successful linguistic socialization” that is 
“tacit knowledge-laden and context specific” and that is used to mediate communication and 
cultural interchange among culturally dissimilar groups. One can say, therefore, that the lack of 
such interactional expertise was a major factor in the demonstrated inability to sustain ICT4D 
initiatives. 
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The negative impact of institutions on vision and establishment of realistic policy objectives 
Institutions impose cognitive, regulative and social costs which therefore shape the introduction 
of new institutions, but which also lead to lack of vision. This was seen in the telecom 
liberalization case, where long before 1997 several indicators were available to suggest that 
TSTT’s monopoly arrangement was untenable for complementing the information society 
aspirations the government had already begun advertising. Prior to the introduction of the WTO 
Reference Paper, however, any narratives about an alternative way to arrange local 
telecommunications that may have existed would have seemed incredulous and hence, would 
not have been successful in enrolling support. 
Conversely, narratives that were too far removed from existing realities, and for which there 
were no clear pathways would similarly not have been supported. A case in point was the 
episode shared by former PS Wilson in which a Minister imposed unrealistic demands for 
introduction of a new public service delivery mechanism, without considering the vast difference 
in contexts between his inspiration and the reality of the T&T public service at the time. Lack of 
appreciation of the difficult details in doing something new puts implementation in jeopardy, so 
plans either remain on the drawing board or stall during execution. 
 
Contradictory philosophies or ‘deep core’ of ideas that underpin causal stories 
Another feature of some of the episodes described in the case study related to contradictory 
narratives being advanced simultaneously by the same person. For example, during 
Parliamentary debate on the Telecommunications Bill, while discussing the role of the Minister 
in the operations of the impending Telecommunications Authority, the Minister appeared to be 
espousing two contradictory viewpoints. On the one hand, as the sponsor of the Bill he was 
clearly in support of the perspective that “we want to set up an independent telecom regulator, 
as prescribed by the WTO and international best practice so as to demonstrate our modernity”, 
which is a form of a ‘catching up’ narrative. Conversely, the government’s attempt to institute 
what some perceived to be Draconian influence on the ability of the Authority to make its own 
decisions can be interpreted as representing a perspective of “we want the Minister to maintain 
control on who gets/doesn’t get access to a telecom licence as a show of dominance over the 
private sector”, which is a form of ‘development reality with postcolonial overtones’ narrative. 
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Lack of contextual adaptation 
The overwhelming majority of documents surveyed and people interviewed perceived ICT4D in 
Trinidad and Tobago as being about the adoption, or slight adaptation, of ICT-based practices 
and associated equipment that were pioneered in advanced economies. One respondent even 
remarked that ICT strategies “had all been done before all over the world, so all T&T had to do 
was pick one and implement it”. Such perspectives were representative of what Avgerou (2010) 
referred to as the “ICT and Development represents socioeconomic improvements through the 
transfer and diffusion of ICT and required institutions” narrative. The downside of this 
perspective is that it unproblematically views ICTs as neutral objects, rather than constructions 
that reflect the contexts in which they were designed. As was demonstrated in the Backbone 
case with the decision to introduce New Systems Facilitators, complex sociotechnical change of 
the sort that most ICT4D projects engage with is never achieved without embedded social 
action. 
 
Section 7.2 has taken a detailed look at the competition among narratives, and the resultant 
translation of the surviving narratives into institutions. Institutions ultimately moderated both 
discursive events (what was said or not said; who was allowed to speak or not speak) and social 
events (which proposals got supported; which departments were staffed, etc.). We will now 
build on this foundation by developing policy creolization as a specific form of the discursive 
construction of policy. 
 
7.3. Interpretation and explanation of the three cases of discursive 
policy construction 
In Section 7.1, texts were found to be just as likely to enter policy processes through external 
events as through local ‘catch up’ directives aimed at striving for ‘information-based’ 
modernity. Demands due to commitments arising from international agreements were not 
really a consideration, except in the case of GATS. This is consistent with Trinidad and Tobago’s 
characteristics of limited public sector technical and managerial capacity – and particularly, low 
levels of interactional expertise - and a limited range of productive relationships among private, 
public and academic actors, owing to the country’s industrial and political history. Without these 
structures or capabilities there is little opportunity to develop future capacity for original policy 
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relevant research, or to engage in policy entrepreneurship, both of which are strategies that can 
be beneficial for enriching the policy process (from analysis through to evaluation). 
As demonstrated in the analysis in Section 7.2, in practice the actual discourse (and social 
action) of development through ICT resulted in uneven development. This may be the case 
because in the absence of existing narratives derived from a local context, the prevailing 
policymaking practice has been the circulation, imitation and adoption of narratives developed 
elsewhere. This led to chaos in implementation and general disappointment with the “ICT4D 
policy” project, the likely result of which would be to further delay a more organic approach to 
ICT4D in the country.  
Analysis of the narrative-institution relationships confirmed that in scenarios where all three of 
the factors that were expected to influence translation of narratives were present and well 
established, the process of creating institutions was successful as evidenced by the sustained 
programmes of intentional action (or action that occurred as a consequence of some prior 
intentional action) that succeeded the narrative-to-institution translation. As a reminder, those 
three factors were: (i) the internal structure of the narratives was consistent; (ii) there was 
support from other highly legitimate narratives; (iii) there was little to no competition from 
conflicting narratives. However, given that in developing countries the scenarios in which all 
three of those supportive factors are present exist as a result of either externally generated 
stimuli or attempts at catching up to other advanced economies, but seldom in response to 
intentional action in response to local particularities, by itself this finding concerning narrative-
institution translation simply means that the asymmetrical power dynamics referred to above 
will continue to be reinforced over time. This worrisome outcome would likely have a negative 
effect on the rate and direction of ICT development in the country.  
Discourse is not deterministic, however, and it presents opportunities for policy change. Many 
of the participants of this research who are either policymakers or others with a vested interest 
in the ICT4D policy environment in Trinidad and Tobago take a view of ICT4D policy as being 
largely about transfer and diffusion of ICT-based practices pioneered elsewhere (Avgerou, 2010: 
9-10). This is complementary to their view of development in general, and ICT-enabled 
development in particular, as progressive transformation. While this is a pragmatic perspective 
in a policy environment of limited resources and low capacity for policy innovation, it 
inadvertently reinforces a power dynamic in which a divide is maintained between digital haves 
and have-nots, and therefore ultimately undermines the information society aspirations of the 
policymakers. 
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As a result, we will now investigate the opportunities for policymakers to alter institutions 
through the discursive construction of policy narratives and eventual translation into 
institutions. This will be done through interpretation and comparison of the three sub-cases as 
different cases of discursive policy construction. 
 
7.3.1. Discursive construction of “liberalizing the telecommunications sector” 
This sub-case was mapped onto a twenty-year period from 1985-2005. During the first half of 
that period, all four of the main texts that influenced the discourse (the Missing Link Report, the 
FCC Benchmark Order, the WTO Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles and GATS Protocol 4) 
originated from external events, and, save for the GATS Protocol 4 document, their impacts on 
the ensuing social action were emergent, relative to the local policy discourse. That is to say, the 
specific impact those documents had on action in the discursive spaces within Trinidad and 
Tobago was not intended by their authors or main proponents, and in fact, the narratives 
conveyed by those documents had to be translated and adapted into contextually appropriate 
narratives by the members of the Ministerial Committee on Telecommunications. In other 
words, the paradigm shift precipitated by the Missing Link Report, and carried through to the 
GATS Protocol 4, was a representation of a discursive struggle that did not originate in Trinidad 
and Tobago and in which local actors were not the primary discussants. The discourse was 
instead translated and embedded into the local discursive space through the Dookeran Report. 
From the GATS Protocol 4 document onward to the publication of various telecommunications 
regulations, the resulting social action was consequential – drawing on broader narratives 
concerning economic development and social progress as the discourse progressed, but not 
initiating any new independent ideas about the rationale for, or impacts of telecommunications 
liberalization.  
Even though the dominant narrative concerning the importance of telecommunications sector 
liberalization for economic development was introduced into the local policy landscape via the 
Dookeran Report, there was a delay in its implementation. This delay occurred due to the 
shifting of Cabinet responsibility for telecommunications (and later, ICT) among multiple 
different ministries and departments. As discussed in the case study these shifts were attributed 
to three factors: evolving attitudes among senior politicians towards ICT4D policy; 
discontinuities in the approach to policy implementation precipitated by multiple general 
elections in quick succession between 2000 and 2002; and, competency gaps among Public 
Service technocrats in a post-liberalization world.  
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Notably, there was no evidence of any real contestation of the objective of the dominant 
narrative, but only of its proposed mechanism of implementation – specifically, the issue of the 
ICT Minister’s power to usurp the authority of the so-called independent regulator. To put it 
another way, even though the entire history of telecommunications in the country to that point 
had been characterised by a monopoly service provider, there was no debate about the merits 
of introducing competition because the expected benefits of the change far outweighed the 
costs – high cost of international calls, low quality of service, lack of value added services – 
precisely as the citizens’ aspirations towards modernity and desires for integration into the 
global community were ascending. Nonetheless, this first set of contestation was resolved via 
debate in the Parliament, an important discursive space for policy. 
The second major source of contestation was also related to the implementation approach 
rather than the intent of the narrative. Specifically, non-adherents to the dominant narrative 
took issue with the new regulator being operationalized without the full slate of supporting 
legislation being in place to facilitate the regulator’s proper functioning. Again, no dissent was 
expressed concerning the regulator’s objective, but rather the complaint was that effecting the 
desired liberalized telecommunications sector without Parliamentary approval of all its 
operational legislation (which was not possible at the time of the debate in 2001) would simply 
result in a chaotic market that could not be regulated. Eventually, however, those obstacles 
were overcome when Parliament returned to its regular operations in 2003.  
The removal of this blockage, combined with the jolt provided by the impending deadline of the 
WTO-mandated reforms, provided the platform for a series of actions:  from obtaining technical 
assistance from the IDB to build the technical and managerial capacity of regulatory staff, 
through to the issuance of operating licences to new service providers. This series of actions 
gave effect to the liberalization thrust because they coincided with, became embedded within, 
and were magnified by, a larger national discourse about “becoming a developed nation by the 
year 2020” which surfaced in 2003. The so-called ‘Vision 2020’ drive towards development 
provided its own set of narratives that were complementary to the “telecommunications for 
modernity” narrative, which allowed the latter to become cemented in the national 
consciousness, not as a technical or political issue as it had been advanced during the discursive 
struggle, but instead, framed squarely in economic and social terms. Ultimately 
telecommunications liberalization began to be taken for granted as an essential aspect of 
contemporary life. In so doing, the narrative of telecommunications liberalization matured into 
a vehicle for the power struggles about identity and destiny in which the citizenry was engaged. 
What was initially perceived as an imposition by advanced countries on the development 
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trajectories of others that were less advanced, came to be adopted in Trinidad and Tobago into 
the aspirational language associated with the Vision 2020 developmental programme that was 
carded to transform the country in ways far beyond what had been achieved since gaining 
Independence in 1962. 
Turning our attention specifically to the role of the key texts in the policy creolization process, 
we see that texts produced by external events outnumbered and outweighed (in terms of 
importance attributed to them by respondents) those produced by local catch up directives. 
Those externally-generated texts embodied the dominant narrative and thereby provided a 
strong normative force for conforming to the tenets of that narrative. In addition, the 
international commitment precipitated by signing onto GATS Protocol 4 required the new 
Telecom Act to usher in sector liberalization. This provided impetus for the new narrative to 
stimulate social action that produced lasting effects on the policy discourse and the institutional 
fields that were still felt at the end of the twenty-year period, and were even felt at the time of 
data collection in 2011. All the social action associated with the production of these texts was 
either emergent or consequential. This signifies that the translation into the local policy 
discourse occurred as a result of a non-trivial amount of debate and discursive struggle.  
 
7.3.2. Discursive construction of “building an e-government wide area network” 
The sub-case chronicling the establishment of the Government’s wide area network was 
mapped onto an eleven-year period from 2000 to 2011. The network was expected to underpin 
Trinidad and Tobago’s public service reform process through the unification of ministries and 
agencies into an electronic “one stop shop”. The process of building the network was construed 
as a technical, operational activity rather than being research or debate driven. As such only one 
text was acknowledged as playing a major discursive role in the sub-case – the National E-
Commerce Policy – and its production was the result of a locally-originated development 
directive to catch up to more advanced countries. The National E-Commerce Policy precipitated 
intentional action as there was a deliberate attempt to foster electronic commerce in the 
country, via the facilitation of electronic government or “e-government” services. The narrative 
of “e-government can do for the public service what e-commerce is doing for the private sector” 
helped legitimise the policy among government policymakers because they saw e-government 
as a catalyst for development. Underlying this narrative was a heavy emphasis on physical 
infrastructure, which therefore allowed ICT infrastructure vendors to have significant influence 
on the implementation choices. 
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The Backbone project was actively contested during its lifetime. Contestation was centred on 
disagreements over how to approach implementation, rather than on discursive struggle among 
the dominant narrative and any of its alternatives. There was no open debate about whether 
the Public Service should be “operating in an accessible, responsive and interactive 
environment” that was “more responsive to customer expectations”. Instead disagreements 
arose concerning the significant technological challenges faced in developing and integrating the 
network solution, as well as resistance from persons that did not buy into the initiative. These 
challenges were in turn caused by a combination of factors, including the lack of a high-level 
champion for the initiative, interpersonal conflict among the Backbone team, technical 
capabilities of the vendors that were inadequate to match the demands of the project, ‘turf 
wars’ between Public Service IT departments and the e-Government Unit, and poor change 
management. 
From 2003 onwards, the Backbone project was incorporated under the umbrella of the national 
ICT development strategy. This helped give the project broader discursive legitimacy and the 
support of a powerful policymaker in the form of the Minister of Public Administration and 
Information, who had been given responsibility for ICTs. At the same time, dedicated change 
management professionals were brought in to help end users assimilate the proposed changes 
by emphasising the value those changes added to their work flows. By then, however, it was a 
case of too little too late as the extensive conflicts surrounding the project and its significantly 
delayed implementation had actually worked to subdue interest in the project among many of 
its intended beneficiaries. 
No external events or international commitments were present to stimulate social action that 
could later institutionalise the new narratives into behaviour that disrupted the status quo of 
non-consumption. Some action occurred (specialist unit convened; equipment purchased and 
installed; basic IT services provided to ministries and departments), however the longer term 
transformative effect of achieving “greater dynamism…more responsive[ness] to customer 
expectations” in the Public Service was not achieved. The timing of the National E-Commerce 
Policy’s publication, and the later publication of the National ICT Strategy, fastforward, meant 
that the E-Commerce Policy was discursively linked to the broader technological upheavals of 
the time. However, the delayed implementation did not facilitate the narratives surrounding “e-
Commerce” and “e-Government” to be established discursively in the institutional field.  
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7.3.3. Discursive construction of “writing a national ICT4D strategy” 
This sub-case was mapped onto a six-year period from 2002 to 2008. Even though the discourse 
started as a result of intentional action (in the form of the publication of the IT Policy for the 
Public Service as well as the Medium Term Policy Framework for 2001-2003), subsequent action 
was all emergent or consequential as none of the subsequent narratives were consistent with 
each other.  
The timing of the publication of the Public Service’s IT Policy, just after the turn of the 21st 
century and the frenzy surrounding Y2K, meant that it coincided with a number of other 
discursive events concerning development agencies that introduced a range of other narratives 
about ICT4D into the policy discursive spaces. These included the publication of the UNDP’s 
Digital Opportunity Initiative Report and the IDB’s 2002 Summit of the Americas Report, the 
formation of the UN ICT Task Force and the start of the WSIS process. As was detailed in Section 
6.3, each of these discursive events advanced a different perspective on the role of ICT in 
development.  
Discursive conflict was therefore inevitable since there was limited technical or leadership 
capacity among the Government technocrats who had responsibility for developing the national 
ICT strategy to resolve those disparate perspectives. Specifically, ICTs were put forward as 
talismans that could simultaneously and rapidly resolve systemic problems in, among other 
areas, education, public administration and doing business. Previous attempts to advance these 
issues through a public service reform initiative dating back to the mid-1980s that had been led 
by a PNM Cabinet minister, Gordon Draper, had been inconclusive. Consequently, the fact that 
no connection was made between the ICT4D thrust and broader public missions around any of 
these issues meant that the ICT narrative was did not benefit from interdiscursivity and was 
perceived as nothing more than the latest fad concocted by the Ministry of Public 
Administration. Ultimately, fastforward was less than successful in achieving its deliverables, 
owing to the chronic inability of the Public Service to implement large-scale projects. This, 
combined with the lack of historical and deep social engagement with topical development 
issues referenced above resulted in fading interest in ICT4D. 
When we look at this turn of events through the lens of the text-narrative-institution 
relationships we see that texts produced by external events were outnumbered by, and 
considered by policy actors to be less relevant to local circumstances, than those originating 
from local catch up directives. Although the fastforward document integrated and translated 
global narratives into the local policy discursive spaces, it did so by combining a range of 
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different narratives that represented conflicting perspectives, and were therefore internally 
inconsistent. This ultimately weakened the document’s authority. With the exception of the two 
texts identified near the start of this case’s period (IT Policy for the Public Service and the MTPF 
2001-2003), all the social action associated with the core texts was emergent or consequential. 
Once again this signifies that the translation into the local policy discourse occurred as a result 
of a non-trivial amount of debate and discursive struggle. Some action occurred (a specialist unit 
was convened to implement the policy and a programme of activity was partially executed), 
however the longer term transformative effect of placing T&T in “a prominent position in the 
global information society through real and lasting improvement in social, economic and cultural 
development caused by deployment and usage of ICT”) did not occur. 
 
7.4. Towards a Model of Policy Creolization as discursive construction of 
policy creoles and policy pidgins 
I propose here that is useful to think about the discursive construction of ICT4D policy as policy 
creolization, viewed as the recombination and hybridization of existing narratives and externally 
derived narratives. Policy creolization is an extension of the discursive model of policy-as-
discourse construction introduced in Chapter 3. Specifically, there are two main factors that 
influence the emergence of policy pidgins and, eventually, policy creoles (both viewed as 
particular forms of institutions) in a setting of discursive construction. These are: 
 The length of the temporal window over which policy actors have an opportunity to 
develop interactional expertise to transfer, imitate and assemble narratives (resulting 
in the emergence of policy pidgins - semi-specific yet incomplete proto-languages that 
mediate discursive transfer), and eventually to translate, edit and embed those 
narratives into social actions (resulting in the emergence of policy creoles - full-fledged 
languages that facilitate not only discursive transfer, but social action). 
 The degree of intentionality of the discursive action, and subsequently the social action, 
that policy actors engage in. As presented in Chapter 3, there are three categories of 
social action:  
o Intentional action – which deliberately conveys particular ideas through texts.  
o Consequential action – which is generated as a by-product of ongoing dialogue 
among actors during which they may draw on broader narratives.  
o Emergent action – which arises through discursive contestation and struggle in 
ways that were not necessarily intended or predicted. 
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Figure 15 – A model of policy creolization 
If we assume that the degree of intentionality of social action occurs on a continuum, then the 
ideal types are intentional on one end and emergent on the other. Therefore, displaying the two 
characteristics, degree of intentionality and length of temporal window to develop interactional 
expertise, on a two-by-two matrix results in a schema of four possible combinations, as shown 
in Figure 15. Going clockwise from bottom right we have: 
 Short temporal window for interactional expertise development and emergent social 
action, for which no change in policy institutions will occur (neither as creoles, pidgins 
nor any other form) 
 Short temporal window for interactional expertise development and intentional social 
action, for which the first type of policy pidgin (type I) emerges - an incomplete 
institution due to insufficient time 
 Long temporal window for interactional expertise development and intentional social 
action, for which a policy creole emerges 
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 Long temporal window for interactional expertise development and emergent social 
action, for which the second type of policy pidgin (type II) emerges – an incomplete 
institution due to lack of intentionality 
 
With this schema, we can see that the features which distinguished the telecom liberalization 
sub-case from the other two as potentially fertile ground for the emergence of a policy creole 
are: 1) the longer temporal window afforded to the events described in this case than to those 
in the others; and 2) the purposive attempts at improving the interactional expertise (couched 
in terms of technical and managerial capacity of regulatory and policy personnel) through the 
training programmes facilitated by the IDB Modernization of Telecommunication loan. Let us 
now revisit all three sub-cases and test the application of the schema. 
 
The analysis showed that in the telecom liberalization case the Government built regulatory 
infrastructure, with the expectation that the private sector would be attracted to enter the 
market and build out the physical infrastructure to facilitate the increase in availability of ICTs. 
This initial part of the process occurred over the better part of a decade. The narrative of 
“telecom liberalization as beneficial for socioeconomic improvement” was shown to be 
internally consistent because it presented a coherent view of the new prospective reality. It 
gained support from a previously existing, well-supported narrative in the form of the Maitland 
Report’s “telecom as a missing link for economic development” narrative, and it overcame 
competition from the narrative of maintaining the status quo of using much-higher-than-cost 
international settlement rates to fund development. The dominant narrative presented in the 
Maitland Report benefited from approximately ten years between the Report’s publication and 
the GATS coming into effect, thereby allowing the narrative to mature and become embedded 
in global telecom regulatory action. Further, there is evidence that training courses were 
established at various sites in Canada, the US and the UK, where Caribbean telecom regulators 
and policymakers routinely went to be brought up to speed on the “contemporary best practice” 
as regards telecommunications development. The persons so trained were the primary 
champions for conveying the new way of approaching telecommunications regulation and 
liberalization, and undoubtedly had to develop a significant amount of interactional expertise to 
do so (by training colleagues, drafting policy documents and regulations, and so on). As a result, 
the narrative was institutionalized as the Telecommunications Act of 2001 was passed, and 
succeeded by the establishment of the independent regulator, the Telecommunications 
Authority, as well as a significant programme of activity to operationalize the liberalization of 
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the sector since 2004 – activity which persists to the current time. In sum, intentional action 
combined with adequate time to develop interactional expertise resulted in a policy creole. 
As an example of the construction of a policy pidgin, we will examine the third sub-case. Here 
the analysis showed that with the fastforward national ICT strategy, the Government attempted 
to change social culture, with the expectation that all private and organizational actors would 
engage in action that was consistent with the Government’s vision of a “knowledge-based 
society”. As in the other two cases, the fastforward text would have been considered internally 
consistent, even though it combined multiple narratives, because of the prestige afforded to the 
National ICT Steering Committee that authored it, as well as the genre and structure of the text 
itself. Owing to the heterogeneity of the intended audience it is difficult to ascertain the 
narrative’s alignment with the national mood, however it did draw on another highly legitimate 
narrative in the form of the ‘developed country’ perspective advanced by the Vision 2020 
national development strategy which was published around the same time. fastforward did not 
appear to be negatively impacted by competition from contradictory narratives, partly because 
it drew upon most of the alternative (though not necessarily conflicting) narratives that had 
been advanced by the international development agencies and funding organisations. The 
initiative was negatively impacted, however, by incomplete implementation and non-delivery of 
some of its main deliverables. The result was that while fastforward enjoyed support initially, 
that support waned over time since the programme of activity did not produce the desired 
societal impact and the associated public expectations could not be sustained. The initial 
strength of the fastforward narrative in 2003, linked as it was to the strong, aspirational 
narrative of the Vision 2020 national development strategy, initially pointed to the potential for 
fastforward to have a degree of intentionality that would contribute to successful 
institutionalization. This interdiscursive strength, however, was hindered by the loss in 
legitimacy brought on by failed project implementation. After a change in minister in 2007 and 
subsequent shift of attention away from the programme, momentum slowed and only a policy 
pidgin (type I) was constructed. 
 
For a final example of the construction of a policy pidgin we can examine the case of the 
Communication Backbone project. In this example the Government (by way of a contractor 
alliance) built physical infrastructure, with the expectation that the public officers (employees 
of the Public Service) would change their organizational culture upon being provided with the 
tools required to function as a modern, progressive Public Service. The narrative of “e-
Government as beneficial for improving public sector efficiency and providing more accountable 
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and transparent service to citizens” was shown to be internally consistent, however it did not 
align well with the prevailing ‘widely held beliefs’ and so it did not achieve support from other, 
highly legitimate narratives. Finally, although the narrative was not faced with competition from 
conflicting narratives, it also did not reference any previously existing texts, so it exhibited little 
interdiscursivity. Consequently, the narrative was not fully translated into an institution, as 
evidenced by the fact that although the project was completed and all the ministries connected, 
those key informants who worked closely with the project reflected that the objective of having 
a “one stop shop” for online access to government services was not achieved and ministries 
continued to operate in a competitive, siloed manner. In other words, the lack of interaction 
with other established narratives as embodied in texts (i.e. lack of interdiscursivity) meant that 
the policy actors did not develop the interactional expertise required to create a policy creole, 
and only a policy pidgin (type II) resulted instead.  
 
7.5. Generalizing the Policy Creolization Model 
Do these interpretations have validity outside of the instant case? The extent of generalizability 
of the model of policy creolization depends on the similarity of mix of particularities in the target 
setting with those in the case study developed here in Chapter 6. As demonstrated in Chapter 
5, Trinidad and Tobago is a Commonwealth Small Island Developing State with an industrialized 
resource-dependent economy and Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. Taking these 
characteristics in groups, one can identify that there are a number of comparator countries55, 
both elsewhere in the Caribbean region and the rest of the developing world, for which similar 
histories and development trajectories make policy creolization an attractive framework for first 
critically analysing, and subsequently, constructing policy. 
 
As in many of its comparators, in Trinidad and Tobago there is an aversion to "creole"56,57,58 
especially when used in particular settings. That aversion has been attributed to a number of 
narratives: “1) our negative history as slave and indentured acquirers of English; 2) a traditional 
attitude that the Creole we created - from the contact of (initially) English and African and 
(subsequently) Indic languages - is not a genuine language for audibly being a 'corruption' of 
                                                          
55 As regards ICT policy, some of these have typically been: Jamaica, Malta, Mauritius, Costa Rica and 
Singapore 
56 “Trinidad and Tobago Standard English?” - http://www.triniview.com/winford/tntenglish.htm  
57 “A Different, not an Incorrect, Way of Speaking, Pt 1” - http://www.trinicenter.com/winford/2002/Feb/  
58 “In Defence of Creole: Loving our Dialect” - http://www.outlish.com/in-defence-of-creole-loving-our-
dialect/  
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English vocabulary and grammar; 3) the use of English for 'high' social functions but the use of 
Creole for 'low' social functions; 4) the international prestige of American and British English 
versus the international lack thereof of Creole English; and 5) codification (in grammars, 
dictionaries, style/usage manual, etc.) of English, but not of Creole”. These narratives have 
become institutionalized in Trinbagonian culture over time, and their effect extends beyond the 
boundaries of interpersonal communication and integrates into all aspects of social interaction. 
The analysis suggests that these embedded institutions have hampered the ICT4D policy 
construction process because of two phenomena that were explored in the case study: 
 Alternative narratives such as “ICT does not necessarily result in development for all; it 
is subject to the power dynamics of IT innovation action” do not recruit support from 
the dominant, highly legitimate narrative “ICT and Development represents 
socioeconomic improvements through the transfer and diffusion of ICT and required 
institutions”  
 There is a high level of competition between contradictory narratives at the “program” 
level of generality (Schmidt, 2008), who defines programs as: (1) the issues to be 
characterised as problems (as opposed to those which are framed as ‘accidental’ 
elements of the environment, and hence are not amenable to human intervention; (2) 
the range of possible solutions that will be considered (and thus, excludes those options 
that are not given consideration); (3) the goals of the action to be undertaken; and, (4) 
the criteria for determining success.  
In two of the three sub-cases sufficient time wasn't built in to the transformation projects 
explored in this thesis to allow for deep recombination and hybridisation of foreign policy 
narratives and locally-derived policy narratives. Policy actors simply did not develop the 
interactional expertise needed to make it happen. This type of institutionalization is arguably a 
generational process, in the sense that it takes a long time to occur, and it requires the 
development of adequate discursive spaces, or from the perspective of policy creolization, 
trading zones. Building new policy creoles is also more challenging, and takes more and different 
resources than building regulative and physical infrastructures (as demonstrated in the cases of 
telecom liberalization and the Backbone project). 
Moreover, ICT4D policy is complementary to other policies that shape other developmental 
institutions such as education, healthcare, or employment. In short, it is an enabler to 
development in other aspects of life. Since the connections between ICT4D policy and other 
strong institutions – either industrial (the country’s oil and gas-dependent economy) or social 
(the rich creative industries, such as Carnival, for which the country is famous) – were not well 
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established, the ICT4D policy could not become well embedded into operational routines, and 
hence, was ineffective. The complexity of the subject (ICT4D) and the means of instituting it 
(discourse) means that a significant temporal dimension is required to construct a policy creole 
that is appropriate, that is to say, simultaneously visionary and contextual for Trinidad and 
Tobago.  
The presence of cross-cutting interlinkages between ICT4D and other development policy 
domains implies that there is scope for applying the policy creolization model to other policy 
domains to examine their institutional dynamics, and to identify possible areas in which policy 
creoles may be developed so as to make the policymaking process more efficacious. 
 
7.6. Chapter Summary 
To recap, in this chapter we conducted an interpretive analysis of the three embedded sub-cases 
within the overall case study presented in Chapter 6.  
Construction of ICT4D policy in the context of a developing country is a discursive process that 
involved translation and adaptation of narratives that could trigger new institutions or disrupt 
existing ones. This process could involve new narratives or existing narratives that were part of 
international discourses and were imported and recombined to create local narratives in an 
ICT4D discourse. The analysis suggests that the ICT4D policy discourse that has been constructed 
in Trinidad and Tobago is unstable and emergent because the narratives embedded within it are 
contradictory, and hence intrinsically and persistently in competition. That persistent 
competition meant that the translation and adaptation that was necessary for new narratives 
and institutions to be established as part of the ICT4D discourse, for nascent institutions to be 
reinforced, or for old institutions to be disrupted, did not take place on a consistent basis.  
We examined the possibilities for policymakers to disrupt well-established policy institutions by 
replacing them with alternatives that facilitate coordination and interaction between the 
internationally generated narratives and local narratives. An example where this process started 
to emerge in the present study was the telecom liberalization case. I have referred to such an 
approach as “policy creolization” and its resulting outputs as either “policy creoles” or “policy 
pidgins”, depending on the maturity and stability of resultant institutions. Establishing the 
examples of construction of policy creoles and pidgins in the form of a model suggested that 
policy creolization requires both interactional expertise (deep contextual knowledge of the 
landscape into which a narrative is being embedded as well as the source of the external 
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narrative) and a high degree of intentionality of social action. The analysis has therefore offered 
an argument for the appropriateness of the metaphor of the “policy creolization” model to 
explain the efforts of Trinidad and Tobago to become an information or knowledge-based 
society. Because ICT is an enabler to so many other issues of concern in development policy, 
such as health, education, economic development, and so on, there is scope for application of 
policy creolization to policy analysis and policymaking in those issues as well. 
In the concluding chapter we summarise the contributions of this research to policy knowledge, 
implications for policy practice, highlight the limitations of the approach and point to 
opportunities for further research.  
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8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter will highlight and reflect on the key contributions of this research, by linking 
the findings, theoretical framework, policy implications and prospective directions for future 
research. 
 
8.1. Contribution to Policy Research Knowledge  
There are three original contributions to knowledge made in this thesis. Firstly, I have proposed 
an analytical framework that integrates three separate bodies of literature. The discursive model 
of institutionalization of Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004) and the ‘policy as discourse’ 
approach of Shaw & Greenhalgh (2008) and Shaw (2010) are integrated by way of a bridge, the 
‘trading zones’ concept of Galison (1997) as extended by Collins, Evans, & Gorman (2007). 
Thereby, I developed a series of analytical constructs that can be used for contextual policy 
research, especially in developing countries where dominant policy narratives constrain and 
moderate discursive exchange when those policy narratives - which were originally articulated 
in advanced economies - are subsequently transferred into developing countries. 
Secondly, I have empirically applied the framework to the study of ICT4D policy construction in 
Trinidad and Tobago, generating new insights in the process. In so doing I critically examined the 
process of constructing policy as discourse with the aim of identifying ways in which policy could 
be done differently. The analysis suggests that the process of discursively transferring previously 
existing policy narratives into new contexts can result in one of three outcomes: no change - if 
the introduction of policy narratives had no impact whatsoever on institutions (either by 
creating new ones, or disrupting existing ones); the construction of policy pidgins (semi-specific 
yet incomplete proto-languages that mediate discursive transfer) when discursive transfer, 
imitation and assemblage of narratives partially occurs; or the construction of policy creoles 
(full-fledged languages that facilitate not only discursive transfer, but social action) if the 
discursive transfer is complemented by translation, editing and social embedding.  
Thirdly, in the model of policy creolization developed in Chapter 7 I identified two main factors 
that influenced the emergence of policy pidgins and, eventually, policy creoles (both viewed as 
particular forms of institutions) in a setting of discursive construction, namely: 
 The length of the temporal window over which policy actors have an opportunity to 
develop interactional expertise to transfer, imitate and assemble narratives, and 
eventually to translate, edit and embed those narratives into social actions; 
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 The degree of intentionality of the discursive action, and subsequently the social action, 
that policy actors engage in, noting that there are three categories of social action:  
o Intentional action – which deliberately conveys particular ideas through texts.  
o Consequential action – which is generated as a by-product of ongoing dialogue 
among actors during which they may draw on broader narratives. 
o Emergent action – which arises through discursive contestation and struggle in 
ways that were not necessarily intended or predicted. 
This highlights that both intentionality and time are required to bridge the knowledge gaps 
present between the different contexts, and even so, that the policy construction process in the 
new context requires practitioners to develop non-trivial levels of interactional expertise. 
 
8.2. Implications for Policy Practice 
Most policy or political analyses of T&T focus on the country’s industrial policy, and specifically 
its energy industries, in respect of its polarising effect on social relations and other economic 
activity. I propose that analyses of policy in another sphere, ICT4D, provides a similarly useful 
opportunity for such reflection, for the reasons expressed above.  
The question that needs to be asked of ICT4D policy makers and policy analysts is "What does 
an information based economy and information society mean for the citizens of Trinidad and 
Tobago?" Arriving at the answer is not simply a matter of translation of the 'international best 
practice' discourse (whether Western or Northern led) into our context, but must entail active 
seeking to create a policy creole through facilitating coordination and interaction between 
external mainstream narratives with alternative narratives, including ones that are locally 
derived. As a first step, I suggest that the methodology developed and demonstrated in this 
thesis is useful for policy analysts to unpack the conceptual constructions of their domain to 
assess the latent power dynamics that may be unwittingly reinforced by lack of critical analysis.  
Another implication for policy practice is that this method offers practitioners a means of 
assessing both “failed” and “successful” policy interventions with a view to understanding the 
institutional dynamics in each case. This is important, as we have shown, because institutions 
exercise powerful normative, cognitive and regulative functions on the development of new 
institutions, and ultimately on social action. As a result, a lot is at stake for policy makers to get 
a deeper understanding of the institutional fields, or discursive spaces, in which they operate. 
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8.3. Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research 
The process of using a discursive method to study policy-as-discourse has opened my eyes to 
the potential of this method for not only “reaching the parts that other theories and methods 
can’t reach” but as suggested above, it has illuminated a new prospective pathway to be 
explored for generating new insight into policy making in developing countries through policy 
creolization.  
As indicated in Chapter 4 the principal limitations of the methodology adopted for this research 
are linked to three factors: the limits of my reflexivity as a new researcher who previously 
worked as a public sector technocrat; the limits of my capability to access research participants 
that could potentially offer a disconfirming view (in this case, the private sector) so as to improve 
triangulation; and the limits of snowballing as a technique to identify and access the all the social 
networks of persons and organizations that are relevant to this topic. 
These shortcomings diminish the explanatory power of the framework, because it is difficult to 
model accurately complex interactions among a plethora of actors in a multilevel discursive 
space over an extended period of time. It is possible that certain aspects may not have been 
fully captured, since it was not always possible to corroborate some. This being the case, I am 
confident, however, that due to the in-depth qualitative research conducted, and the innate 
strengths of contextualism as a methodological concept that these shortcomings do not limit 
the claims I have made.  
Another potential limitation of this research is the small number of cases examined. As pointed 
out by (Langley, 1999), employing a narrative strategy for organizing processual data as I have 
done here reveals theory that is “high on accuracy, lower on simplicity and generality”. This 
shortcoming is counterbalanced by the fact that I have been able to compare mechanisms across 
three embedded sub-cases, and thus, the generality of the findings can only be improved by 
further research. 
Further research is required to adequately conceptualize policy creolization as a potential 
mechanism for the conduct of contextually appropriate policy research. Such research should 
also seek to define an appropriate methodology for operationalizing the concept so that can be 
tested empirically. Some expected outcomes of this type of research would be firstly shoring up 
the validity of the concept, and secondly, design of an agenda for policy change that can be 
employed in creating policy-as-creole. 
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Appendix I – Interview Details 
 
Fieldwork Schedule: July to December 2011 
Table 9 – Fieldwork schedule 
Period Activity 
July – August .Document collection and initial analysis 
.Identification of framing themes to guide in-depth 
interviews 
September – November .Conducting interviews 
.Writing field notes and collecting additional documents 
referenced in interviews 
.Developing initial narratives 
December .Getting initial feedback from informants 
 
Table 10 – Interview particulars 
Interviewee Affiliation Sector Interview Date 
(dd/mm/yyyy) 
Length of 
Interview 
(hh:mm) 
Dr. Kim Mallalieu University of The 
West Indies 
Academia 23/09/2011 01:25 
Prof. St. Clair King University of The 
West Indies 
Academia 12/10/2011 01:13 
Cintra Sooknanan Trinidad and Tobago 
Computer Society 
Civil Society 29/09/2011 01:12 
David Little PSTG Consulting 
Caribbean Ltd. 
Consultant 27/10.2011 00:36 
Devindra 
Ramnarine 
PSTG Consulting 
Caribbean Ltd. 
Consultant 04/10/2011 01:19 
Vashtie 
Dookiesingh 
Inter-American 
Development Bank 
Multilateral 
Funding 
Agency 
29/11/2011 01:11 
Adam Montserin National ICT Centre Government 26/11/2011 00:37 
Arlene McComie Ministry of Public 
Administration 
Government 09/11/2011 00:46 
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Atiba Phillips National ICT Centre 
/ National ICT 
Company 
Government 14/09/2011 01:11 
Cleveland 
Thomas 
National ICT Centre 
/ National ICT 
Company 
Government 16/09/2011 00:49 
Denyse White National ICT Centre 
/ National ICT 
Company 
Government 04/10/2011; 
07/10/2011 
01:01; 
00:39 
Gerard James National ICT Centre 
/ National ICT 
Company 
Government 29/08/2011; 
03/11/2011 
01:12; 
00:12 
Gillian Macintyre Ministry of Public 
Administration 
Government 12/10/2011 00:59 
Jacqueline Wilson Ministry of Public 
Administration and 
Information 
Government 01/11/2011 01:44 
John Mollenthiel National ICT Centre 
/ National ICT 
Company 
Government 29/09/2011 02:09 
Joy Lange-Syriac National ICT Centre Government 10/12/2011 01:25 
Kenwyn Austin National ICT Centre Government 05/01/2012 02:15 
Kwesi Prescod National ICT Centre Government 29/08/2011; 
05/09/2011 
01:21; 
02:30 
Dr. Lenny Saith Ministry of Public 
Administration 
Government 07/12/2011 01:07 
Peter Mitchell National ICT Centre Government 03/08/2011; 
29/08/2011 
02:05; 
01:11 
Bernadette Lewis Caribbean 
Telecommunications 
Union 
Inter-
governmental 
agency 
15/08/2011 01:15 
Edo Stork United Nations 
Development 
Programme 
Inter-
governmental 
agency 
18/11/2011 01:17 
Nigel Cassimire Caribbean 
Telecommunications 
Union 
Inter-
governmental 
agency 
16/08/2011 02:05 
Mark Lyndersay Lyndersay Digital / 
Trinidad Guardian 
Newspapers 
Journalist 17/11/2011 01:04 
Bernard Mitchell Evolving 
TecKnologies and 
Enterprise 
Parastatal 25/08/2011 00:50 
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Development 
Company Ltd 
Cris Seecheran Telecommunications 
Authority of 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Regulatory 
Agency 
11/10/2011 00:31 
Annie Baldeo Telecommunications 
Authority of 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Regulatory 
Agency 
11/10/2011 00:30 
Total: 27 participants, 37 hours, 41 minutes of audio recordings 
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Appendix II – Document Details 
 
Table 11 – Documents used for the analysis 
Document Description 
The Missing Link Report (1984) This Report was published by the Independent 
Commission for World Wide Telecommunications 
Development, a commission that had been convened in 
1982 by ITU’s. This report, which has since been cited by 
practitioners and academics as a landmark document in 
the field, zeroed in on telecommunications development, 
and particularly the improvement of telecommunications 
infrastructure as a critical precondition for socioeconomic 
development. 
The Text of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1986) 
The GATT was the global multilateral trade negotiating 
mechanism that preceded the WTO. This document was 
the cumulative output of amendments since the 
document first came into force in 1948. 
Trinidad Guardian newspaper articles 
from 1993 to 1999 and 2001-2003 (173 
articles in total) 
The Trinidad Guardian is one of three daily newspapers 
published in Trinidad and Tobago, and it has wide 
circulation59 
The Text of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) (1994) 
The GATS was a landmark document because it introduced 
services to the coverage of the global multilateral trade 
negotiations landscape. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
relevant service under consideration was basic 
telecommunications 
Fourth Protocol of the GATS (1996) This attachment to the main GATS text set out 
requirements for each member state to submit a Schedule 
of Specific Commitments and a List of Exemptions from 
Article II concerning basic telecommunications annexed to 
the Protocol 
Cabinet Minute 1737 of 19 July 1997 Confirmed the acceptance of an IT Policy for the Public 
Service as a basis for specific directives to guide the use of 
IT in the Public Service 
Cabinet Minute 1931 of 31 July 1997 Confirmed the establishment of the “Year 2000 
Compliance Committee” within the National Information 
Systems Centre (NISC) to lead the work of bringing all 
computer systems in ministries and agencies into year 
2000 compliance, along with the adoption of the ISO 9000 
Standard Date Format (YYYYMMDD) 
Schedule of Commitments under the 
Fourth Protocol of GATS – Trinidad and 
Tobago (1997) 
This document set out Trinidad and Tobago’s GATS 
commitments as they related to trade in basic 
telecommunications 
                                                          
59 While I initially also acquired old articles published during the period 1995 to 2010 in the Trinidad 
Express, the other major daily newspaper published in Trinidad and Tobago, the format in which the 
articles were generated by the Express’ archival software meant that most of the articles were lumped 
together long streams of text, and many omitted publication dates. As such, none of these could be 
reliably used. 
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Cabinet Minute 3416 of 30 December 
1998 
Cabinet noted that a Consultancy Report produced by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat to finalize an IT strategy to 
transform the Public Service had proposed a Roles and 
Responsibilities Matrix to delineate the intertwining 
functions of the various IT stakeholders across 
government and external service providers. They then 
went on to approve 3 projects proposed in the Report: the 
Government Wide Area Network; an Information 
Systems Strategic Plan for the government; and “fast 
track” deliverables for two unnamed government 
business areas. 
Cabinet Minute 1389 of 2 June 1999 Recounted that Cabinet noted a status update from the 
Year 2000 Compliance Committee  
Cabinet Minute 1626 of 1 July 1999 Confirmed the establishment of the National Electronic 
Commerce Policy Committee under the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry and Consumer Affairs, and indicated that T&T 
had been selected to participate in a World Bank study on 
e-commerce in the Western Hemisphere with the aim of 
addressing issues such as payments, security systems, and 
risk management – an area of work that was considered a 
“very critical area since a robust and reliable electronic 
financial infrastructure is essential for the growth of 
confidence in, and hence the further development of, e-
commerce.” 
Cabinet Minute 2089 of 8 September 
1999 
Confirmed the government’s agreement to a Microsoft 
Enterprise Select Agreement for the use of Microsoft 
Office software throughout the Public Service 
Cabinet Minute 1548 of 16 August 2000 Confirmed the decision to procure and implement and 
Automated Human Resource Information System for the 
Public Service 
Electronic Transfer of Funds Crime Act, 
2000 
This was an important piece of legislation for establishing 
the requisite organisational structures and giving effect to 
provisions outlined in its associated Policy document 
Computer Misuse Act, 2000 This was an important piece of legislation for establishing 
the requisite organisational structures and giving effect to 
provisions outlined in its associated Policy document 
Donor’s Memo for the IDB 
“Modernization of Telecommunications” 
project (TC-99-11-04-6) (2001) 
Used to identify the objectives of the loan programme, as 
well as to get insight on the IDB’s perspective on 
telecommunications & ICT development 
Cabinet Minute 1600 of 7 November 
2001 
Confirmed the role of the E-Commerce Secretariat as a 
facilitator to “focus on policy issues that would provide the 
environment for participation by the private sector in e-
commerce” and to “review the National E-Commerce 
Action Plan to determine the relevant policy issues to be 
addressed” 
Telecommunications Act, 2001 This was an important piece of legislation for establishing 
the requisite organisational structures and giving effect to 
provisions outlined in its associated Policy document 
Medium Term Policy Framework 2002-
2004 (2001) 
This was a national planning framework that was 
published by the Ministry of Planning. The document 
heralded the development of a National Information and 
Communication Technology Strategy and the continued 
execution of the National e-Commerce Action Plan by the 
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National Electronic Commerce Secretariat that had been 
established in 2000 
National Budget Statements from 2001-
2011 
These were considered annual guides to the government’s 
operations that signalled the expected public expenditure 
for a given year. They were used for data triangulation. 
Cabinet Minute 1974 of 31 July 2003 Recorded Cabinet’s denial of UWI’s request to support its 
bid to establish a Country Gateway - an interactive portal 
to provide information on development and poverty 
reduction, on the grounds that such a portal was a function 
for a central government agency only. 
Cabinet Minute 414 of 20 February 2003 Recorded the government’s decision to allow the IDB to 
award a contract to a firm called Consulting and Audit 
Canada for consultancy services to assist GoRTT in 
preparing a National ICT Plan.  
fastforward – The National ICT Strategy 
of Trinidad and Tobago (2003) 
Trinidad and Tobago’s first national ICT policy document. 
The document envisioned T&T in “a prominent position in 
the global information society through real and lasting 
improvements in social, economic and cultural 
development caused by deployment and usage of 
information and communication technology” 
Cabinet Minute 144 of 15 January 2004 Confirmed the agreement to hire additional technical staff 
to support the e-Government Unit’s Government 
Network Management Centres 
Cabinet Minute 1646 of 17 June 2004 Confirmed the decision to hire New Systems Facilitators in 
the Ministry of Public Administration and Information for 
assignment to Ministries and Departments to facilitate the 
integration of new systems and work procedures (such as 
those facilitated by the Backbone) to transform the Public 
Service 
Cabinet Minute 2098 of 22 July 2004 Established a Memorandum of Understanding between 
GoRTT and the Government of Canada, to secure the 
Canadian government’s assistance for the 
implementation of the fastforward Governance project, 
and the e-Government Portal project. The document also 
rescinded a previous decision that had been recorded in 
Minute 433 of 12 February 2004 to enter a contract with 
the Government of Canada to hire Consultancy and Audit 
Canada to undertake consultancies for three fastforward 
Pathfinder projects 
Cabinet Minute 2142 of 29 July 2004 Recorded the agreement to extend the employment 
contracts of technical staff within the e-Government Unit 
for 6 months, on the same terms as their previously 
approved contracts from 2001 
Cabinet Minute 2466 of 2 September 
2004 
Confirmed the established of the ICT Division in MPAI  
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Cabinet Minute 2698 of 23 September 
2004 
Recounted the salient elements of a report on the 5th 
Caribbean Ministerial Consultation on Regional 
Cooperation for e-Government Capacity Building that had 
been held on 17-18 June 2004. Minister of Public 
Administration and Information Dr. Lenny Saith as the 
Chairman of a working session on Building upon the 
Caribbean e-Government Strategy had led a proposal to 
achieve a series of objectives, including: 
* Endorsing the action-oriented e-government strategy for 
the Caribbean region as a framework within which the 
government of the region could develop their own 
national strategies and national e-government 
programmes 
* Advocating for well-informed commitment of political 
leadership and genuine participation of the people in 
determining e-government objectives, as critical factors 
for successful e-government development 
* Recommending that the regional e-government strategy 
endorsed at the Consultation be used to complement the 
CARICOM ICT Connectivity Agenda that was due to be 
endorsed by an upcoming meeting of CARICOM ICT 
ministers that was due to be held on 12-15 October 2014 
* Requesting the CARICOM Secretariat and the UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) to 
provide resources and support for a regional information 
sharing and coordination facility that was due to be 
established 
Cabinet Minute 2967 of 21 October 2004  Recorded the agreement to send staff of the e-
Government Unit and the National ICT Secretariat to visit 
Puerto Rico to review their government’s e-Government 
Portal Project 
Cabinet Minute 3352 of 2 December 
2004 
Recounted the salient elements of the 3rd Meeting of 
Caribbean ICT Ministers held on 15 October 2004, which 
included a decision to endorse a proposal from the 
Caribbean Broadcasting Union to establish a Regional 
Programme Development Fund to develop: local/regional 
programme content; programming platforms for radio and 
TV to showcase the content; training facilities to develop 
the requisite skills to produce quality radio and TV 
programmes. Notably, the Minute did NOT reference the 
Regional e-Government Strategy that had been endorsed 
at the regional meeting 6 months prior, nor the CARICOM 
ICT Connectivity Agenda that it was meant to complement. 
Cabinet Minute 357 of 5 February 2004 Recorded the agreement to implement Phase I of an 
Electronic Document Management System to divisions of 
the Office of the Prime Minister 
Cabinet Minute 433 of 12 February 2004 Recorded the agreement to implement 3 projects under 
the National ICT Plan (namely: fastforward Governance; 
National Broadband Strategy and Implementation; e-
Government Portal) through a contractual arrangement 
with the Government of Canada to hire a firm Consulting 
and Audit Canada. 
Telecommunications (Amendment) Act, 
2004 
This was an important piece of legislation for establishing 
the requisite organisational structures and giving effect to 
provisions outlined in its associated Policy document 
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Summit of the Americas: The IDB Agenda 
to Support the Mandates of the Summits 
of Quebec and Nuevo León (2005) 
Framework document that sets out the IDB agenda for 
supporting the development of member countries in the 
wake of the 2001 and 2004 Summits of the Americas 
Cabinet Minute 122 of 13 January 2005 Confirmed the decision to extend the employment of staff 
in the e-Government Unit, e-Commerce Secretariat and 
National ICT Secretariat, as an interim measure in 
preparation for the creation of the ICT Division of the MPAI 
Cabinet Minute 1298 of 19 May 2005 Confirmed the organisational structure of the newly 
created ICT Division 
Cabinet Minute 3146 of 8 December 
2005 
Recorded the agreement to enter a contract with a state-
owned Special Purpose Company – eTecK – for the 
implementation of Phase II of the Backbone project 
ICT Policy Formulation and eStrategy 
Development – A Comprehensive 
Guidebook (2005) 
A publication of the UNDP-Asia Pacific Development 
Information Programme. The document’s author, Mr. 
Richard Labelle, was sub-contracted by a firm (Goulet 
Telecom) that was hired to conduct ICT governance and 
management capacity building workshops for the National 
ICT Centre and the rest of the Public Service in 2007 
Final Report on “The Development, 
Implementation and Maintenance of a 
Communications Backbone for the Public 
Service” (2005) 
This report was produced by Mr. Kenwyn Austin, upon 
completion of Phase I of the Backbone project. At the time 
of writing, Mr. Austin had just completed a stint as e-
Government Consultant, and the report’s objective was to 
highlight key elements of the implementation, lessons 
learnt, recommendations and next steps. 
BitDepth newspaper articles from May 
2005 to June 2011 (24 articles in total) 
These covered a range of topics ranging from emerging 
choices in the local broadband Internet access market, to 
coverage of the ICT Symposium put on by the Government 
in 2008. Most articles attempted to take a critical stance 
on the issues being highlighted 
Cabinet Minute 1318 of 1 June 2006 Noted that Cabinet reviewed a proposal for IT Policies and 
Guidelines for the continued support of the 
Communications Backbone and referred it to the Finance 
and General Purposes Committee for consideration 
Cabinet Minute 1797 of 20 July 2006 Confirmed the decision to carry out a series of 
enhancement works to the Government Wide Area 
Network (Backbone) in light of a litany of technical issues 
faced during implementation (saturation of internet 
connectivity bandwidth, challenges with operational 
applications, LAN interconnectivity, and lack of site 
readiness for interconnection). Of note, in this document 
Cabinet agreed that the Special Purpose Company to be 
selected for the job might consider selective tendering of 
an appropriate sub-contractor “so as to take advantage of 
the accumulated project knowledge and experience, as 
well as cost savings inherent in such an approach” 
thereby opening the way for the re-selection of the firms 
who had possibly contributed to the technical challenges 
in the first place. 
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Cabinet Minute 38 of 5 January 2006 Recorded the agreement to accept the National Data 
Protection Policy, and instructed the Attorney General to 
make amendments to the Freedom of Information Act 
(1999) to ensure conformity with the principles articulated 
in the Policy, and to prepare the necessary legislation to 
enforce the provisions outlined in the Policy document. 
The document outlined that the Policy’s purpose was to 
“deal with the protection of the right to privacy for citizens 
of Trinidad and Tobago, while ensuring that the 
regulations which mandate certain actions on the part of 
the private sector are not unrealistic and burdensome.” 
The document also outlined that the Policy sought to give 
effect to a number of general principles of Protection of 
Personal Privacy, including: accountability, consent, 
limiting collection, limiting use, and openness. 
Cabinet Minute 39 of 5 January 2006 Recorded the agreement to accept the National Policy on 
Electronic Transactions, and instructed the Attorney 
General to prepare the necessary legislation to enable to 
enforce the provisions outlined in the Policy document. 
In the document e-commerce is identified as “an 
important strategic driver for economic growth” and the 
Policy document was intended to create “a clear and 
predictable legal environment that can be trusted by 
citizens, institutions and businesses”. There was also an 
appeal to international best practice: “common 
approaches have been taken by governments worldwide 
and are built on the principles of media neutrality, 
functional equivalence and technological neutrality”.  
In recognition of the expected reticence in the mainstream 
to accept electronic transactions, the Policy highlighted 
that its provisions were “mostly enabling which allow for a 
particular legal effect, but [did] not impose regulatory 
requirements, so that people will continue to have a 
choice as to whether they use electronic transactions or 
continue with a paper-based environment”. In so doing, 
the Policy’s provisions sought to ensure that “electronic 
communications have the same protection in court as 
paper documents.” 
The Minute went on to recount the specific issues that the 
Policy attempted to pronounce on so as to facilitate the 
adoption of electronic transactions. 
Annual Telecommunications and 
Broadcasting Sector Market Reports 
from 2006 to 2010 
These were produced annually by TATT to chronicle the 
state of the telecommunications and broadcast sectors 
since the commencement of the liberalization process 
Final Report of Contracted Services for 
the Communications Backbone Project 
Implementation Phase II and Related 
Activities (2008) 
This report was produced by Mr. Kenwyn Austin, upon 
completion of Phase II of the Backbone project. Once 
again, Mr. Austin had been retained on a short term 
consultancy to oversee the implementation of the project, 
and once again his report outlined a number of issues and 
recommendations. 
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CARICOM Draft Regional Digital 
Development Strategy (RDDS) 2010-
2014 
This document was a product of the CARICOM Secretariat 
and was produced with funding from the European Union. 
It invoked the WSIS and the Regional Plan of Action, 
eLAC2007, and was framed as the strategy required to give 
effect to those action plans. The document was intended 
to be the Caribbean Region’s ICT Strategy for 
Development, serving to “build the sustainable 
knowledge society in the shortest possible time.” 
A Broadband Network in Support of 
Economic and Social Development 
(2011) 
Concept note produced by Prof. St Clair King that sets out 
his thesis in support of the government building a 
nationwide broadband network in Trinidad and Tobago 
The Information and Computer 
Technologies (2011) 
Concept note produced by Prof. St Clair King to define a 
way forward for ICT as part of a foresighting exercise 
undertaken by the government 
Data Protection Act, 2011 This was an important piece of legislation for establishing 
the requisite organisational structures and giving effect to 
provisions outlined in its associated Policy document 
Electronic Transactions Act, 2011 This was an important piece of legislation for establishing 
the requisite organisational structures and giving effect to 
provisions outlined in its associated Policy document 
Sustainable Development of the ICT 
Sector (2011) 
This was a PowerPoint presentation produced by Mr. 
Bernard Mitchell of eTecK that sought to present a 
snapshot of the country’s development progress, while 
clarify a role for eTecK in future developments. The 
highlight of eTecK’s contribution to that point was the 
Tamana InTech Park which was under construction at the 
time, and was intended to serve as a specialised 
technology park with advanced broadband network 
infrastructure. 
Constitution of the IT Professional 
Society of Trinidad and Tobago (Draft) 
(2013) 
Used to identify this civil society organisation’s objectives, 
and give insight into their perspective on the role of IT in 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Transcript of interview with the 
Administrator of the Trinidad and 
Tobago Network Information Centre 
(TTNIC) conducted by the Trinidad and 
Tobago Computer Society (n.d.) 
Used as a substitute for directly interviewing the TTNIC 
Administrator myself to identify his perspective on the 
role of ICT, and the Internet in particular, in Trinidad and 
Tobago, as well as the role of the government in 
supporting ICT. 
 
